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Abstract
We develop a theory for continuous–time non–Markovian stochastic control problems which are inherently
time–inconsistent. Their distinguishing feature is that the classical Bellman optimality principle no longer holds.
Our formulation is cast within the framework of a controlled non–Markovian forward stochastic differential equa-
tion, and a general objective functional setting. We adopt a game–theoretic approach to study such problems,
meaning that we seek for sub–game perfect Nash equilibrium points. As a first novelty of this work, we introduce
and motivate a new definition of equilibrium that allows us to establish rigorously an extended dynamic program-
ming principle, in the same spirit as in the classical theory. This in turn allows us to introduce a system of
backward stochastic differential equations analogous to the classical HJB equation. We prove that this system is
fundamental, in the sense that its well–posedness is both necessary and sufficient to characterise the value function
and equilibria. As a final step we provide an existence and uniqueness result. Some examples and extensions of
our results are also presented.
Key words: Time inconsistency, consistent planning, non–exponential discounting, mean–variance, backward
stochastic differential equations.
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with developing a general theory to address time–inconsistent stochastic control problems
for sophisticated agents. In particular, we address this task in a continuous–time and non–Markovian framework.
This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first work that studies these problems in such level of generality.
Time–inconsistency has recently redrawn the attention of many academic disciplines, ranging from mathematics to
economics, due to the both the mathematical challenges that rigorously understanding this phenomenon carries,
as well as the need for the development of economic theories that are able explain the behaviour of agents that
fail to comply with the usual rationality assumptions. Indeed, one can find clear evidence of such attitudes in a
number of applications, from consumption problems to finance, from crime to voting, from charitable giving to
labour supply, see Rabin [70] and Dellavigna [20] for detailed reviews. In recent years, the need for thorough studies
of this phenomenon has became more urgent, due notably to the rapid advent of new economies such as e-commerce
and online advertisement.
The distinctive feature in these situations is that human beings do not necessarily behave as what neoclassical
economists refer to perfectly rational decision–makers. Such idealised individuals are aware of their alternatives, form
expectations about any unknowns, have clear preferences, and choose their actions deliberately after some process of
optimisation, see Osborne and Rubinstein [65, Chapter 1]. In reality, their criteria for evaluating their well–being are
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in many cases a lot more involved than the ones considered in the classic literature. For instance, empirical studies
suggest that relative preferences of agents do seem to change with time, see Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue
[31] and Fang and Silverman [30]. Similarly, there is robust evidence of an inclination for imminent gratification even
if accompanied by harmful delayed consequences, see Mehra and Prescoot [58], Friedman and Savage [33], Ellsberg
[29] and Allais [1]. In mathematical terms, this translates into stochastic control problems in which the classic
dynamic programming principle, or in other words the Bellman optimality principle, is not satisfied.
In fact, let us consider the form of pay–off functionals at the core of the continuous–time optimal stochastic control
literature in a non–Markovian framework. Given a time reference t ∈ [0, T ], where T > 0 is a gix time horizon, a
past trajectory x for the state process X , whose path up to t we denote by X·∧t, and an action plan M = (P, ν),
that is to say a probability distribution for X and an action process, the reward derived by an agent is
J(t, x,M) = EP
[ ∫ T
t
fr(X·∧r, νr)dr + ξ(X·∧T )
]
. (1.1)
However, as pointed out by Samuelson [71], ’it is completely arbitrary to assume that the individual behaves so
as to maximise an integral of the form envisaged in (1.1). This involves the assumption that at every instant of
time the individual’s satisfaction depends only upon the action at that time, and that, furthermore, the individual
tries to maximise the sum of instantaneous satisfactions reduced to some comparable base by time discount’. As a
consequence, adds [71], ’the solution to the problem of maximising (1.1) holds only for an agent deciding her actions
throughout the period at the beginning of it, and, as she moves along in time, there is a perspective phenomenon
in that her view of the future in relation to her instantaneous time position remains invariant, rather than her
evaluation of any particular year.[...] Moreover, these results will remain unchanged even if she were to discount
from the existing point of time rather than from the beginning of the period. Therefore, the fact that this is so is in
itself a presumption that individuals do behave in terms of functionals like (1.1)’. Consequently, understanding the
rationale behind the actions of a broader class of economic individuals calls for the incorporation of functionals able
to include the previous one as a special case. This is the motivation behind any theory of time–inconsistency.
Time–inconsistency is generally the fact that marginal rates of substitution between goods consumed at differ-
ent dates change over time, see Strotz [75], Laibson [54], Gul and Pesendorfer [36], Fudenberg and Levine [34],
O’Donoghue and Rabin [63; 64]. For example, the marginal rate of substitution between immediate consumption
and some later consumption is different from what it was when these two dates were seen from a remote prior date.
In many applications, these time–inconsistent preferences introduce a conflict between ’an impatient present self and
a patient future self ’, see Brutscher [11]. In [75], where this phenomenon was first treated, three different types
of agents are described: the pre–committed agent does not revise her initially decided strategy even if that makes
her strategy time–inconsistent; the naive agent revises her strategy without taking future revisions into account
even if that makes her strategy time–inconsistent; the sophisticated agent revises her strategy taking possible future
revisions into account, and by avoiding such makes her strategy time–consistent.
Which type is more relevant depends on the entire framework of the decision in question. Marín-Solano and Navas
[57] comment on which strategies the three different types of agents should use, see also Harris and Laibson [38] and
Vieille and Weibull [79] for explanations of the deep mathematical problems arising in seemingly benign situations,
such as non uniqueness. Indeed, in some applications one is interested in the rational decision–maker who pre–commits
her future behaviour by precluding future options and conforming to her present desire, for instance individuals who
make irrevocable trusts or buy life insurance. This is in stark contrast to the one who, aware of her inconsistency,
searches for strategies where the inconsistency is anticipated and embedded in her decision plan. In this paper we
are interested in the latter type. As an illustrative example, suppose an online ride–sharing platform wants to revise
its contracts scheme as it has noticed a decline in the frequency drivers are available in the platform. The company
is considering to make available different bonus packs whose access depends on the number of rides fulfilled. In such
scenario one could find, due to time–inconsistency, how bonus plans can be designed so as to motivate drivers to fulfil
rides in a short amount of time. This is similar in spirit as to how, with credit cards and non–traditional mortgages,
consumers are motivated to repay their loan fast, and why delaying repayment carries large penalties, see Heidhues
[43] and Eliaz and Splieger [28]. Now, though empirical evidence confirms drivers have indeed time–inconsistent
preferences, this paper is concerned with developing the tools necessary to understand the decision–making behind
time–inconsistent sophisticated drivers, and will not address the contracting situations mentioned above. This is
unarguably the initial step towards designing any kind of contracts for these agents.
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The study of time–inconsistency has a long history. The game–theoretic approach started with [75] where the
phenomena was introduced in a continuous setting and it was proved that preferences are time–consistent if, and
only if, the discount factor representing time preferences is exponential with a constant discount rate. Pollak [68] gave
the right solution to the problem for both naive and sophisticated agents under a logarithmic utility function. For
a long period of time, most of the attention was given to the discrete–time setting introduced by Phelps and Pollak
[67]. This was, presumably, due the unavailability of a well–stated system of equations providing a general method
for solving the problem, at least for sophisticated agents. Nonetheless, the theory for time–inconsistent problems
for sophisticated agents progressed, and results were extended to new frameworks, although this was mostly on a
case–by–case basis. For example, Barro [2] studied a modified version of the neoclassical growth model by including
a variable rate of time preference, and [54] considered the case of quasi–hyperbolic time preferences. Notably,
Basak and Chabakauri [3] treated the mean–variance portfolio problem and derived its time–consistent solution
by cleverly decomposing the nonlinear term and then applying dynamic programming. In addition, Goldman [35]
presented one of the first proofs of existence of an equilibrium under quite general conditions. More recently, [79]
showed how for infinite horizon dynamic optimisation problems with non–exponential discounting, multiplicity of
solutions (with distinct pay–offs) was the rule rather than the exception.
To treat these problems in a systematic way, the series of works carried out by Ekeland and Lazrak [23; 24], and
Ekeland and Pirvu [25] introduced and characterised the first notion of sub–game perfect equilibria in continuous–
time, where the source of inconsistency is non–exponential discounting. [23] consider a deterministic setting, whereas
[24] extend these ideas to Markovian diffusion dynamics. In [25], the authors provide the first existence result
in a Markovian context encompassing the one in their previous works. This was the basis for a general Markovian
theory developed by Björk and Murgoci [6] in discrete–time and Björk, Khapko, and Murgoci [9] in continuous–time.
Inspired by the notion of equilibrium in [24] and their study of the discrete case in [6], in [9] the authors consider a
general Markovian framework with diffusion dynamics for the controlled state process X , and provide a system of
PDEs whose solution allows to construct an equilibrium for the problem. Recently, He and Jiang [40] fills in a missing
step in [9] by deriving rigorously the PDE system and refining the definition of equilibrium. Nonetheless, so far none
of these approaches was able to handle the typical non–Markovian problems that would necessarily arise, for example,
in contracting problems involving a principal and time–inconsistent agents (see Cvitanić, Possamaï, and Touzi [16]).
Simultaneously, extensions have been considered, and unsatisfactory seemingly simple scenarii have been identified.
Björk, Murgoci, and Zhou [7] studycthe time–inconsistent version of the portfolio selection problem for diffusion
dynamics and a mean variance criterion. Czichowsky [17] considers an extension of this problem for general semi–
martingale dynamics. Hu, Jin, and Zhou [45; 46] provide a rigorous characterisation of the linear–quadratic model,
and Huang and Zhou [49] perform a careful study in a Markov chain environment. Regarding the expected utility
paradigm, Karnam, Ma, and Zhang [53] introduce the idea of the ‘dynamic utility’ under which an original time–
inconsistent problem (under the original fixed utility) becomes a time–consistent one. He, Strub, and Zariphopoulou
[42] propose the concept of forward rank–dependent performance processes, by means of the notion of condi-
tional nonlinear expectation introduced by Ma, Wong, and Zhang [56], to incorporate probability distortions with-
out assuming that the model is fully known at initial time. One of the first negative result was introduced by
Landriault, Li, Li, and Young [55], here the authors present an example, stemming from a mean variance investment
problem, in which uniqueness of the equilibrium via the PDE characterisation of [6] fails.
A different approach is presented in Yong [84] and Wei, Yong, and Yu [81], where, in the framework of recursive
utilities, an equilibrium is defined as a limit of discrete–time games leading to a system of forward–backward SDEs.
Building upon the analysis in [81], Wang and Yong [80] consider the case where the cost functional is determined by
a backward stochastic Volterra integral equation (BSVIE, for short) which covers the general discounting situation
with a recursive feature. A Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation (HJB equation, for short) is associated in order to
obtain a verification result. Moreover, Wang and Yong [80] establish the well–posedness of the HJB equation and
derive a probabilistic representation in terms of a novel type of BSVIEs. As explained in Section 3.3, for the class
of problems considered in this paper, our approach helps making explicit the connection between time–inconsistent
problems and BSVIEs. Han and Wong [37] study the case where the state variable follows a Volterra process and, by
associating an extended path–dependent Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation system, obtains a verification theorem.
Finally, Mei and Zhu [59] deals with a class of time–inconsistent control problems for McKean-Vlasov dynamics
which are, for example, a natural framework to study mean–variance problems.
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When it comes to time–inconsistent stopping problems, recent works have progressed significantly in understand-
ing this setting, yet many peculiarities and questions remain open. A novel treatment of optimal stopping for a
Markovian diffusion process with a payoff functional involving probability distortions, for both naïve and sophis-
ticated agents, is carried out by Huang, Nguyen-Huu, and Zhou [48]. Huang and Zhou [47] consider a stopping
problem under non–exponential discounting, and looks for an optimal equilibrium, one which generates larger val-
ues than any other equilibrium does on the entire state space. He, Hu, Obłój, and Zhou [41] study the problem of
a pre–committed gambler and compare his behaviour to that of a naïve one. Another series of works is that of
Christensen and Lindensjö [13; 14; 12] and Bayraktar, Zhang, and Zhou [4]. [13] study a discrete–time Markov chain
stopping problem and propose a definition of sub–game perfect Nash equilibrium for which necessary and sufficient
equilibrium conditions are derived, and an equilibrium existence result is obtained. They extend their study to
the continuous setting by considering diffusion dynamics in [14], and study in [12] a moment constrained version
of the optimal dividend problem for which both the pre–committed and sub–game perfect solutions are studied.
Independently, [4] studied a continuous Markov chain process and propose another notion of equilibrium. The au-
thors thoroughly obtain the relation between the notions of optimal–mild, weak and strong equilibrium introduced
in [48], [14] and [4], respectively, and provide a novel iteration method which directly constructs an optimal–mild
equilibrium bypassing the need to first find all mild–equilibria. Notably, Tan, Wei, and Zhou [76] gives an example
of nonexistence of an equilibrium stopping plan. On the other hand, Nutz and Zhang [62] provide a first approach
to the recently introduced conditional optimal stopping problems which are inherently time–inconsistent.
The contributions of this paper can be summarised as follows, see Section 3 for detailed statements. First, regarding
the set–up of the problem, we present the first treatment of non–Markovian time–inconsistent stochastic control
problems in which the dynamics of the controlled state process are prescribed in weak formulation, and control
on both the drift and the volatility are allowed. As already mentioned, we chose to address time–inconsistent
control problems from a sophisticated agent point of view, and seek for equilibrium actions. Keeping in mind
the rationale behind such agents and reviewing the existing literature, we found a common assertion among both
economists and mathematicians: ‘[The] problem [of a sophisticated agent] is then to find the best plan among those
that [she] will actually follow,’ see [75]. This indicates that the agent is to choose a plan so as to coordinate her
future preferences, and therefore, the equilibrium action is time–consistent. Consequently, the value associated to
an equilibrium is expected to satisfy a dynamic programming principle (DPP for short). However, both a proper
statement and a rigorous proof of such property were absent in the existing literature, the closest being a one–step
DPP in the discrete–time framework of [6]. Motivated by this goal, we propose a novel definition of equilibrium,
which, despite the fact that it borrows from the ones available in the literature, also incorporates a distinctive local
feature, see Definition 2.6. This turn out to be the correct property in order to rigorously prove an extended DPP,
see Theorem 3.2. This is the central contribution to the theory of time–inconsistent control problems of this paper
and the starting point for our study of these problems. Once a DPP is available, we can naturally associate a system
of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs for short) to it, see System (H). This system features the same
fully coupled structure known in the Markovian environment, and agrees with the corresponding PDE system known
in such framework, see Theorem 3.7. Naturally, we address the question of stating what a solution to the system
is, see 3.6, and we are able to obtain a verification result, see Theorem 3.11. Moreover, another novel result of this
paper is that (H) is, at the same time, necessary to the study of this problem, see Theorem 3.9. By this we mean
that given an equilibrium, its corresponding value function is naturally associated to a solution to (H). In particular,
we prove that an equilibrium must necessarily maximise the Hamiltonian functional of the agent. Consequently, (H)
is fundamental to the study of time–inconsistent control problems for sophisticated agents. Finally, we provide a
well–posedness result in the case where the volatility of the state process is not controlled, see Theorem 3.14.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the formulation of the problem. It presents our probabilistic
framework, motivates a game formulation to time–inconsistent non–Markovian stochastic control problems, and
introduces our novel definition of equilibrium. Section 3 is dedicated to state and describe our results, and to
compare our definition of equilibrium with the ones available in the literature. Section 4 presents direct extensions
of our model to more general reward functionals, while Section 5 works out some examples. Section 6 takes care of
rigorously proving the extend dynamic programming principle. Section 7 contains the analysis and main results of
the proposed methodology, that is to say the necessity and the sufficiency of (H) in a general setting. Additionally,
the appendix includes the proof of the well–posedness of System (H) in the case when only drift control is allowed,
as well as some auxiliary and technical results.
Notations: Throughout this document we take the convention ∞−∞ := −∞, and we fix a time horizon T > 0.
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R+ and R⋆+ denote the sets of non–negative and positive real numbers, respectively. Given (E, ‖ · ‖) a Banach space,
a positive integer p, and a non–negative integer q, Cpq (E) (resp. C
p
q,b(E)) will denote the space of functions from E
to Rp which are at least q times continuously differentiable (resp. and bounded with bounded derivatives). We set
Cq,b(E) := C1q,b(E), i.e. the space of q times continuously differentiable bounded functions with bounded derivatives
from E to R . Whenever E = [0, T ] (resp. q = 0 or b is not specified), we suppress the dependence on E (resp. on
q or b), e.g. Cp denotes the space of continuous functions from [0, T ] to Rp. For ϕ ∈ Cpq (E) with q ≥ 2, ∂
2
xxϕ will
denote its Hessian. For a function φ : [0, T ]× E with s 7−→ φ(s, α) uniformly continuous uniformly in α, we denote
by ρφ : [0, T ] −→ R its modulus of continuity, which we recall satisfies ρφ(ℓ) −→ 0 as ℓ ↓ 0. For (u, v) ∈ Rp × Rp,
u · b will denote their usual inner product, and |u| the corresponding norm. For positive integers m and n, we denote
by Mm,n(R) the space of m × n matrices with real entries. By 0m,n and In we denote the m × n matrix of zeros
and the identity matrix of Mn(R) := Mn,n(R), respectively. S+n (R) denotes the set of n × n symmetric positive
semi–definite matrices. Tr[M ] denotes the trace of a matrix M ∈Mn(R).
For (Ω,F) a measurable space, Prob(Ω) denotes the collection of all probability measures on (Ω,F). For a filtration
F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] on (Ω,F), Pprog(E,F) (resp. Ppred(E,F), Popt(E,F)) will denote the set of E–valued, F–progressively
measurable processes (resp. F–predictable processes, F–optional processes). For P ∈ Prob(Ω) and a filtration F,
FP := (FPt )t∈[0,T ], denotes the P–augmentation of F. We recall that for any t ∈ [0, T ], F
P
t := Ft ∨ σ(N
P), where
N P := {N ⊆ Ω : ∃B ∈ F , N ⊆ B and P[B] = 0}. With this, the probability measure P can be extended so
that (Ω,F ,FP,P) becomes a complete probability space, see Karatzas and Shreve [52, Chapter II.7]. FP+ denotes
the right limit of FP, i.e. FPt+ :=
⋂
ε>0 F
P
t+ε, t ∈ [0, T ), and F
P
T+ := F
P
T , so that F
P
+ is the minimal filtration
that contains F and satisfies the usual conditions. Moreover, given P ⊆ Prob(Ω) we introduce the set of P–
polar sets NP := {N ⊆ Ω : N ⊆ B, for some B ∈ F with supP∈P P[B] = 0}, as well as the P–completion of
F, FP := (FPt )t∈[0,T ], with F
P
t := Ft ∨ σ(N
P ), t ∈ [0, T ] together with the corresponding right–continuous limit
FP+ := (F
P
t+)t∈[0,T ], with F
P
t+ :=
⋂
ε>0 F
P
t+ε, t ∈ [0, T ), and F
P
T+ := F
P
T . For {s, t} ⊆ [0, T ], with s ≤ t, Ts,t(F)
denotes the collection of [t, T ]–valued F–stopping times.
Given x ∈ Cp, we denote by x·∧t the path of x stopped at time t, i.e. x·∧t := (x(r ∧ t), r ≥ 0). Given (x, x˜) ∈ Cp×Cp
and t ∈ [0, T ], we define their concatenation x ⊗t x˜ ∈ Cp by (x ⊗t x˜)(r) := x(r)1{r≤t} + (x(t) + x˜(r) − x˜(t))1{r≥t},
r ∈ [0, T ]. Given P ∈ Prob(Ω), consider Z an F–predictable process and X an (F,P)–semi–martingale, both taking
values in Rp. We set Z •Xt :=
∫ t
0
Zr · dXr, t ∈ [0, T ].
Additionally, given A ⊆ Rk, A denotes the collection of finite and positive Borel measures on [0, T ] × A whose
projection on [0, T ] is the Lebesgue measure. In other words, any q ∈ A can be disintegrated as q(dt, da) = qt(da)dt,
for an appropriate Borel measurable kernel qt which is unique up to (Lebesgue) almost everywhere equality. We are
particularly interested in the set A0, of q ∈ A of the form q = δφt(da)dt, where δφ the Dirac mass at a Borel function
φ : [0, T ] −→ A.
2 Problem formulation
2.1 Probabilistic framework
Let d and n be two positive integers, and X := Cd. We will work on the canonical space Ω := X × Cn × A, whose
elements we will denote generically by ω := (x,w, q) and with canonical process (X,W,Λ), where
Xt(ω) := x(t), Wt(ω) := w(t), Λ(ω) := q, (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω.
X and Cd are endowed with the topology T∞, induced by the norm ‖x‖∞ := sup0≤t≤T |x(t)|, x ∈ X , while A is
endowed with the topology Tw induced by weak convergence which we recall is metrisable, for instance, by the
Prohorov metric, see Stroock and Varadhan [74, Theorem 1.1.2]. With these norms, both spaces are Polish.
For (t, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ]× Cb([0, T ]×A), we define
∆t[ϕ] :=
∫∫
[0,t]×A
ϕ(r, a)Λ(dr, da), so that ∆t[ϕ](ω) =
∫∫
[0,t]×A
ϕ(r, a)qr(da)dr, for any ω ∈ Ω.
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We denote by F the Borel σ–field on Ω. In this paper, we will work with the filtrations F := (Ft)t∈[0,T ] and
FX := (FXt )t∈[0,T ] defined for t ∈ [0, T ] by
Ft := σ
(
(Xr,Wr ,∆r[ϕ]) : (r, ϕ) ∈ [0, t]× Cb([0, T ]×A)
)
, FXt := σ
(
(Xr,∆r[ϕ]) : (r, ϕ) ∈ [0, t]× Cb([0, T ]×A)
)
.
Additionally, we will work with processes ψ : [0, T ]×X −→ E, (t, x) 7−→ ψ(t, x), for E some Polish space, which areG–
optional, with G an arbitrary filtration, i.e. Popt(E,G)–measurable. In particular, these processes are automatically
non–anticipative, that is to say, ψr(X) := ψr(X·∧r) for any r ∈ [0, T ]. We denote by πX the canonical projection
from Ω to X and let πX#P := P ◦ (π
X )−1 denote the push–forward of P. As the previous processes are defined on
[0, T ]×X ( [0, T ]× Ω, we emphasise that throughout this paper, the assertion
’P– a.e.x ∈ X ’, will always mean that
(
πX#P
)
[X ] = 1. (2.1)
P ∈ Prob(Ω) will be called a semi–martingale measure if X is an (F,P)–semi–martingale. By Karandikar [51], there
then exists an F–predictable process, denoted by 〈X〉 = (〈X〉t)t∈[0,T ], which coincides with the quadratic variation of
X , P– a.s., for every semi–martingale measure P. Thus, we can introduce the d× d symmetric positive semi–definite
matrix σ̂ as the square root of σ̂2 given by
σ̂2t := lim sup
εց0
〈X〉t − 〈X〉t−ε
ε
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.2)
2.2 Conditioning and concatenation of probability measures
In this section, we recall the celebrated result on the existence of a well–behaved ω–by–ω version of the conditional
expectation. We also introduce the concatenation of a measure and a stochastic kernel. These objects are key for
the statement of our results in the level of generality we are working with.
Recall Ω is a Polish space and F is a countably generated σ–algebra. For P ∈ Prob(Ω) and τ ∈ T0,T (F), Fτ is also
countably generated, so there exists an associated regular conditional probability distribution (r.c.p.d. for short)
(Pτω)ω∈Ω, see [74, Theorem 1.3.4], satisfying
(i) for every ω ∈ Ω, Pτω is a probability measure on (Ω,F);
(ii) for every E ∈ F , the mapping ω 7−→ Pτω[E] is Fτ–measurable;
(iii) the family (Pτω)ω∈Ω is a version of the conditional probability measure of P given Fτ , that is to say for every
P–integrable, F–measurable random variable ξ, we have EP[ξ|Fτ ](ω) = EP
τ
ω [ξ], for P– a.e. ω ∈ Ω;
(iv) for every ω ∈ Ω, Pτω[Ω
ω
τ ] = 1, where Ω
ω
τ := {ω
′ ∈ Ω : ω′(r) = ω(r), 0 ≤ r ≤ τ(ω)}.
Moreover, for P ∈ Prob(Ω) and an Fτ–measurable stochastic kernel (Qτω)ω∈Ω such that Q
τ
ω[Ω
ω
τ ] = 1 for every ω ∈ Ω,
the concatenated probability measure is defined by
P⊗τ Q·[A] :=
∫
Ω
P(dω)
∫
Ω
1A(ω ⊗τ(ω) ω˜)Qω(dω˜), ∀A ∈ F . (2.3)
The following result, see [74, Theorem 6.1.2], gives a rigorous characterisation of the concatenation procedure.
Theorem 2.1 (Concatenated measure). Consider a stochastic kernel (Qω)ω∈Ω, and let τ ∈ T0,T (F). Suppose the
map ω 7−→ Qω is Fτ–measurable and Qω[Ωωτ ] = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. Given P ∈ Prob(Ω), there is a unique probability
measure P ⊗τ(·) Q· on (Ω,F) such that P ⊗τ(·) Q· equals P on (Ω,Fτ ) and (δω ⊗τ(ω) Qω)ω∈Ω is an r.c.p.d. of
P⊗τ(·) Q·|Fτ . In particular, for some t ∈ [0, T ], suppose that τ ≥ t, that M : [t, T ]×Ω −→ R is a right–continuous,
F–progressively measurable function after t, such that Mt is P⊗τ(·)Q·–integrable, that for all r ∈ [t, T ], (Mr∧τ )r∈[t,T ]
is an (F,P)–martingale, and that (Mr −Mr∧τ(ω))r∈[t,T ] is an (F,Qω)–martingale, for all ω ∈ Ω. Then (Mr)r∈[t,T ] is
an (F,P⊗τ(·) Q·)–martingale.
In particular, if ξ is an F–measurable function, we have EP⊗τP
τ
· [ξ] = EP[EP[ξ|Fτ ]] = EP[ξ]. This is nothing elese
than the classical tower property. We also mention that the reverse implication in the last statement in Theorem 2.1
holds as a direct consequence of [74, Theorem 1.2.10].
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2.3 Controlled state dynamics
Let k be a positive integer, and let A ⊆ Rk. An action process ν is an FX–predictable process taking values in
A. Given an action process ν, the controlled state equation is given by the stochastic differential equation (SDE for
short)
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X, νr)
(
br(X, νr)dr + dWr
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.4)
where W is an n–dimensional Brownian motion, x0 ∈ Rd, and
σ : [0, T ]×X ×A −→Md,n(R), is bounded, and (t, x) 7−→ σ(t, x, a) is FX–optional for any a ∈ A,
b : [0, T ]×X ×A −→ Rn, is bounded, (t, x) 7−→ b(t, x, a) is FX–optional for any a ∈ A.
(2.5)
In this work we characterise the controlled state equation in terms of weak solutions to (2.4). These are elegantly
introduced via the so-called martingale problems, see [74, Chapter 6]. Let X := (X,W ) and σ : [0, T ] × X −→
Mn+d(R) given by
σ :=
(
σ 0d,n
In 0n,d
)
,
For any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , we define P(t, x) as the collection of P ∈ Prob(Ω) such that
(i) there exists w ∈ Cn such that P ◦ (X·∧t,W·∧t)−1 = δ(x·∧t,w·∧t);
(ii) for all ϕ ∈ C2,b(Rd+n), the process Mϕ : [t, T ]× Ω −→ R defined by
Mϕr := ϕ(Xr)−
∫∫
[t,r]×A
1
2
Tr
[
(σσ⊤)u(X, a)(∂2xxϕ)(Xu)
]
Λ(du, da), r ∈ [t, T ], (2.6)
is an (F,P)–local martingale;
(iii) P[Λ ∈ A0] = 1.
There are classical conditions ensuring that the set P(t, x) is non–empty. For instance, it is enough that the mapping
x 7−→ σt(x, a) is continuous for some constant control a, see [74, Theorem 6.1.6]. We also recall that uniqueness of a
solution, i.e. there is a unique element in P(t, x) , holds when in addition σσ⊤t (x, a) is uniformly positive away from
zero, i.e. there is λ > 0 s.t. θ⊤σσ⊤t (x, a)θ ≥ λ|θ|
2, (t, x, θ) ∈ [0, T ]×X × Rd, see [74, Theorem 7.1.6].
Given P ∈ P(x) := P(0, x), W is an n–dimensional P–Brownian motion and there is an A−valued process ν such
that
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X, νr)dWr , t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s. (2.7)
Remark 2.2. We remark some properties of the previous martingale problem which, in particular, justify (2.7)
(i) for any P ∈ P(t, x) and ν verifying P[Λ ∈ A0] = 1, (2.6) implies
σ̂2r = (σσ
⊤)r(X, νr), dr ⊗ dP– a.e., on [t, T ]× Ω; (2.8)
(ii) we highlight the fact that our approach is to enlarge the canonical space right from the beginning of the formu-
lation. This is in contrast to, for instance, El Karoui and Tan [27, Remark 1.6], where the canonical space is
taken as X × A and enlargements are considered as properly needed. As P(t, x) ought to describe the law of
X as in (2.7), this cannot be done unless the canonical space is extended. We feel our approach simplifies the
readability and understanding of the analysis at no extra cost. Indeed, the extra canonical process W allows us
to get explicitly the existence of a P–Brownian motion by virtue of Lévy’s characterisation. By [74, Theorem
4.5.2] and (2.8), since(
σ 0
In 0
)(
σ⊤ In
0 0
)
=
(
σ̂2 σ
σ⊤ In
)
, it follows
(
Xt
Wt
)
=
(
x0
w0
)
+
∫ t
0
(
σ 0
In 0
)
dWs, t ∈ [0, T ]; (2.9)
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(iii) the reader might notice that the notation P(t, x) does not specify an initial condition for neither the process
W , nor for the measure valued process Λ. Arguably, given our choice of Ω, one is naturally led to introduce
P(t, ω), with initial condition ω = (x,w, q) ∈ Ω. Nevertheless, by (2.6) and (2.9), we see that the dynamics of
X depends on the increments of the application [0, T ] ∋ t 7−→ ∆t[σσ⊤](ω) ∈Md(R) for ω ∈ Ω. It is clear from
this that the initial condition on W and Λ are irrelevant. This yields P(t, ω) = P(t, ω˜) for all ω˜ = (x, w˜, q˜) ∈ Ω.
We now introduce the class of admissible actions. We let A denote the set of A−valued and FX−predictable processes.
At the formal level, we will say ν ∈ A is admissible whenever (2.7) has a unique weak solution. A proper definition
requires first to introduce some additional notations. We will denote by (Pνt,x)(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X the corresponding family
of solutions associated to ν. Moreover, we recall that uniqueness guarantees the measurability of the application
(t, x) 7−→ Pνt,x, see [74, Exercise 6.7.4]. For (t, x,P) ∈ [0, T ]×X × P(t, x), we define
A0(t, x,P) :=
{
ν ∈ A : Λ(dr, da) = δνr (da)dr, dr ⊗ dP– a.e. on [t, T ]× Ω
}
,
M0(t, x) :=
{
(P, ν) ∈ P(t, x)×A0(t, x,P)
}
, and P0(t, x, ν) :=
{
P ∈ Prob(Ω) : (P, ν) ∈M0(t, x)
}
.
Letting A0(t, x) :=
⋃
P∈P(t,x)A
0(t, x,P), we define rigorously the class of admissible actions
A(t, x) :=
{
ν ∈ A0(t, x) : P0(t, x, ν) = {Pνt,x}
}
. (2.10)
We set A(x) := A(0, x) and define similarly, A(t, x,P), P(t, x, ν), M(t, x), A(x,P), M(x) and P(x, ν).
Remark 2.3. (i) We remark that the sets M(t, x) and A(t, x) are equivalent parametrisations of the admissible
solutions to (2.7). This follows since uniqueness of weak solutions for fixed actions implies the sets A(t, x,P)
are disjoint, i.e.
A(t, x) =
⋃
·
P∈P(t,x)
A(t, x,P).
(ii) The convenience of introducing the sets A(t, x,P) is that it allows us to better handle action processes for which
the quadratic variation of X is the same. For different P ∈ P(t, x) the discrepancy among such probability
measures can be read from (2.8), i.e. in the (support of the) quadratic variation of X. This reflects the fact
that different diffusion coefficients of (2.7) might induce mutually singular probability measures in P(t, x). We
also recall that in general P(t, x) is not finite since it is a convex set, see Jacod and Shiryaev [50, Proposition
III.2.8].
Remark 2.4. (i) Since b is bounded, it follows that given (P, ν) ∈M(x), if we define M := (P
ν
, ν) with
dP
ν
dP
:= exp
(∫ T
0
br(X, νr) · dWr −
∫ T
0
|br(X, νr)|2dr
)
, andWMt :=Wt −
∫ t
0
br(X, νr)dr, t ∈ [0, T ],
we have that WM is a P
ν
–Brownian motion, and
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X, νr)
(
br(X, νr)dr + dW
M
r
)
, P
ν
– a.s.
(ii) We will exploit the previous fact and often work under the drift–less dynamics (2.7). We stress that in contrast
to the strong formulation setting, in the weak formulation the state process X is fixed and the action process ν
allows to control the distribution of X via P
ν
.
In light of the previous discussion, we define the collection of admissible models with initial conditions (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X
M(t, x) :=
{
(P
ν
, ν) : (P, ν) ∈M(t, x)
}
.
and we setM(x) :=M(0, x). To ease notations we set Tt,T := Tt,T (F), for any τ ∈ T0,T , Pτ· := (P
τ
ω)ω∈Ω, and for any
(τ, ω) ∈ T0,T × Ω, P(τ, x) := P(τ(ω), x), M(τ, x) := M(τ(ω), x), and M(τ, x) :=M(τ(ω), x).
We will take advantage in the rest of this paper of the fact that we can move freely from objects in M to their
counterparts in M, see Lemma A.4.2. Also, we mention that we will make a slight abuse of notation, and denote by
M elements in both M(t, x) and M(t, x). It will be clear from the context whether M refers to a model for (2.4), or
the drift–less dynamics (2.7).
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2.4 Objective functional
Let us introduce the running and terminal cost functionals
f : [0, T ]× [0, T ]×X ×A −→ R, Borel measurable, with f·(s, ·, a) FX–optional, for any (s, a) ∈ [0, T ]×A;
ξ : [0, T ]×X −→ R, Borel measurable.
We are interested in a generic pay–off functional of the form
J(t, x, ν) := EP
ν
[∫ T
t
fr(t,X, νr)dr + ξ(t,X·∧T )
]
, (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×A(t, x).
Remark 2.5. (i) As we work on an enlarged probability space, one might wonder whether the value of the reward
under both formulations coincide or not. We recall that we chose to enlarge the canonical space, see Section 2.3,
to explicitly account for the randomness driving (2.4), i.e. the process W . Nevertheless, as for any ω ∈ Ω and
M ∈ M(t, x), the latter depends only on x, see Remark 2.2, we see that given M, J is completely specified by
(t, x).
(ii) Given the form of the pay–off functional J , the problem of maximising A(x) ∋ ν 7−→ J(0, x, ν) has a time–
inconsistent nature. More precisely, the dependence of both f and F on the current time t is here the source of
inconsistency.
Due to the nature of the pay–off functional, the classic dynamic programming principle falls apart, and the action
prescribed by a maximiser is in general not optimal at future times. In this work, out of the three approaches to
time–inconsistency, namely naive, pre–committed and sophisticated planning, we adopt the latter. Thus, we study
this problem from a game–theoretic perspective and look for equilibrium laws. The next section is dedicated to
explaining these concepts more thoroughly.
2.5 Game formulation
In order to define a game, say G, one has to specify, see Osborne and Rubinstein [65]: a set of I players; a set
of decision nodes D; a specification of the unique immediate predecessor Υ; a set of actions Θ; a set H forming
a partition of D referred to as information sets; a function H : D 7−→ H that assigns each decision node into an
information set; a probability distribution P on (Ω,F ,F) that dictates nature’s moves and the rewards J.
Let x ∈ X , D := {(s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× [0, T ]×X : s = t and x(0) = x(0)}, H :=
{
{z} : z ∈ D
}
and z 7−→ H(z) := {z} ∈
H. Defining Υ is one of the bottlenecks in a continuum setting which we address via our definition of equilibrium.
We define the game G := {[0, T ], [0, T ],A,H,H, (Ω,F ,F,P), J} as a non–cooperative game in which
(i) we have one player for each point in time s ∈ [0, T ], we refer to this player as ‘Player s’;
(ii) at time t = s, Player s can control the process X exactly at time t. She does that by choosing an admissible
action model, (P
ν
, ν) ∈ M(t,X·∧t), after negotiating with future versions of herself, i.e. s ∈ [t, T ];
(iii) when all players reach a ‘successful’ negotiation, we end up with an action model
(
P
ν⋆
, ν⋆
)
∈ M(x);
(iv) the reward to Player s is given by J
(
s, s,X·∧s, ν
⋆
)
, where following [6], we introduce
J(s, t, x, ν) := EP
ν
[ ∫ T
t
fr(s,X, νr)dr + ξ(s,X·∧T )
]
, (s, t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]× [s, T ]×X ×A(s, x). (2.11)
To motivate the concept of equilibrium law we will introduce in the sequel, we recall the idea behind the concept
of a Nash equilibrium. An action profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can do better by unilaterally deviating
from her strategy while the other players still play the equilibrium. In other words, imagine that each player asks
herself: ‘knowing the strategies of the others, and treating them as fixed, can I benefit by changing my strategy?’. If
the answer is no, then the current combination of strategies is a Nash equilibrium. In the context of dynamic games,
the concept of sub–game perfection has been commonly adopted, see [65]. To introduce this concept we recall that
a sub–game is any part, i.e. subset, of a game that satisfies
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• the initial decision node is in a singleton information set, which means that only one possible sequence of
actions could have led to the sub–game’s initial decision node;
• if a decision node is contained in the sub–game, then so are all of its subsequent decision nodes;
• if a decision node in a particular information set is in the sub–game, then all members of that information set
belong to the sub–game.
In our framework, the first condition translates into the fact that every player, together with a past trajectory, define
a new sub–game. In the particular case of the first player, i.e. s = 0, we will write, now and in the following, x ∈ X
so that the initial decision node is well defined. Note this corresponds to fixing an initial value for the trajectories
of X . The last two conditions imply that, given a player s ∈ [0, T ], every sub–game of which a subsequent player
s ≤ t ≤ T is part of, must be part of the sub–game defined by s. These three conditions together yield sub–games
of the form [s, T ], together with a past trajectory. A strategy profile is therefore sub–game perfect if it prescribes
a Nash equilibrium in any sub–game. This motivates the idea behind the definition of an equilibrium model, see
among others [75], [23] and [5].
Let x ∈ X , ν⋆ ∈ A(x) be an action, which is a candidate for an equilibrium, (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω an arbitrary initial
condition, ℓ ∈ (0, T − t], τ ∈ Tt,t+ℓ and ν ∈ A(τ, x). We define
ν ⊗τ ν
⋆ := ν1[t,τ) + ν
⋆1[τ,T ].
Definition 2.6 (Equilibrium). Let x ∈ X , ν⋆ ∈ A(x). For ε > 0 let
ℓε := inf
{
ℓ > 0 : ∃P ∈ P(x), P
[{
(t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×A(t, x) : J
(
t, t, x, ν⋆
)
< J
(
t, t, x, ν ⊗t+ℓ ν
⋆
)
− εℓ
}]
> 0
}
.
If for any ε > 0, ℓε > 0 then ν⋆ is an equilibrium model, and we write ν⋆ ∈ E(x).
Remark 2.7. We now make a few remarks regarding our definition
(i) The first advantage of Definition 2.6 is that ℓε is monotone in ε. Indeed, let 0 < ε′ ≤ ε, then by definition, ℓε
satisfies the condition in the definition of ℓε′ , thus ℓε′ ≤ ℓε.
(ii) We chose A(t, x) for the class of actions to be compared to in the equilibrium condition. One could have chosen
instead
A(t, x, t + ℓ) :=
{
ν ∈ A(t, x) : ν ⊗t+ℓ ν⋆ ∈ A(t, x)
}
, (2.12)
as it was actually considered in [25]. Clearly, A(t, x, t+ ℓ) ⊆ A(t, x) for ℓ > 0 and, a priori, A(t, x, t+ ℓ) could
be considered as a more sensible choice, since there is no guarantee that ν⊗t+ℓ ν⋆ ∈ A(t, x) for any ν ∈ A(t, x).
It turns out that under the assumption of weak uniqueness, this is indeed the case, see Lemma A.4.1.
(iii) From the definition, given (ε, ℓ) ∈ R⋆+ × (0, ℓε), for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X and any (t, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×A(t, x)
J(t, t, x, ν⋆)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+ℓ ν⋆) ≥ −εℓ. (2.13)
From this we can better appreciate two distinguishing features of our definition. The fist one is that (2.13) holds
for P(x)– q.e.x ∈ X . This is in contrast to [6] and [40], where the rewards are respectively compared for all
x ∈ X and x in the support of Pν
⋆
∈ P(x). The approach in [6] is too stringent as it might impose a condition
on trajectories that are not reachable by any admissible action. On the other hand, requiring it to hold only in
the support of the probability measure associated with the equilibrium might lead to situations which fail to be
sub–game perfect. Our choice is motivated by the rationale behind sub–game perfection, i.e. a sub–game perfect
equilibrium should prescribed a (ε)–Nash equilibrium in any possible sub–game, i.e. for P(x)− q.e.x ∈ X . The
second one is that Definition 2.6 imposes (2.13) for all ℓ < ℓε. This local feature had not been considered in the
literature and it will be key to rigorously prove that these equilibria lead to an extended DPP, see Section 3.1
for more details.
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(iv) Alternatively, we could have introduced ℓε,t,ν > 0, i.e. let the choice of ℓ depend on ε, t and ν, via (2.13), which
we will refer here as lax equilibria. These equilibria are in close connection with the current standard definition
of equilibrium in the Markovian context. Furthermore, we could have also considered strict equilibria as those
lax equilibria for which (2.13) holds with ε = 0. While this document was being finalised, we were made aware of
the works [49] and [40] where this last notion of equilibrium, referred there as regular equilibrium, was studied.
See once more Section 3.1 for a discussion on how we compare our definition to this and other notions of
equilibria in the literature.
(v) In addition, one could analyse something that we would coin f–equilibria. This corresponds to considering,
for a given increasing right–continuous function f : R⋆+ −→ R+ with f(ℓ) −→ 0 as ℓ −→ 0, the criterion
J(t, t, x, ν⋆)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+ℓ ν⋆) ≥ −εf(ℓ), for any 0 < ℓ < ℓε.
With this one could study the optimal speed at which the term on the left–hand side converges to zero. It is
known that provided extra regularity of the action process, f would be in general linear in ℓ. Nevertheless, as
in this work the action processes are only measurable, in general, f needs to be appropriately chosen, and it
need not be linear in ℓ. In the case of strict equilibria, [40, Theorems 1 and 2] state sufficient conditions on
the data of the problem for the term on the left hand side in the above inequality to be a linear ( or quadratic)
decreasing function of ℓ, respectively. Insights on how f is related to the dynamics of X can be drawn from [17],
where X is a general semi–martingale. Motivated by the Dambis–Dubins–Schwartz theorem on time–change for
continuous martingales, see [52, Theorem III.4.6], the quadratic variation of the controlled process is exploited
to define an equilibria. See again Section 3.1 for more details.
In the rest of the document we fix x ∈ X and study the problem
v(t, x) := J(t, t, x, ν⋆), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , ν⋆ ∈ E(x). (P)
The previous function is well–defined for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X and measurable. This follows from the weak uniqueness
assumption.
Remark 2.8. We emphasise that (P) is fundamentally different from the problem of maximising A(t, x) ∋ ν 7−→
J(t, t, x, ν). First, (P) is solved by finding ν⋆ ∈ A(x) and then defining the value function. This contrasts with the
classical formulation of optimal control problems. Second, the previous maximisation problem will correspond to find-
ing the pre–committed strategy for player t, i.e. solving an optimal control problem for which dynamic programming
does not hold.
In fact, given the sequential nature of G, our definition of equilibrium which compares rewards on sub–games of the
form [t, T ] via coalitions among players [t, t + ℓ], is compatible with sub–game perfection. Indeed, to find her best
response, Player t reasons as follows: for any τ ∈ [t, t+ ℓε) knowing that Players [τ, T ] are following the equilibrium
ν⋆, i.e. the sub–game [τ, T ] is following the equilibrium, and treating the actions of those players as fixed, the action
prescribed by the equilibrium to Player t is such that she is doing at least as good as in any coalition/deviation ν
from the equilibrium with players t+ ℓ ∈ [t, τ), give or take εℓ. This allows us to interpret the equilibrium as Player
t’s ε–best response for all sub–games containing [t, T ] via coalitions. Consequently the equilibrium agrees with an ε
sub–game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Additionally, note that according to our definition, if ν⋆ is an equilibrium action model for the game [0, T ], by sub–
game perfection it is also an equilibrium for [t, T ]. Indeed, this follows immediately from the fact ℓε in Definition 2.6
is uniform in t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, we expect the value of the game to be time–consistent. This feature motivates
why these type of solutions are referred in the literature as consistent plans, see [75].
3 Related work and our results
As a preliminary to the presentation of our contributions, this section starts by comparing our setting with the ones
considered in the extant literature.
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3.1 On the different notions of equilibrium
We now make a few comments on our definition of equilibria, its relevance and compare it with the ones previously
proposed. Let us begin by recalling the set–up adopted by most of the existing literature in continuous time–
inconsistent stochastic control.
Given T > 0, on the time interval [0, T ] a fixed filtered probability space
(
Ω,FW ,FWT ,P
)
supporting a Brownian
motion W is given. Here, FW denotes the P–augmented Brownian filtration. Let A denote the set of admissible
actions and G a (possibly) smaller filtration than FW . For a G–adapted process ν ∈ A, representing an action
process, the state process X is given by the unique strong solution to the SDE
dX0,x0,νt = bt(X
0,x0,ν
t , νt)dt+ σt(X
0,x0,ν
t , νt)dWt, for t ∈ [0, T ], X
0,x0,ν
0 = x0. (3.1)
As introduced in [25], ν⋆ is then said to be an equilibrium if for all (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×A
lim inf
ℓց0
J(t, t, x, ν⋆)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+ℓ ν⋆)
ℓ
≥ 0.
If we examine closely the above condition we obtain that for any κ := (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×A and any ε > 0, there
is a positive integer Nκε and a sequence (ℓ
κ
n)n∈N ⊆ [0, T ], ℓ
κ
n −→ 0, such that
∀n ≥ Nκε , J(t, t, x, ν
⋆)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+ℓκn ν
⋆) ≥ −εℓκn. (3.2)
From (3.2) it is clear that classic definition of equilibrium is an ε–like notion of equilibrium. Now, ever since its
introduction, the distinctive case in which the lim inf is 0 has been noticed. In fact, a situation in which the agent
is worse–off in a sequence of coalitions with future versions of herself but in the limit is indifferent conforms with
this definition. This case is excluded when ε = 0, i.e. the case of strict equilibria [40]. In addition, we stress that
the notion of equilibrium prescribed by (3.2), being defined via sequences, lacks good local properties whenever the
lim inf is not a true limit, i.e. the lim inf might exists only along a Lebesgue measure zero set, more precisely the
sequence in (3.2). Consequently, this raises a pressing flaw in (3.2), namely the fact it might neglect the notion of
sub–game perfection. In fact, as (3.2) is satisfied along, (ℓn)n∈N, given ℓn ≤ ℓn+1, it follows the sub–game [t, T ] is
in equilibrium along coalitions on [t, t+ ℓn] and [t, t+ ℓn+1]. Yet, there is no guarantee that along any intermediate
negotiation [t, t+ ℓˆ] with ℓn ≤ ℓˆ ≤ ℓn+1 the sub–game [t, T ] is in equilibrium too. The concept of sub–game perfection
motivated our definition and, as a by–product, they are naturally endowed with a local feature we will profit off.
At this point we want to emphasise the main idea in our approach to time–inconsistent control for sophisticated agents:
any useful definition of equilibrium for a sophisticated agent ought to lead to a dynamic programming principle. This
idea has substantial justification from both the economical as well as the mathematical perspectives to the problem.
Firstly, the idea behind the reasoning of the sophisticated agent is that she ‘internalises’ her time–inconsistency, so
as to design a plan that reconciles present and future preferences, i.e. versions of herself. Consequently, this leads to
time–consistent game values under equilibria from which a dynamic programming principle is expected. Secondly,
given the approach taken in this paper, a necessary condition to achieve this is a nice local behaviour. Thus, a
definition with no local features in the windows for ‘negotiation’ prescribed by ℓ is not amenable to our analysis of
the problem. As we will see in the next section, once a DPP is available, all the parts necessary for a complete theory
of time–inconsistent non–Markovian stochastic control will become apparent.
We also mention that the definition proposed in this work is by no means the only definition complying with the
features just described. The notion of strict equilibrium, which is point–wise in (t, ν) and imposes a sign condition
on (2.13) leads, under extra assumptions, to the same dynamic programming principle we obtain for equilibria, see
Remark 3.4.
We use the rest of this section to address different works in the area.
(i) The inaugural papers on the sophisticated, i.e. game theoretic, approach to inconsistent control problems
are the sequence of papers by Ekeland and Lazrak [23; 24], and Ekeland and Pirvu [25]. In their initial work
[23], the authors consider a strong formulation framework, i.e. (3.1) and G = GX denotes the augmented
natural filtration of X0,x0,ν , and seek for closed loop, i.e. GX–measurable, action processes defined via spike
perturbations of the form
(a⊗t+ℓ ν)r := a1[t,t+ℓ)(r) + ν(X
0,x0,ν
r )1[t+ℓ,T ](r), (3.3)
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that maximise the corresponding Hamiltonian. However as already pointed out by Wei, Yong, and Yu in [81],
the local comparison is made between a Markovian feedback control, i.e. G = GX and νr = ν(X0,x0,νr ), and an
open–loop control value a, i.e. G = FW , and there is no argument as to whether admissibility is preserved. The
later two works [25] and [24] introduce the definition of equilibrium via (3.2) in which admissibility is defined
by progressively measurable open loop processes with moments of all orders. This last condition is imposed to
guarantee uniqueness of a strong solution to the dynamics of the state process. In our framework we do not
need such condition as the state dynamics hold in the sense of weak solutions.
(ii) The study in the linear quadratic set–up is carried out by Hu, Jin, and Zhou [45; 46]. There, the dynamics are
stated in strong formulation. To bypass the admissibility issues in [23], [25] and [24], the class of admissible
actions is open loop, i.e. G = FW . Equilibria are defined via (3.2) but contrasting against spike perturbation as
in (3.3). In [45], the authors obtain a condition which ensures that an action process is an equilibrium, and in
[46] the authors are able to complete their analysis and provide a sufficient and necessary condition, via a flow
of forward–backward stochastic differential equations. The approach taken to characterise equilibria in both
[45] and [46] leverages on the particular structure of the linear quadratic setting and the admissibility class.
Moreover, the authors are able to prove uniqueness of the equilibrium in the setting of a mean–variance portfolio
selection model in a complete financial market, where the state process is one–dimensional and the coefficients
in the formulation are deterministic. Unlike theirs, our results require standard Lipschitz assumptions.
(iii) Another sequence of works that has received great attention is by Björk and Murgoci [6] and Björk, Khapko, and Murgoci
[9]. There, the authors approach the problem of inconsistent control in strong formulation, i.e. (3.1), and ad-
missibility is defined by Markovian feedback actions, i.e. G = GX and νr = ν(X0,x0,νr ). The first of these
works deals with the problem in discrete–time, scenario in which the classic backward induction algorithm is
implemented to obtain an equilibrium by seeking for a sign on the difference of the pay–offs corresponding to ν⋆
and ν ⊗t+ℓ ν⋆. In their subsequent paper, the results are extended to a continuous–time setting, implementing
the definition of equilibrium (3.2). Their main contribution is to provide a system of PDEs associated to the
problem and provide a verification theorem. Nevertheless, the derivation of such system is completely formal
and, in addition, there is no rigorous argument about the well–posedness of the system.
(iv) The study of more general dynamics for the state processesX begun in Czichowsky[17] where the mean–variance
portfolio selection problem was considered for general semi–martingales. There, the author developed a time–
consistent formulation, based on a local notion of optimality called local mean–variance efficiency. Namely, given
GX , the augmented natural filtration of the semi–martingalesX , an increasing partition Π = (ti)1≤i≤m ⊆ [0, T ]
and two action processes ν and µ, the author introduces
uΠ[ν, µ] :=
m−1∑
i=1
J(ti, ti, x,P, ν)− J(ti, ti, x,P, ν + µ1(ti,ti+1])
E[〈X〉ti+1 − 〈X〉ti |G
X
ti ]
.
With this, given a sequence of increasing partitions (Πn)n∈N, Πn ⊂ [0, T ] with mesh, i.e. ‖Πn‖ := maxi |tni+1 −
tni |, tending to zero, a strategy ν
⋆ if said to be locally mean–variance efficient (LMVE) if
lim inf
n→∞
uΠ
n
[ν⋆, ν] ≥ 0.
We highlight how the notion of LMVE serves as a justification as to why the dependence in ℓ in (3.2) is linear.
Clearly extensions of our results to more general state processes would call for such considerations to be taken
into account, via the study of f–equilibria, as mentioned in Remark 2.7.
(v) A different setting is taken in Wei, Yong, and Yu [81] and Wang and Yong [80], see references therein too.
Both works study a time–inconsistent recursive optimal control problem in strong formulation setting, i.e.
(3.1), in which the class of admissible actions are Markovian feedback, i.e. G = GX and νr = νr(X0,x0,νr ). The
motivation is the following: when J˜(t;x0, ν) := EP[e−λ(T−t)ξ(X
0,x0,ν
T )|Gt], it is known that J˜(t;x0, ν) = Yt,
t ∈ [0, T ], P–a.s., where the pair (Y, Z) solves the BSDE dYt = −λYtdt + ZtdXt, YT = ξ(X
0,x0,ν
T ). In other
words, in the case of exponential discounting, the generator of the BSDE representing the reward functional
depends (linearly) on the Y term of the solution (Y, Z). Therefore, [81] studies the natural extension to a general
time–inconsistent recursive utility problem. An equilibrium is defined as the unique continuous solution to a
forward–backward system that describes the controlled state process and the reward functionals of the players
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and satisfy a local approximate optimality property. More precisely, u is the limit of a sequence of locally optimal
controls at discrete times. Such property builds upon the known fact, see [6], that in discrete–time, equilibria
are optimal given the best response of subsequent players. We highlight that in addition to a verification
theorem, the authors are able to prove well–posedness of their system in the uncontrolled volatility scenario.
However, we do not think their definition of an equilibrium is tractable in theory or practice. The definition is
lengthy enough to fit in one page, making the overall definition quite hindered and hard to check in practice.
We believe this is due to the fact that their approach relies heavily on the approximation of the solution
to the continuous game by discretised problems, and requires the equilibrium to be continuous in time, as
opposed to mere measurability which is the case for us, see Equation (2.10). Overall, we feel it might send the
wrong impression and make the sophisticated approach to time–inconsistent stochastic control problems look
somehow excessively cumbersome and convoluted to deal with. We believe the approach taken in this paper
makes a good case to show the opposite. Building upon the ideas in [81], [80] modelled the reward functional
by a BSVIE and look for a time–consistent locally near optimal equilibrium strategy. The authors are able to
extend the results of the previous paper, but more importantly, they argue that a BSVIE is a more suitable
way to represent a recursive reward functional with non–exponential discounting. On this matter, we highlight
that in our approach (H) allows us to identify as well a BSVIE, see Section 3.3 and Appendix A.4.
(vi) Other recent works on this subject are Huang and Zhou [49] and He and Jiang [40]. The first article considers an
infinite–horizon stochastic control problem in which the agent can control the generator of a time–homogeneous,
continuous–time, finite–state Markov chain at each time. The authors begin by introducing two variations
of the notion of lax equilbiria, referred there as strong and weak equilibria. Exploiting the structure on
their dynamics, and in particular by computing an expansion of the reward at a given equilibria, they derive
necessary and sufficient conditions for both notions of equilibria. Moreover, under compactness of the set of
admissible actions, existence of an equilibria is proved. In the second work, motivated by the missing steps
in [9] and working in the same framework, i.e. strong formulation (3.1), and Markovian feedback actions, i.e.
G = GX and νr = ν(X0,x0,νr ), the authors ‘perform the analysis of the derivation of the system posed in [9],
i.e. lay down sufficient conditions under which the value function satisfies the system’. In addition to their
analysis, the authors introduce two new notions of equilibria, regular and strong equilibria. Regular equilibria
compare rewards in (2.13) with feasible actions different from ν⋆ at t, and strong equilibria allow comparisons
with any feasible actions. These notions correspond to pointwise versions of our notion of equilibrium with
ε = 0, see Remark 2.7. By requiring extra regularity on the actions, the authors provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for a strategy to be a regular or a strong equilibria. It is our opinion that our definition of equilibrium
is both natural and advantageous compared to their setting, as it allows to derive an extended DPP which in
turn naturally links the value function to an appropriate system of equations. Moreover, even though their
notion of equilibrium is a variation of ours, an extended DPP can be also be obtained, but extra requirements
are necessary, see Remark 3.4. Finally, we mention that even though [40] succeeds in characterising regular
equilibria, the conditions under which such results hold are, as expected, quite stringent, requiring for instance
that the optimal action is differentiable in time and with derivatives of polynomial growth.
We emphasise that in our setting the dynamics of the state process are non–Markovian, moreover, we have chosen
the class of admissible actions to be ‘closed loop’1 and non–Markovian, i.e. FX–adapted see Section 2.1, both being
novelties of this work. Additionally, another novelty of our treatment of time–inconsistent control problems is our
weak formulation set–up. which is an extension on all the previous works in the subject. See Zhang [85, Section 4.5]
for a presentation of weak formulation in optimal stochastic control and Cvitanić, Possamaï, and Touzi [16] for an
application in contract theory in which both features are essential.
The remaining of this section is devoted to present the main results of this paper.
3.2 Dynamic programming principle
Our first main result for the study of time–inconsistent stochastic control problems for sophisticated agents, Theorem
3.2, concerns the local behaviour of the value function v as defined in (P). This result is the first of its kind in a
continuous–time setting and it is the major milestone for a complete theory. This result confirms the intuition drawn
1This is not a closed–loop formulation per se, as our controls are allowed to be adapted as well to the information generated by the
canonical process Λ.
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from the behaviour of a sophisticated agent, in the sense that v does indeed satisfy a dynamic programming principle.
In fact, it can be regarded as an extended one, as it does reduce to the classic result known in optimal stochastic
control in the case of exponential discounting, see Remark 6.5. This result requires the following main assumptions.
Assumption A. (i) The map s 7−→ ξ(s, x) (resp. s 7−→ ft(s, x, a)) is continuously differentiable uniformly in x
(resp. in (t, x, a)), and we denote its derivative by ∂sξ(s, x) (resp.∂sft(s, x, a)).
(ii) The set A is bounded and a 7−→ ∂sft(s, x, a) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, i.e.
∃C > 0, ∀(s, t, x, a, a′) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X ×A2,
∣∣∂sft(s, x, a)− ∂sft(s, x, a′)∣∣ ≤ C|a− a′|.
(iii) (a) x 7−→ ξ(t, x) is lower–semicontinuous uniformly in t, i.e.
∀(x˜, ε) ∈ X × R⋆+, ∃Ux˜ ∈ T∞, x˜ ∈ Ux˜, ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Ux˜, ξ(t, x) ≥ ξ(t, x0)− ε, when ξ(t, x0) > −∞.
(b) x 7−→ b(t, x, a) and x 7−→ σ(t, x, a) are uniformly Lipschitz continuous, i.e.
∃C > 0, ∀(t, x, x′, a) ∈ [0, T ]×X 2 ×A, |bt(x, a)− bt(x′, a)|+ |σt(x, a) − σt(x′, a)| ≤ C‖x·∧t − x′·∧t‖∞.
Remark 3.1. Let us comment on the above assumptions. As it will be clear from our analysis in Section 6 and
Section 7.3, to study time–inconsistent stochastic control problems for sophisticated agents under our notion of
equilibrium, one needs to make sense of a system. The fact that we get such a system should be compared to
the classical stochastic control framework, where only one BSDE suffices to characterise the value function and the
optimal control, see [85, Section 4.5].
Consequently, Assumption A.(i) and Assumption A.(ii) are fairly mild requirements in order to understand the
behaviour of the reward functionals on the agent’s type, which is the source of inconsistency. We also remark that
Assumption A.(i) guarantees that the map t 7−→ ft(t, x, a) is continuous, uniformly in (x, a), which ensures extra
regularity in type and time for the player’s running rewards. Lastly, given our approach and our choice to not impose
regularity on the action process, in order to get a rigorous dynamic programming principle, we cannot escape imposing
extra assumptions. Namely, if we do not want to assume that t 7−→ νt(X) is continuous, we have to impose regularity
in x, which is exactly what Assumption A.(iii) does. This allows us to use the result in [27] regarding piece–wise
constant approximations of stochastic control problems. We believe our choice is the least stringent and it is clearly
much weaker than any regularity assumptions made in the existing literature, see [6], [81], [40]. For details see the
discussion after (6.3) and Remark 6.3.
Our dynamic programming principle takes the following form.
Theorem 3.2. Let Assumption A hold, and ν⋆ ∈ E(x). For {σ, τ} ⊆ Tt,T , σ ≤ τ and P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X , we have
v(σ, x) = sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
∫ τ
σ
(
fr(r,X, νr)− EP
ν⋆
r,·
[
∂sξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
r
∂sfu(r,X, ν⋆u)du
])
dr
]
. (3.4)
Moreover, ν⋆ attains the sup in (3.4).
As a direct consequence of Theorem 3.2, we are led to consider a system consisting of a second order BSDE (2BSDE for
short) and a infinite dimensional collection of processes in order to solve Problem (P), which will be the object of the
next section. As a by–product, we also obtain a connection, already mentioned in strong formulation with feedback
Markovian actions in [6, Proposition 4.1.], between time–inconsistent control problems and optimal stochastic control
problems. In words, it says that given an equilibrium for a time–inconsistent stochastic control problem, it is possible
to associate a classical time–consistent optimal stochastic control problem which attains the same value.
Corollary 3.3. Let Assumption A hold, and ν⋆ ∈ E(x). There exists a time–consistent stochastic control problem
with the same value v, for which ν⋆ prescribes an optimal control. Namely let
[0, T ]×X ×A −→ R, (t, x, a) 7−→ kt(x, a) := ft(t, x, a)− EP
ν⋆
t,x
[
∂sξ(t,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂sfu(t,X, ν⋆u)du
]
,
Then, for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X
v(t, x) = sup
ν∈A(t,x)
EP
ν
[ ∫ T
t
kr(X, νr)dr + ξ(T,X·∧T )
]
.
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For the purposes of this paper, this is as much as we can gain from this last result as it requires knowing the
equilibrium strategy a priori, since the functional k does depend on ν⋆. This is obviously of little practical use.
Remark 3.4. We remark that all the results in this section are true for strict equilibria, provided there is more
control of ℓε,t,ν , see Remark 2.7 and Remark 6.4. Namely, it suffices, for instance, to have that for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X
inf
(t,ν)∈[0,T ]×A(t,x)
ℓ0,t,ν > 0.
3.3 BSDE system associated to (P)
Let us introduce the functionals needed to state the rest of our results. As in the classical theory of optimal control,
we introduce the Hamiltonian operator associated to this problem. For (s, t, x, z, γ,Σ, u, v, a) ∈ [0, T )2 × X × Rd ×
Sd(R)× Sd(R)× R× Rd ×A, let
ht(s, x, z, γ, a) :=ft(s, x, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x, a)⊤z +
1
2
Tr
[
(σσ⊤)t(x, a)γ
]
;
Ht(x, z, γ, u) := sup
a∈A
{
ht(t, x, z, γ, a)
}
− u.
Following the approach of Soner, Touzi, and Zhang [73], we introduce the range of our squared diffusions coefficient
and the inverse map which assigns to every squared diffusion the corresponding set of generating actions
Σt(x) :=
{
Σt(x, a) ∈ Sd(R) : a ∈ A
}
, where Σt(x, a) := (σσ⊤)t(x, a),
At(x,Σ) :=
{
a ∈ A : (σσ⊤)t(x, a) = Σ
}
, Σ ∈ Σt(x).
The previous definitions allow us to isolate the partial maximisation with respect to the squared diffusion. Let
ht(s, x, z, a) := ft(s, x, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x, a)
⊤z, ∂ht(s, x, v, a) := ∂sft(s, x, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x, a)
⊤v.
Ft(x, z,Σ, u) := sup
a∈At(x,Σ)
{
ht(t, x, z, a)
}
− u,
With this, 2H = (−2F )∗ is the covex conjugate of −2F , i.e.
Ht(x, z, γ, u) = sup
Σ∈Σt(x)
{
Ft(x, z,Σ, u) +
1
2
Tr[Σγ]
}
. (3.5)
Moreover, we assume there exists a unique A–valued Borel measurable map V⋆(t, x, z) satisfying
[0, T ]×X × Rd ∋ (t, x, z) 7−→ V⋆(t, x, z) ∈ argmax
a∈At(x,σˆ2t (x))
ht(t, x, z, a). (3.6)
In the most general setting for (P) considered in this paper, where control on both the drift and the volatility are
allowed, to ξ, ∂sξ, ∂sf and F as above, we associate the system
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −K
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(x)– q.s.,
∂Y st (ω) := E
P
ν⋆
t,x
[
∂sξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂sfr(s,X,V⋆(r,X,Zr))dr
]
, (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, ω ∈ Ω.
(H)
where Pν
⋆
∈ P(x) with ν⋆t := V
⋆(t,X, Zt) ∈ A(x).
If only drift control is allowed, i.e. σt(x) := σt(x, a) for all a ∈ A, the weak uniqueness assumption for (2.7) implies
P(x) = {P}. Letting
hot (s, x, z, a) := ft(s, x, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x)
⊤z, ∂hot (s, x, z, a) := ∂sft(s, x, a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x)
⊤z,
Hot (x, z, u) := sup
a∈A
{hot (t, x, z, a)} − u,
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we show, see Proposition 7.6, that (H) reduces to the system
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Hor (X,Zr, ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s.,
∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂hor(s,X, ∂Z
s
r ,V
⋆(r,X,Zr))dr −
∫ T
t
∂Zsr · dXr, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s., 0 ≤ s ≤ T.
(Ho)
Though BSDEs have been previously incorporated in the formulation and analysis of time–inconsistent control
problems, the kind of systems of BSDEs prescribed by (H) and (Ho) are new in the literature. Indeed, in [25] an
auxiliary family of BSDEs was introduced in order to argue, in combination with the stochastic maximum principle,
that a given action process complies with the definition of equilibrium (3.2). This was a reasonable line or arguments
as we recall at the time no verification theorem was available. More recently, [80] studied the case in which the
reward functional is represented by a Type–I BSVIEs, a generalization of the concept of BSDEs. In fact, [80] argues
that when the running cost rate and the terminal cost are time dependent then the reward functional does fulfil a
BSVIE. As it happens, in order to conduct our analysis of (Ho), we also identify a link to such type of equations,
namely we obtained that the process ∂Y tt fulfils a Type–I BSVIE, see Lemmata A.2.2 and A.2.3.
In the general case, the first equation in (H) defines a 2BSDE, whereas the second defines an infinite dimensional
family of processes, (∂Y s)0≤s≤T , each of which admits a BSDE representation. We chose to introduce such processes
via the family (Pν
⋆
t,x)(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X as in the first equation one needs an object defined on the support of every P ∈ P(x).
We recall that when the volatility is controlled, the supports of the measures in P(x) may be disjoint, whereas in
the drift case, as the support is always the same, one can expect a simplification as it is the case in (Ho). Had we
chosen to introduce the BSDE representation. we would have obtained an object defined only on the support of P
ν⋆
.
Moreover, as we work with non–dominated probabilities measures this last choice would not have been consistent
with our extended DPP nor would have sufficed to obtain the rest of our results.
The novel features of system (H) mentioned above raise several theoretical challenges. At the core of such system is
the coupling arising from the appearance of ∂Y tt , the diagonal process prescribed by the infinite dimensional family
(∂Y s)0≤s≤T , in the first equation and of Z in the definition of the family. This makes any standard results available
in the literature immediately inoperative. Therefore, the natural questions of stating sufficient conditions under
which well–posedness holds, i.e. existence and uniqueness of a solution, needed to be addressed. Of course part of
these duties consists of determining in what sense such a solution exists, see Definition 3.6 and Definition 3.12 for the
general case and the drift control case, respectively. Answers to well–posedness of (Ho), i.e. when only drift control
is allowed are part of our, rather technical, Appendix A.3. See Section 3.6 for precise statements of our results and
the necessary assumptions.
We now introduce the concept of solution of a 2BSDE which we will use to state the definition of a solution to System
(H). To do so, we introduce for (t, r, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X , P ∈ P(t, x) and a filtration G
Pt,x(r,P,G) :=
{
P′ ∈ P(t, x) : P′ = P on Gr
}
. (3.7)
We will write Px(r,P,G) for P0,x(r,P,G). We postpone to Section 7 the definition of the spaces involved in the
following definitions.
Definition 3.5. For a given process ∂Y tt consider the equation
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −K
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.8)
We say (Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x)) is a solution to 2BSDE (3.8) under P(x) if for some p > 1
(i) Equation (3.8) holds P(x)– q.s.;
(ii) (Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x)) ∈ S
p
x
(
F
X,P(x)
+
)
×Hpx
(
F
X,P(x)
+ , X
)
× Ipx
(
(FX,P+ )P∈P(x)
)
;
(iii) the family (KP)P∈P(x) satisfies the minimality condition
0 = ess infP
P′∈Px(t,P,FX+ )
EP
′[
KP
′
T −K
P′
t
∣∣FX,P′t+ ], 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s., ∀P ∈ P(x). (3.9)
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We now state our definition of a solution to (H).
Definition 3.6. We say (Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x), ∂Y ) is a solution to (H), if for some p > 1
(i)
(
Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x)
)
is a solution to the 2BSDE in (H) under P(x);
(ii) ∂Y ∈ Sp,2x
(
F
X,P(x)
+
)
;
(iii) there exists ν⋆ ∈ A(x) such that
0 = EP
ν⋆
[
KP
ν⋆
T −K
Pν
⋆
t
∣∣∣FX,Pν⋆t+ ], 0 ≤ t ≤ T,Pν⋆ − a.s.
An immediate result about system (H) is that it is indeed a generalisation of the system of PDEs given in [6] in the
Markovian framework. This builds upon the fact second–order, parabolic, fully nonlinear PDEs of HJB type admit
a non–linear Feynman-Kac representation formula.
Theorem 3.7. Consider the Markovian setting, i.e. ψt(X, ·) = ψt(Xt, ·) for ψ = b, σ, f, ∂sf , and, ψ(s,X) = ψ(s,XT )
for ψ = ∂sξ, ξ. Assume that
(i) there exists a unique A-valued Borel measurable map V
⋆
(t, x, z, γ) satisfying
[0, T ]×X × Rd × Sd(R) ∋ (t, x, z, γ) 7−→ V
⋆
(t, x, z, γ) ∈ argmax
a∈A
{
ht(t, x, z, γ, a)
}
;
(ii) for (s, t, x) ∈ [0, T )× [0, T ]× Rd := O, there exists (v(t, x), J(s, t, x)) ∈ C1,2([0, T ]× Rd) × C1,1,2([0, T ]2 × Rd)
classical solution to the system2

∂tV (t, x) +H(t, x, ∂xV (t, x), ∂xxV (t, x), ∂sJ (t, t, x)) = 0 (s, t, x) ∈ O,
∂tJ s(t, x) + hs(t, x, ∂xJ s(t, x), ∂xxJ s(t, x), ν⋆(t, x)) = 0, (s, t, x) ∈ O,
V (T, x) = ξ(T, x), J s(T, x) = ξ(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd.
(3.10)
where ν⋆(t, x) := V
⋆
(t, x, ∂xV (t, x), ∂xxV (t, x)).
(iii) v, ∂xv, J , ∂xJ and f(s, t, x) := f(s, t, x, ν⋆(t, x)) have uniform exponential growth in x3, i.e.
∃C > 0, ∀(s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 × Rd, |v(t, x)|+ |∂xv(t, x)| + |J(s, t, x)|+ |∂xJ(s, t, x)|+ |f(s, t, x)| ≤ C exp(C|x|1),
Then, a solution to the 2BSDE in (H) is given by
Yt := v(t,Xt), Zt := ∂xv(t,Xt), Kt :=
∫ t
0
krdr, ∂Y
s
t := ∂sJ
s(t,Xt),
where kt := H(t,Xt, Zt,Γt, ∂Y tt ) − Ft(Xt, Zt, σ̂
2
t , ∂Y
t
t ) −
1
2 Tr[σ̂
2
t Γt] and Γt := ∂xxv(t,Xt). Moreover, if for ν
⋆
t :=
V
⋆
(t,Xt, Zt,Γt) there exists P⋆ ∈ P(x, ν⋆), then (Y, Z,K, ∂Y ) and ν⋆ are a solution to (H).
Remark 3.8. We highlight the assumption on P(x, ν⋆) is satisfied, for instance, if the map x 7−→ σσ⊤t (x, ν
⋆(t, x))
is continuous for every t, see [74, Theorem 6.1.6]. Note that the latter is a property of (3.10) itself. In addition,
we also remark that under the assumptions in the verification theorem in [5, Theorem 5.2], it is immediate that (H)
admits a solution.
The next sub–sections present the remaining of our results. The first of them is about the necessity of our system.
We show that given an equilibrium and the associated game value function, one can construct a solution to (H). The
second result is about the sufficiency of our system, i.e. a verification result. In words, it says that from a solution
to (H) one can recover an equilibrium. Our last result is about the well–posedness of the system (H) when volatility
control is forbidden.
2 Following [6], for a function (s, ·) 7−→ ϕ(s, ·), ϕs(·), stresses that the s coordinate is fixed.
3For x ∈ Rd, |x|1 =
∑
d
i=1
|xi|.
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3.4 Necessity of (H)
The next result, familiar to those acquainted with the literature on optimal stochastic control, is new in the context
of time–inconsistent control problems for sophisticated agents. Up until now, the study of such problems, regardless
of the notion of equilibrium considered, has been limited to a verification argument, and the study of multiplicity
of equilibria. Ever since the work of [9, Section 5], it had been conjectured that, in a Markovian setting, given an
equilibrium ν⋆ and its value function v, the latter would satisfy the associated system of PDEs (3.10), and ν⋆ would
attain the supremum in the associated Hamiltonian. Capitalising on the DPP satisfied by any equilibrium and our
probabilistic approach, we are able to present a proof of this claim in a general non–Markovian setting. For our
results to hold, we need the following assumption, standard in the context of 2BSDEs, see Possamaï, Tan, and Zhou
[69].
Assumption B. (i) There exists p > 1 such that for every (s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X
sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
|ξ(T,X)|p + |∂sξ(s,X)|
p +
∫ T
t
|Fr(X, 0, σ̂
2
r , 0)|
p + |∂sfr(s,X, ν
⋆
r )|
pdr
]
< +∞.
(ii) Rd ∋ z 7−→ Ft(x, z,Σ, u) is Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in (t, x,Σ, u), i.e. there exists C > 0 s.t.
∀(z, z′) ∈ Rd × Rd, |Ft(x, z,Σ, u)− Ft(x, z′,Σ, u)| ≤ C|Σ1/2(z − z′)|, ∀(t, x,Σ, u) ∈ [0, T ]×X × Σt(x) × R.
(iii) Rd ∋ z 7−→ V⋆(t, x, z) ∈ A is Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , i.e. there exists C > 0 s.t.
∀(z, z′) ∈ Rd × Rd,
∣∣V⋆(t, x, z)− V⋆(t, x, z′)∣∣ ≤ C|z − z′|, ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X .
Theorem 3.9 (Necessity). Let Assumption A and Assumption B hold. Given ν⋆ ∈ E(x), one can construct
(Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x), ∂Y ) solution to (H), such that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and P(x) − q.e.x ∈ X
v(t, x) = sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
Yt
]
.
Moreover, ν⋆ satisfies Definition 3.6.(iii), i.e. ν⋆ is a maximiser of the Hamiltonian.
Remark 3.10. We stress that in light of the previous result, every equilibrium must necessarily maximise the Hamil-
tonian associated to (P). This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first time such a statement is rigorously justified in
the framework of time–inconsistent control problems. This result is the analogue of the discrete–time analysis where
via backward induction, it is known that taking the strategies of the subsequent players as given, every player solves
an optimisation problem.
3.5 Verification
As is commonplace for control problems, we are able to prove the sufficiency of our system. Indeed, our notion of
equilibrium is captured by solutions to System (H). Our result is not the first of its kind, though our framework
allows us to state a fairly simple proof with clear arguments. For instance, [6, Theorem 6.3] is stated to be a
direct consequence of the simpler case of a state dependant final reward functional plus a non–linear functional of
a conditional expectation of the final state value, but no proof is presented. Also, the proof of [81, Theorem 6.2]
requires laborious arguments, as a consequence of the notion of equilibrium considered, and relies heavily on PDE
arguments. Our theorem requires the following set of assumptions.
Assumption C. (i) There exists p > 1 such that for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X
sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
|ξ(T,X)|p + |∂sξ(s,X)|p +
∫ T
t
|Fr(X, 0, σ̂2r , 0)|
p + |∂sfr(s,X, ν⋆r )|
pdr
]
< +∞.
(ii) s 7−→ ξ(s, x) (resp. s 7−→ ft(s, x, a)) is continuously differentiable uniformly in x (resp. in (t, x, a)).
(iii) x 7−→ Φ(r, x) := ∂sξ(r, x) +
∫ T
r
∂sfu(r, x, a)du is continuous in x.
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Theorem 3.11 (Verification). Let Assumption C hold. Let (Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x), ∂Y ) be a solution to (H) as in Defi-
nition 3.6 with ν⋆t := V
⋆(t,Xt, Zt). Then, ν⋆ ∈ E(x) and for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X
v(t, x) = sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
Yt
]
.
We stress that together, Theorem 3.9 and Theorem 3.11 imply that System (H) is fundamental for the study of
time–consistent stochastic control problems for sophisticated agents.
3.6 Well–posedness
Our analysis would not be complete without a well–posedness result. The well–posedness result we present is limited
to the drift control case, see Appendix A.3. In this framework, there is a unique weak solution to (2.7) which we
will denote by P. In the context of PDEs, under a different and stronger notion of equilibrium, a well–posedness
result for the corresponding system of PDEs was given in [81]. Nonetheless, as we present a probabilistic argument
as opposed to an analytic one, our proof makes substantial improvements in both weakening the assumptions as well
as the presentation and readability of the arguments. We state next our definition of a solution to (Ho).
Definition 3.12. The pairs (Y, Z), and (∂Y, ∂Z) are a solution to the system (Ho) if for some p > 1
(i) (Y, Z) ∈ Spx(F
X,P
+ )×H
p
x(F
X,P
+ , X) satisfy the first equation in (Ho) P–a.s.;
(ii) (∂Y, ∂Z) ∈ Sp,2x (F
X,P
+ )×H
p,2
x (F
X,P
+ , X) and for every s ∈ [0, T ], (∂Y
s, ∂Zs) satisfies the second equation in (Ho)
P–a.s.;
(iii) there exists ν⋆ ∈ A(x) such that
Hot (X,Zt, ∂Y
t
t ) = h
o
t (t,X, Zt, ∂Y
t
t , ν
⋆
t ) dt⊗ dP– a.e. on [0, T ]×X .
Our well–posedness result in the uncontrolled volatility case is subject to the following assumption.
Assumption D. (i) σt(x) := σt(x, a) for any a ∈ A, i.e. the volatility is not controlled;
(ii) s 7−→ ξ(s, x) (resp. s 7−→ ft(s, x, a)) is continuously differentiable uniformly in x (resp. in (t, x, a));
(iii) z 7−→ Hot (x, z, u) is Lipschitz uniformly in (t, x, u), i.e.
∃C > 0, ∀(z, z′) ∈ Rd × Rd, |Hot (x, z, u)−H
o
t (x, z
′, u)| ≤ C|σt(x)1/2(z − z′)|, ∀(t, x, u) ∈ [0, T ]×X × R;
(iv) Rd ∋ z 7−→ V⋆(t, x, z) ∈ A is Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , i.e. there exists C > 0 s.t.
∀(z, z′) ∈ Rd × Rd,
∣∣V⋆(t, x, z)− V⋆(t, x, z′)∣∣ ≤ C|σt(x)1/2(z − z′)|, ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X .
(v) (z, a) 7−→ ∂hot (s, x, a) is Lipschitz continuous, uniformly in (s, t, x), i.e. there exists C > 0 such that for all
(s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X
∀(z, z′, a, a′) ∈ Rd × Rd ×A2, |∂hot (s, x, z, a)− ∂h
o
t (s, x, z
′, a′)| ≤ C(|σt(x)
1/2(z − z′)|+ |a− a′|);
(vi) there exists p > 1 such that for any (s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X
EP
[∣∣ξ(T,X)∣∣p + ∫ T
t
∣∣Hot (x, 0, 0)∣∣pdr
]
+ EP
[∣∣∂sξ(s,X)∣∣p + ∫ T
t
∣∣∂hot (s, x, 0, 0)∣∣pdr
]
< +∞
Remark 3.13. We would like to comment on the previous set of assumptions. We will follow a classic fix point
argument to get the well–posedness of System (Ho), thus Assumption D consists of a tailor–made version of the
classic requirements to get a contraction in a Lipschitz context. Conditions (iii), (iv) and (v) will guarantee the
Lipschitz property of the drivers. Condition (ii) will be exploited to control the coupling between the two BSDEs.
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The technical but simple results regarding well–posedness are deferred to Appendix A.3. In fact, we are able to
establish a well–posedness result for a more general class of systems, see System (S), for which we allow for orthogonal
martingales. Moreover, we stress that coupled systems as the ones considered in this work, where the coupling is via
an uncountable family of BSDEs, have not been considered before in the literature.
Theorem 3.14 (Wellposedness). Let Assumption D hold with p = 2. There exists a unique solution, in the sense
of Definition 3.12, to (Ho) with p = 2.
We would like to mention here that the assumption p = 2 is by no means crucial in our analysis and our results hold
in the general case p > 1, a fact that should be clear to our readers familiar with the theory of BSDEs. Nevertheless,
hoping to keep our arguments simple and to not drown them in additional unnecessary technicalities, we have opted
to present the case p = 2 only. In this case, it is easier to distinguish between the essential ideas behind our
assumptions, and how they work into the probabilistic framework we propose for the study of (P) and (Ho).
4 Extensions of our results
We use this section to present some extensions of our results to more general classes of pay–off functionals. We will
only present the corresponding results, the proofs will be presented in Hernández [44] and are available upon request.
We emphasise that the formulation of the dynamics of the controlled process X remains as in Section 2.3. We will
consider
f : [0, T ]2 ×X × R×A −→ R, Borel measurable, with f·(s, n, ·, a) FX–optional, for any (s, n, a) ∈ [0, T ]× R×A;
f : [0, T ]×X −→ R, Borel measurable, with f·(·) FX–optional; g : X −→ R, Borel measurable;
ξ : [0, T ]×X −→ R, Borel measurable; G : [0, T ]× R −→ R, Borel measurable,
and define for (s, t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X ×A(t, x)
J(s, t, x, ν) = EP
ν
t,x
[ ∫ T
t
fr
(
s,X,EP
ν
s,x [fr(X)], νr
)
dr + ξ(s,X·∧T ) +G
(
s,EP
ν
s,x
[
g(X·∧T )]
)]
.
As a motivation for the consideration for this kind of pay–off functionals, notice that the presence of the term
G(s,EP
ν
t,x [g(x)]) allows, for example, to include classic mean–variance models into the analysis. In order to present
the corresponding DPP in this framework we need to adapt the assumptions that led to it.
Assumption E. Assumption A.(ii) and A.(iii) together with
(i) s 7−→ ξ(s, x) is continuously differentiable uniformly in x; (s, n) 7−→ ft(s, x,n, a) is in ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×R,R) with
derivative continuous uniformly in (t, x, a); (s,m) 7−→ G(s,m) is in C1,2([0, T ]× R,R);
(ii) the mappings x 7−→ ft(x), and x 7−→ g(x) are continuous.
We will continue to use the convention ∂2nnft(s, x,n, a) :=
∂2
∂n2 ft(s, x,n, a) to denote the respective derivatives.
Let ν⋆ ∈ E(x) and define
M⋆t (ω) := E
P
ν⋆
t,x
[
g(X·∧T )
]
, N⋆,tr (ω) := E
P
ν⋆
s,x [fr(X)], (r, t) ∈ [0, T ]2.
We emphasise that N defines an infinite dimensional family of processes, when considered as functions of t, one
for every r ∈ [0, T ]. We also recall that under the weak uniqueness assumption, both processes are well–defined.
Moreover, we know that the application (t, x) 7−→ Pν
⋆
t,x is measurable and continuous for the weak topology, see [74,
Corollary 6.3.3] and the proceeding comments.
Remark 4.1. We would to comment on the previous set of assumptions. Concerning Assumption E.(i), it guarantees
that once the analogous version of the lemmata in Section 6 have been obtained, one can properly makes sense of the
limits as in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
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In addition, the reader might have noticed the continuity assumptions imposed on f and g in Assumption E.(ii). Given
the non–linear dependence of the reward, when passing to the limit in the proof of Theorem 4.2, below, one should
expect that first order, i.e. linear, approximations, as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, would not suffice to rigorously
obtain the limit. Not surprisingly, it is necessary to have access to the quadratic variations of the previously introduced
processes. This is usually carried out by having a pathwise construction of the stochastic integral. In our context,
the approach proposed in Nutz [60] via so–called medial limits is not feasible as it requires to know M and N are
semi–martingales under any measure in P(x). A viable way is to follow the approach in [51]. For this, it is necessary
to guarantee that M⋆ and N⋆,·r are left limits of càdlàg processes. In light of the continuity of the map (t, x) 7−→ P
ν⋆
t,x,
the assumptions on f and g guarantee that these processes are continuous. With this, the existence of a process [M⋆]
(resp. [N⋆,·r ] for any r ∈ [0, T ]) which coincide with the quadratic variation of M
⋆ (resp. N⋆,·r for any r ∈ [0, T ])
under P
ν⋆
is guaranteed.
In light of the previous remark we define
σ̂2t m̂
⋆
t := lim sup
εց0
[M⋆]t − [M⋆]t−ε
ε
, σ̂2t n̂
⋆,t
r := lim sup
εց0
[N⋆,·r ]t − [N
⋆,·
r ]t−ε
ε
, (r, t) ∈ [0, T ]2.
Following the same arguments as in Theorem 3.2, we can profit from the resent results available in Djete, Possamaï, and Tan
[22] to obtain the next dynamic programming principle. We also remark time–inconsistent McKean-Vlasov problems
have been recently studied in [59].
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumption E hold, and let ν⋆ ∈ E(x). For {σ, τ} ⊆ Tt,T , σ ≤ τ and P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X
v(σ, x) = sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
∫ τ
σ
(
fr(r,X, fr(X), νr)− ∂sG(r,M⋆r )−
1
2
∂2
mm
G(r,M⋆r )σ̂
2
rm̂
⋆
r
)
dr
−
∫ τ
σ
EP
ν⋆
r,·
[
∂sξ(r,X) +
∫ T
r
(
∂sfu(r,X,N⋆,ru , ν
⋆
u) +
1
2
∂2nnfu(r,X,N
⋆,r
u , ν
⋆
u)σ̂
2
r n̂
⋆,r
u
)
du
]
dr
]
.
Analogously, we can associate a system of BSDEs to the problem. For this, we introduce for (s, t, x, z, γ,Σ, u, v, n, z,m, z, a) ∈
[0, T )2 ×X × Rd × Sd(R)× Sd(R)× R× Rd × R× Rd × R× Rd ×A
ht(s, x, z, a) := ft(s, x, ft(x), a) + bt(x, a) · σt(x, a)⊤z;
Ft(x, z,Σ, u,m, z) := sup
a∈At(x,Σ)
{
ht(t, x, z, a)
}
− u−
1
2
z
⊤Σ z ∂2
mm
G(t,m),
and V⋆(t, x, z) denotes the unique (for simplicity) A–valued Borel measurable map satisfying
[0, T ]×X × Rd ∋ (t, x, z) 7−→ V⋆(t, x, z) ∈ argmax
a∈A
ht(t, x, z, a).
In light of Theorem 4.2, we consider for (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2 and ω ∈ Ω the system
Yt = ξ(T,X) +G(T, g(X)) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r ,M
⋆
r , m̂
⋆
t )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +K
P
T −K
P
t , P(x)– q.s.,
∂Y st (ω) = E
P
ν⋆
t,x
[
∂sξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t
(
∂sfr(s,X,N
⋆,s
r ,V
⋆(r,X,Zr)) +
1
2
∂2nnfr(s,X,N
⋆,s
r ,V
⋆(r,X,Zr))σ̂
2
s n̂
⋆,s
r
)
dr
]
,
M⋆t (ω) = E
P
ν⋆
t,ω
[
g(X)
]
, N⋆,st (ω) = E
P
ν⋆
s,ω
[
ft(X)
]
, σ̂2t m̂
⋆
t :=
d[M⋆]t
dt
, σ̂2t n̂
⋆,t
r :=
d[N⋆,·r ]t
dt
.
(He)
In the case of drift control only, we define
hot (s, x, z, a) := ft(s, x, n, a) + bt(x, a) · z;
∂hot (s, x, v,n, z, a) := ∂sft(s, x,n, a) + bt(x, a) · v +
1
2
z⊤ z ∂2nnft(s, x,n, a);
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Hot (x, z, u,m, z) := sup
a∈A
{
hot (t, x, z, a)
}
− u− ∂sG(t,m)−
1
2
z
⊤
z ∂2
mm
G(t,m),
and (He) reduces to the infinite dimensional system of BSDEs which holds P–a.s. (recall the notations in Section 3.3)
for (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2
Yt = ξ(T,X) +G(T, g(X)) +
∫ T
t
Hor (X,σ
⊤Zr, ∂Y
r
r ,M
⋆
r , σ
⊤
r Z
⋆
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr,
∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,X) +
∫ T
t
∂hor
(
s,X, σ⊤r ∂Z
s
r , N
⋆,s
r , σ
⊤
s Z
⋆,s
r ,V
⋆(r,X, σ⊤r Zr)
)
dr −
∫ T
t
∂Zsr · dXr,
M⋆t = g(X) +
∫ T
t
br
(
X,V⋆(r,X, σ⊤r Zr)
)
· σ⊤r (X)Z
⋆
rdr −
∫ T
t
Z⋆r · dXr,
N⋆,st = ft(X) +
∫ T
s
br
(
X,V⋆(r,X, σ⊤r Zr)
)
· σ⊤r (X)Z
⋆,r
t dr −
∫ T
s
Z⋆,rt · dXr.
(Hoe)
In the same way, a necessity theorem holds. It does require us to introduce the following set of assumptions.
Assumption F. Assumption B.(ii) and B.(iii) together with
(i) There exists p > 1 such that for every (s, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X
sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
|ξ(T,X)|p + |∂sξ(s,X)|p +
∫ T
t
|Fr(X, 0, σ̂2r , 0, 0, 0)|
p + |∂hor(s,X, 0, N
⋆,s
r , σ̂
2
s n̂
⋆,s
r , ν
⋆
r )|
pdr
]
< +∞.
Theorem 4.3 (Necessity). Let Assumption E and Assumption F hold. Given ν⋆ ∈ E(x), one can construct
(Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x), ∂Y ) solution to (H), such that for any t ∈ [0, T ] and P(x)– q.e.x ∈ X
v(t, x) = sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
Yt
]
.
Moreover, ν⋆ satisfies Definition 3.6.(iii), i.e. ν⋆ is a maximiser of the Hamiltonian.
Remark 4.4. We would like to comment that the well–posedness of (Hoe), i.e. the extended system when only drift
control is allowed, remains a much harder task. In particular, it is known that the presence of a non–linear functionals
of conditional expectations opens the door to scenarii with multiplicity of equilibria with different game values, see
[55] for an example in a mean–variance investment problem. Consequently and in line with current results available
for system of BSDEs with quadratic growth, see Frei and Dos Reis [32] Harter and Richou [39] Xing and Žitković
[82], we expect to be able to obtain existence of a solution. This takes into consideration that requiring uniqueness
will contradict the intrinsic nature of these kind of systems.
Finally, one could also include into the analysis on the current paper rewards allowing for recursive utilities as studied
in [80]. Recall these are models in which the utility at time t is not only a function of the state variable process and
the action but also of the future utility. This is, for (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X ×A(t, x), the reward in given by
J(t, x, ν) := EP
ν
[Yt]
where Y is the first coordinate of the solution to the following BSVIE
Yt = ξ(t,X) +
∫ T
t
kr(t,X,Yr,Zsr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zsr · dXr, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P− a.s.,
where k is a non–anticipate functional that allows for, possibly, non–linear dependences on future utilities. We
highlight we have taken expectations with respect to P ∈ A(t, x) in the definition of J(t, x, ν). As we work under
a general filtration, the solution to the previous BSVIE is FX,P(x)+ and therefore the need to take expectation. Of
course, the analysis would require to derive the corresponding DPP and from it pose the system encoding equilibria.
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5 An example
5.1 Optimal investment with CRRA utility and non–exponential discounting
We consider the following non–exponential discounting framework
ξ(s, x) = ϕ(T − s)ξ˜(x), ft(s, x, a) = ϕ(t− s)f˜t(x, a), (t, s, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X ×A,
where ξ˜ is a Borel map, and
f˜ : [0, T ]×X ×A −→ R, Borel, with f˜·(·, a) F
X–optional for any a ∈ A,
and
ϕ : [0, T ] −→ R, non–negative, differentiable, with ϕ(0) = 1.
Let us assume in addition d = m = 1, A = R⋆+×R
⋆
+ and a Markovian framework. We define an action process ν as a
2−dimensional FX−adapted process (αt(Xt), ct(Xt))t∈[0,T ] with exponential moments of all orders bounded by some
arbitrary large constant M . We let σt(Xt, νt) := αt(Xt), bt(Xt, νt) := β+α
−1
t (Xt)(rXt − ct(Xt)). Consequently, for
M = (P, ν) ∈M(s, x), with M(s, x) = {(P, ν) ∈ Prob(Ω)×A(s, x,P)}
dXs,x,νt = αt
(
β + α−1t (rXt − ct)dt+ dW
M
t
)
, P
ν
– a.s.
Here we will study the case where the utility function is given, for all x ∈ R by
U(x) :=


x1−η − 1
1− η
, η ∈ (0, 1)
log(x), η = 1
so that
J(s, t, x, ν) = EP
ν
[
ϕ(T − s)U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
ϕ(r − s)U(cr)dr
]
.
This model, studied for specific cases of U and ϕ in [25] and [8], represents an agent who is seeking to find investment
and consumption plans, in cash value, α and c respectively, which determine the wealth process X . She derives
utility only from consumption. At time s, the present utility from consumption at time r is discounted according to
ϕ(r − s). Here, we present a solution based on the verification theorem introduced in this paper. The system (H) is
defined by
Yt = U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(Xr, Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −K
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(x)– q.s.,
∂Y st (ω) := E
P
ν⋆
t,x
[
∂sϕ(T − s)U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
∂sϕ(r − s)U(c⋆(r,Xr, Zr))dr
]
, (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, ω ∈ Ω.
where for (t, x, z, γ,Σ) ∈ [0, T ]×X × R× R× R⋆+
Ft(x, z,Σ, u) = sup
(c,α)∈R⋆+×{α
2=Σ}
{
(rx + βα− c)z + U(c)
}
− u; Ht(x, z, γ) = sup
Σ∈R⋆+
{
Ft(x, z,Σ, u) +
1
2
Σγ
}
.
Proposition 5.1. Let (Y, Z,K) and ν⋆ be given by
Yt := a(t)U(Xt) + b(t), Zt := a(t)X
−η
t , Kt :=
∫ t
0
krdr, ν
⋆
t := (βη
−1Xt, a(t)
− 1
ηXt),
where
kt := H(t,Xt, Zt,Γt, ∂Y tt )− Ft(Xt, Zt, σ̂
2
t , ∂Y
t
t )−
1
2
Tr[σ̂2t Γt], Γt := −ηa(t)X
−(1+η)
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
∂Y s is defined as above, and a(t) and b(t) as in Equation (A.1), which we assume has a unique and continuous
solution. Then, there exists P⋆ ∈ P(x, ν⋆), (Y, Z,K, ∂Y ) define a solution to (H) and (P⋆, ν⋆) is an equilibrium
model. Moreover
dXt = Xt
((
r + β2η−1 + a(r)−
1
η
)
dt+ βη−1dWt
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P
ν⋆
– a.s.
24
Proof. By computing the Hamiltonian, we obtain (c⋆(t, x, z), α⋆(t, x, z, γ)) := (z−
1
η , |βzγ−1|) define the maximisers
in F and H respectively. Therefore, in this setting, the 2BDE in (H) can be rewritten as for any P ∈ P(x)
Yt = U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
(
Zr(rXr + βσ̂r − Z
− 1
η
r ) + U(Z
− 1
η
r )− ∂Y rr
)
dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −K
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s.
Moreover, taking Y, Z and K as in the statement we obtain ν⋆t := (α
⋆
t , c
⋆
t ) = (βη
−1Xt, a(t)
− 1
ηXt), t ∈ [0, T ]. Note
that the map (t, x, z, u) 7−→ Ft(x, z,Σ, u) is clearly continuous for fixed Σ and that the processes X,Y, Z and Γ are
continuous in time for fixed ω. This yields, as in the proof of Theorem 3.7, that the process K satisfies the minimality
condition under every P ∈ P(x). Moreover, note that x 7−→ α⋆t (x) is continuous for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, there
exists Pν
⋆
∈ A(x, ν⋆) such that
dXt = Xt
((
r + β2η−1 + a(r)−
1
η
)
dt+ βη−1dWt
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P
ν⋆
– a.s.
Moreover, we may find a(t) and b(t) given by Equation (A.1) so that for any P ∈ P(x)
Yt = U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
hr(r,Xr, a(r)X−ηr , a(t)
− 1
ηXt)− ∂Y rr dr −
∫ T
t
a(r)X−ηr · dXr +KT −Kt,
= U(XT ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(Xr, Xr, a(r)X−ηr , σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
a(r)X−ηr · dXr +KT −Kt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s.,
where we exploited the fact ∂Y satisfies (A.5). Also note that given our choice of ν⋆, KP
ν⋆
= 0. We are left to
argue the integrability of Y, Z,K. This follows as in the proof of Theorem 3.7 as the uniform exponential growth
assumption is satisfied, since a(t) and b(t) are by assumption continuous on [0, T ]. The integrability follows as the
action processes are assumed to have exponential moments of all orders bounded by M . With this we obtained that
(Y, Z,K) is a solution to the 2BSDE in (H). The integrability of ∂Y is argued as in the proof of (3.9).
6 Dynamic programming principle
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.2, namely we wish to obtain the corresponding extended version
of the dynamic programming principle. We begin with a sequence of lemmata that will allow us to study the local
behaviour of the value of the game. These results are true in great generality and require mere extra regularity of
the running and terminal rewards in the type variable.
Throughout this section we assume there exists ν⋆ ∈ E(x). We stress that no assumption about uniqueness of the
equilibrium will be imposed. Therefore, in the spirit of keeping track of the notation, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X we recall
we set
v(t, x) = J(t, t, x, ν⋆) = EP
ν⋆
t,x
[ ∫ T
t
fr(t,X, ν⋆r )dr + ξ(t,X·∧T )
]
,
and (Pν
⋆
t,x)(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X denotes the unique solution to the martingale problem for (2.7), with initial condition (t, x)
and fixed action process ν⋆. Similarly, for ω = (x,w, q) ∈ Ω, {σ, τ} ⊂ T0,T , with σ ≤ τ , and ν ∈ A(σ, x) we also set
v(σ,X)(ω) := v(σ(ω), x·∧σ(ω)), and J(σ, τ,X, ν)(ω) := J(σ(ω), τ(ω), x·∧σ(ω), ν).
Our first result consists of a one step iteration of our equilibrium definition. This is in spirit similar to the analysis
performed in a discrete–time set up in [9].
Lemma 6.1. Let ν⋆ ∈ E(x) and v the value associated to ν⋆ as in (P). Then, for any (ε, ℓ, t, σ, τ) ∈ R⋆+ × (0, ℓε)×
[0, T ]× Tt,t+ℓ × Tt,t+ℓ with σ ≤ τ, and P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X
v(σ, x) ≤ sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
J(σ, σ, x, ν ⊗τ ν⋆),
v(σ, x) ≥ sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
∫ τ
σ
fr(σ,X, νr)dr + J(σ, τ,X, ν⋆)− J(τ, τ,X, ν⋆)
]
− εℓ.
(6.1)
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Proof. The first inequality is clear. Indeed for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X , P
ν⋆
σ(ω),x ∈ P(σ(ω), x) and therefore ν
⋆ ∈ A(σ, x).
To get the second inequality note that for (ε, ℓ, t, σ, τ) ∈ R⋆+×(0, ℓε)×[0, T ]×Tt,t+ℓ×Tt,t+ℓ with σ ≤ τ, P(x)– q.e. x ∈
X and ν ∈ A(σ, x)
v(σ, x) = J(σ, σ, x, ν⋆) ≥ J(σ, σ, x, ν ⊗τ ν⋆)− εℓ
= EP
ν⊗τ ν
⋆
[∫ τ
σ
fr(σ,X, (ν ⊗τ ν
⋆)r)dr +
∫ T
τ
fr(σ,X, (ν ⊗τ ν
⋆)r)dr + ξ(σ,X·∧T )
]
− εℓ
= EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
∫ τ
σ
fr(σ,X, νr)dr + J(σ, τ,X, ν⋆)− J(τ, τ,X, ν⋆)
]
− εℓ,
where the last equality follows by conditioning and the Fτ measurability of all the terms. Indeed, in light of
Lemma A.4.1, an r.c.p.d. of P
ν⊗τν
⋆
with respect to Fτ , evaluated at x, agrees with P
ν⋆
τ(x),x, the weak solution to
(2.7) with initial condition (τ, x) and action ν⋆, for P
ν⊗τν
⋆
– a.e. x ∈ X . As all the terms inside the expectation are
Fτ–measurable, the previous holds for P
ν
– a.e. x ∈ X .
From the previous result, we know that equilibrium models satisfy a form of ε–optimality in a sufficiently small
window of time. We now seek to gain more insight from iterating the previous result. This will allow us to move
forward the time window into consideration.
In the following, given (σ, τ) ∈ Tt,T ×Tt,t+ℓ, with σ ≤ τ , we denote by Πℓ := (τ ℓi )i=1,...,nℓ ⊆ Tt,T a generic partition of
[σ, τ ] with mesh smaller than ℓ, i.e. for nℓ :=
⌈
(τ −σ)/ℓ
⌉
, σ =: τ ℓ0 ≤ · · · ≤ τ
ℓ
nℓ := τ, ∀ℓ, and sup1≤i≤nℓ |τ
ℓ
i − τ
ℓ
i−1| ≤ ℓ.
We also let ∆τ ℓi := τ
ℓ
i − τ
ℓ
i−1. The previous definitions hold ω–by–ω.
Proposition 6.2. Let ν⋆ ∈ E(x) and {σ, τ} ⊂ Tt,T , with σ ≤ τ . Fix ε > 0 and some partition Πℓ with ℓ < ℓε. Then
for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X
v(σ, x) ≥ sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
nℓ−1∑
i=0
∫ τℓi+1
τℓ
i
fr(τ ℓi , X, νr)dr + J(τ
ℓ
i , τ
ℓ
i+1, X, ν
⋆)− J(τ ℓi+1, τ
ℓ
i+1, X, ν
⋆)− nℓεℓ
]
.
Proof. A straightforward iteration of Lemma 6.1 yields that for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X
v(σ, x) ≥ sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
EP
ν
[ ∫ τℓ1
σ
fr(σ,X, νr)dr + J(σ, τ ℓ1 , X, ν
⋆)− J(τ ℓ1 , τ
ℓ
1 , X, ν
⋆) + v(τ ℓ1 , X)− εℓ
]
≥ sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
∫
Ω
(∫ τℓ1
σ
fr(σ,X, νr)dr + J(τ ℓ0 , τ
ℓ
0 , X, ν
⋆)− J(τ ℓ1 , τ
ℓ
1 , X, ν
⋆)
+ sup
ν˜∈A(τℓ1 ,x˜)
EP˜
ν˜
[
v(τ ℓ2 , X) +
∫ τℓ2
τℓ1
fr(τ ℓ1 , X, ν˜r)dr + J(τ
ℓ
1 , τ
ℓ
2 , X, ν
⋆)− J(τ ℓ2 , τ
ℓ
2 , X, ν
⋆)− 2εℓ
])
P
ν
(dω˜)
= sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
EP
ν
[ ∫ τℓ1
σ
fr(σ,X, νr)dr + J(τ ℓ0 , τ
ℓ
1 , X, ν
⋆)− J(τ ℓ1 , τ
ℓ
1 , X, ν
⋆)
+ v(τ ℓ2 , X) +
∫ τℓ2
τℓ1
fr(τ ℓ1 , X, νr)dr + J(τ
ℓ
1 , τ
ℓ
2 , X, ν
⋆)− J(τ ℓ2 , τ
ℓ
2 , X, ν
⋆)− 2εℓ
]
,
where the second inequality follows by applying the definition of an equilibrium at (τ ℓ1 , X). Now, the last step follows
from [26, Theorem 4.6.], see also [61, Theorem 2.3.], which holds thanks to [27]. Indeed, as F is countably generated
and P(t, x) 6= ∅, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X , [27, Lemmata 3.2 and 3.3] hold. The general result follows directly by
iterating and the fact the iteration is finite.
In the same spirit as in the classic theory of stochastic control, a natural question at this point is whether there
is, if any, an infinitesimal limit of the previous iteration and what kind of insights on the value function we can
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draw from it. The next theorem shows than under a mild extra regularity assumption on the running cost, namely
Assumption A.(i), we can indeed pass to the limit.
To ease the readability of our main theorem, for x ∈ X , {σ, ζ, τ} ⊂ T0,T with σ ≤ ζ ≤ τ , ν⋆ ∈ A(x), ν ∈ A(σ, x),
and any FXT –measurable random variable ξ, we introduce the notation
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
ζ [ξ] := E
P
ν
⊗ζP
ν⋆
ζ,X [ξ],
where Pν
⋆
ζ,X is given by ω 7−→ P
ν⋆
(ζ(ω),x·∧ζ(ω))
and denotes the Fζ−kernel prescribed by the family of solutions to the
martingale problem associated with ν⋆, see [74, Theorem 6.2.2]. Note in particular EP
ν
,P
ν⋆
σ [ξ] = E
P
ν⋆
σ,X [ξ].
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let ε > 0, 0 < ℓ < ℓε and Πℓ be as in the statement of Proposition 6.2. From Proposition 6.2
we know that for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X
v(σ, x) ≥ sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
{
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
nℓ−1∑
i=0
∫ τℓi+1
τℓ
i
fr(τ ℓi , X, νr)dr + J(τ
ℓ
i , τ
ℓ
i+1, X, ν
⋆)− J(τ ℓi+1, τ
ℓ
i+1, X, ν
⋆)− nℓεℓ
]}
= sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
{
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
nℓ−1∑
i=0
∫ τℓi+1
τℓ
i
fr(τ
ℓ
i , X, νr)dr − nℓεℓ
]
+
nℓ−1∑
i=0
∫
Ω
E
P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
(ω˜),X(ω˜)
[ ∫ T
τℓ
i+1
(
fr(τ ℓi , X, ν
⋆
r )− fr(τ
ℓ
i+1, X, ν
⋆
r )
)
dr + ξ(τ ℓi , X)− ξ(τ
ℓ
i+1, X)
]
P
ν
(dω˜)
}
= sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
{
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
nℓ−1∑
i=0
∫ τℓi+1
τℓ
i
fr(τ ℓi , X, νr)dr − nℓεℓ
]
+
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[ ∫ T
τℓ
i+1
(
fr(τ ℓi , X, ν
⋆
r )− fr(τ
ℓ
i+1, X, ν
⋆
r )
)
dr + ξ(τ ℓi , X·∧T )− ξ(τ
ℓ
i+1, X·∧T )
]}
,
(6.2)
where we used the definition of J and conditioned. For (t, x, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×A(t, x), let Gt(s) :=
∫ s
t fr(s, x, νr)dr,
s ∈ [t, T ]. We set G(s) := Gσ(s), so that
nℓ−1∑
i=0
EP
ν
[∫ τℓi+1
τℓ
i
fr(τ
ℓ
i , X, νr)dr
]
=
nℓ−1∑
i=0
EP
ν
[
G(τ ℓi+1)−G(τ
ℓ
i ) +
∫ τℓi+1
σ
(
fr(τ
ℓ
i , X, νr)− fr(τ
ℓ
i+1, X, νr)
)
dr
]
=
nℓ−1∑
i=0
EP
ν
[
G(τ ℓi+1)−G(τ
ℓ
i )
]
+ EP
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[∫ τℓi+1
σ
(
fr(τ ℓi , X, νr)− fr(τ
ℓ
i+1, X, νr)
)
dr
]
.
(6.3)
where the last equality follows from the Fτℓ
i+1
–measurability of the integral and Theorem 2.1. Now we observe that
we can add the integral terms in (6.2) and (6.3), i.e.
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[ ∫ T
τℓ
i+1
(
fr(τ ℓi , X, ν
⋆
r )− fr(τ
ℓ
i+1, X, ν
⋆
r )
)
dr
]
+ EP
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[∫ τℓi+1
σ
(
fr(τ ℓi , X, νr)− fr(τ
ℓ
i+1, X, νr)
)
dr
]
=
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[ ∫ T
σ
(
fr(τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r)− fr(τ ℓi+1, X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r)
)
dr
]
.
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Consequently, for every P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X
v(σ, x) ≥ sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
{
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
nℓ−1∑
i=0
G(τ ℓi+1)−G(τ
ℓ
i )− nℓεℓ
]
+
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[∫ T
σ
fr(τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r)− fr(τ ℓi+1, X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r)dr
]
+
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[
ξ(τ ℓi , X·∧T )− ξ(τ
ℓ
i+1, X·∧T )
]}
.
(6.4)
The idea in the rest of the proof is to take the limit ℓ −→ 0 on both sides of (6.4). As v is finite we can exchange the
limit with the sup and study the limit inside. The analysis of all the above terms, except the error term
⌈
τ −σ/ℓ
⌉
εℓ,
is carried out below. Regarding the error term, we would like to make the following remarks as it is clear that simply
letting ε go to zero will not suffice for our purpose. As ℓε is bounded and monotone in ε, see Remark 2.7, we consider
ℓ0 given by ℓε −→ ℓ0 as ε −→ 0. We must consider two cases for ℓ0: when ℓ0 = 0 the analysis in the next paragraph
suffices to obtain the result; in the case ℓ0 > 0, we can then take at the beginning of this proof ℓ < ℓ0 ≤ ℓε, in which
case all the sums in (6.4) are independent of ε, we then first let ε go to zero so that
⌈
τ − σ/ℓ
⌉
εℓ −→ 0 as ε −→ 0,
and then study the limit ℓ→ 0 as in the following. In both scenarii (3.4) holds.
We now carry–out the analysis of the remaining terms. To this end, and in order to prevent enforcing unnecessary
time regularity on the action process, we will restrict our class of actions to piece–wise constant actions, i.e. νt :=∑
k≥1 νk1(̺k−1,̺k](t) for a sequence of non–decreasing F–stopping times (̺k)k≥0, and random variables (νk)k≥1, such
that for any k ≥ 1, νk is FX̺k−1–measurable. We will denote by A
pw(t, x) the corresponding subclass of actions.
By [27] the supremum over A(t, x) and Apw(t, x) coincide. Indeed, under Assumption A.(ii) and A.(iii), we can
apply [27, Theorem 4.2]. Assumption A.(ii), i.e. the Lipschitz continuity of a 7−→ ft(t, x, a), ensures the continuity
of the drift coefficient when the space is extended to include the running reward, see [27, Remark 3.8]. Without
lost of generality we assume (̺k)k≥0 ⊆ Πℓ, this is certainly the case as we can always refine Πℓ so that νr = νi for
τ ℓi ≤ r ≤ τ
ℓ
i+1.
In the following, we fix ω ∈ Ω. A first–order Taylor expansion of the first summation term in (6.4) guarantees the
existence of γℓi ∈ (τ
ℓ
i , τ
ℓ
i+1), i ∈ {0, . . . , nℓ} such that∣∣∣∣∣
nℓ−1∑
i=0
G(τ ℓi+1)−G(τ
ℓ
i )−∆τ
ℓ
i+1
(
fτℓ
i
(τ ℓi , X, νi) +
∫ τℓi+1
σ
∂sfr(τ ℓi+1, X, νr)dr
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
nℓ−1∑
i=0
∆τ ℓi+1
(
fγℓ
i
(γℓi , X, νi)− fτℓ
i
(τ ℓi , X, νi) +
i∑
k=0
∫ τℓk+1∧γℓi
τℓ
k
∂sfr(γ
ℓ
i , X, νk)dr −
∫ τℓk+1
τℓ
k
∂sfr(τ
ℓ
i+1, X, νk)dr
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
nℓ−1∑
i=0
|∆τ ℓi+1|
(
ρf (|∆τ ℓi+1|) +
i∑
k=0
∫ τℓk+1
τℓ
k
ρ∂sf (|∆τ
ℓ
i+1|)dr
)
≤ 2T
(
ρf (ℓ) + ρ∂sf (ℓ)
) ℓ→0
−−−→ 0.
The equality follows by replacing the expansion of the terms G(τ ℓi+1) and the fact ν is constant between any two terms
of the partition. The first inequality follows from Assumption A.(i), where ρ and ρ∂sf are the modulus of continuity
of the maps t 7−→ ft(t, x, a) and s 7−→ ∂sfr(s, x, a), for a constant. The limits follows by bounded convergence as
the last term is independent of ω. Thus, both expressions on the first line have the same limit for every ω ∈ Ω. We
claim that for a well chosen sequence of partitions of the interval [σ, τ ]
EP
ν
[ nℓ−1∑
i=0
G(τ ℓi+1)−G(τ
ℓ
i )
]
ℓ→0
−−−→ EP
ν
[∫ τ
σ
fr(r,X, νr)dr +
∫ τ
σ
EP
ν⋆
r,X
[ ∫ r
σ
∂sfu(r,X, νu)du
]
dr
]
, (6.5)
where the integrals on the right–hand side are w.r.t the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ], and we recall the term inside
EP
ν⋆
r,X is FXr –measurable. Indeed, following van Neerven [77, Theorem 1], for ℓ > 0 fixed we can, ω–by–ω, take a
sequence of sample points (γˆℓi )1≤i≤nℓ of Π
ℓ, i.e. γˆℓi ∈ (τ
ℓ
i , τ
ℓ
i+1), so that
nℓ−1∑
i=0
∆τ ℓi+1
∣∣∣∣
(
fγˆℓ
i
(γˆℓi , X, νi) +
∫ γˆℓi
σ
∂sfr(γˆℓi , X, νr)dr
)
−
(
fτℓ
i
(τ ℓi , X, νi) +
∫ τℓi+1
σ
∂sfr(τ ℓi+1, X, νr)dr
)∣∣∣∣ ℓ→0−−−→ 0 (6.6)
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and the first Riemann sum in (6.6) converges to the Lebesgue integral ω–by–ω. With this, we are left to argue
(6.5). Recall that so far, our analysis was for ω ∈ Ω fixed, therefore one has to be careful about, for instance, the
measurability of the partition (γˆℓi )1≤i≤nℓ . An application of Galmarino’s test, see Dellacherie and Meyer [19, Ch.
IV. 99–101], guarantees that γˆℓi ∈ T0,T for all i, i.e. the random times γˆ
ℓ
i are in fact stopping times. See Lemma A.4.3
for details on why this is the case. Finally, (6.5) follows by the bounded convergence theorem.
Similarly, a first–order expansion of the second term in (6.4) yields (γℓi )0≤i≤nℓ such that∣∣∣∣∣
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[∫ T
σ
(
fr
(
τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r
)
− fr
(
τ ℓi+1, X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r
)
+∆τ ℓi+1∂sfr
(
τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r
))
dr
]∣∣∣∣∣
(6.7)
=
∣∣∣∣∣
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[
∆τ ℓi+1
∫ T
σ
(
∂sfr
(
γℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r
)
− ∂sfr
(
τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r
))
dr
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Tρ∂sf (ℓ) ℓ→0−−−→ 0
Therefore, since the limits agree, we study the limit of the last summands in (6.7). We split it into the sum of the
following terms
I1 :=
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i
[
∆τ ℓi+1
∫ T
σ
∂sfr
(
τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i
ν⋆)r
)
dr
]
,
I2 :=
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[
∆τ ℓi+1
∫ T
σ
(
∂sfr
(
τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i
ν⋆)r
)
− ∂sfr
(
τ ℓi+1, X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i
ν⋆)r
))
dr
]
,
I3 :=
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[
∆τ ℓi+1
∫ T
σ
(
∂sfr
(
τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r
)
− ∂sfr
(
τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i
ν⋆)r
))
dr
]
,
I4 :=
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[
∆τ ℓi+1
∫ T
σ
(
∂sfr
(
τ ℓi+1, X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i
ν⋆)r
)
− ∂sfr
(
τ ℓi+1, X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r
))
dr
]
,
I5 :=
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[
∆τ ℓi+1
∫ T
σ
∂sfr
(
τ ℓi+1, X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r
)
dr
]
− EP
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i
[
∆τ ℓi+1
∫ T
σ
∂sfr
(
τ ℓi , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i
ν⋆)r
)
dr
]
.
We claim that I2, I3, I4 and I5 converge to zero, independently of ν ∈ A(t, x), while, for an appropriate choice of Πℓ,
I1 equals
EP
ν
[ nℓ−1∑
i=0
∆τ ℓi+1E
P
ν⋆
τℓ
i
,X
[ ∫ T
σ
∂sfu(τ
ℓ
i , X, (ν ⊗τℓ
i
ν⋆)u)du
]]
ℓ→0
−−−→ EP
ν
[ ∫ τ
σ
EP
ν⋆
r,X
[ ∫ T
σ
∂sfu(r,X, (ν ⊗r ν
⋆)u)du
]
dr
]
.
(6.8)
The limit is justified as above via piece–wise constant actions, a well chosen partition Πℓ, the uniform continuity of
s 7−→ ∂sfr(s, x, a) and the joint measurability of the application (r, ω) 7−→ P
ν⋆
r,x for (r, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω which holds by
weak uniqueness, see [74, Exercise 6.7.4.]. Finally, the application of dominated convergence is justified by Fubini’s
theorem and the regularity of s 7−→ ft(s, x, a), see Assumption A.(i).
Let us argue the remaining claims. The analysis of I2 is similar to the one in (6.7) by exploiting the uniform
continuity of s 7−→ ∂sft(s, x, a). The terms I3 and I4 are argued the same way. Regarding I3, we recall that
under Assumption A.(ii), ∂sf is Lipschitz continuous in the action process uniformly in (s, t, x). Therefore taking
expectation and using Fubini’s theorem, which cancels several terms, in combination with bounded convergence,
recall ζ ∈ [0, T ], we obtain ω–by–ω that
|I3| ≤ ℓ
nℓ−1∑
i=0
E
P
ν
,P
ν⋆
τℓ
i+1
[ ∫ τi+1
τi
∣∣(ν ⊗τℓ
i+1
ν⋆)r − (ν ⊗τℓ
i
ν⋆)r
∣∣dr] ≤ ℓEPν[∫ τ
σ
∣∣νr − ν⋆r ∣∣dr
]
≤ Cℓ
ℓ→0
−−−→ 0.
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As for I5, it being a telescopic sum and noticing the integral term is bounded under Assumption A lead to
|I5| ≤ ℓ
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
σ
(
EP
ν
,P
ν⋆
τ
[
∂sfr(τ,X, ν
⋆
r )
]
− EP
ν
,P
ν⋆
σ
[
∂sfr(σ,X, ν
⋆
r )
])
dr
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cℓ ℓ→0−−−→ 0.
Combining the double integrals in (6.5) and (6.8) we obtain back in (6.4) that for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X
v(σ, x) ≥ sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
∫ τ
σ
[
fr(r,X, νr)− EP
ν⋆
r,X
[
∂sξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
r
∂sfu(r,X, ν⋆u)du
]]
dr
]
.
Now for the reverse inequality, note that for P(x) − q.e.x ∈ X , P
ν⋆
σ(ω),x ∈ P(σ(ω), x), i.e. ν
⋆ ∈ A(σ, x). Second, by
definition
v(σ, x) = EP
ν⋆
σ,x
[
v(τ,X) +
∫ T
σ
fr(σ,X, ν⋆)dr −
∫ T
τ
fr(τ,X, ν⋆)dr + ξ(σ,X·∧T )− ξ(τ,X·∧T )
]
.
In light of the regularity of s 7−→ ft(s, x, a) and the measurability of ν⋆, Fubini’s theorem yield
EP
ν⋆
σ,x
[ ∫ T
σ
fr(σ,X, ν
⋆
r )dr −
∫ T
τ
fr(τ,X, ν
⋆
r )dr
]
= EP
ν⋆
σ,x
[ ∫ τ
σ
(
fr(r,X, ν
⋆
r )− E
P
ν⋆
r,X
[∫ T
u
∂sfu(r,X, ν
⋆
u)du
])
dr
]
,
where we also use the tower property. Proceeding similarly for s 7−→ ξ(s, x), we conclude that for P(x)− q.e.x ∈ X
v(σ, x) = EP
ν⋆
σ,x
[
v(τ,X) +
∫ τ
σ
(
fr(r,X, ν⋆r )− E
P
ν⋆
r,X
[
∂sξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
r
∂sfu(r,X, ν⋆u)du
])
dr
]
,
which gives us the desired equality and the fact that ν⋆ does attain the supremum.
Remark 6.3. Let us comment on the necessity of Assumption A.(iii) for our result to hold. As commented in
the proof, a crucial step in our approach is that the sup in (6.4) attains the same value over A(t, x) and Apw(t, x).
For this we used [27, Theorem 4.5] which holds in light of Assumption A.(iii). Indeed, after inspecting the proof of
[27, Theorem 4.5], one sees that [27, Assumption 1.1] guarantees pathwise uniqueness of the solution to an auxiliary
SDE. From this, using classic arguments as in Yamada and Watanabe [83], the uniqueness of the associated auxiliary
martingale problem follows. However, as pointed out also in Claisse, Talay, and Tan [15, Section 2.1], the previous
condition can be relaxed to weaker conditions which imply weak uniqueness. As it is not our purpose in this paper to
extend their results in such a direction, we have not pursued it. Possible generalisations of this results are certainly
interesting question worthy of further consideration.
Remark 6.4. A close look at our arguments in the above proof, right after Equation (6.4), brings to light how to
obtain Theorem 3.2 for strict equilibria, or regular equilibria in [40] which are point–wise defined. Indeed, we need to
control ℓ0,t,ν, the limit ε −→ 0 of ℓε,t,ν, see Remark 2.7. In the case of equilibria, no extra condition was necessary as
ℓε is uniform in (t, ν). However, for strict equilibria this is not the case and we could add, for instance, the condition
that for P(x) − q.e.x ∈ X
inf
(t,ν)∈[0,T ]×A(t,x)
ℓ0,t,ν > 0.
Remark 6.5 (Reduction in the exponential case). As a sanity check at this point, we can see what Theorem 3.2
yields in the case of exponential discounting. Let, for any (t, s, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]2 ×X ×A
f(s, t, x, a) = e−θ(t−s)f˜(t, x, a), ξ(s, x) = e−θ(T−s)ξ˜(x),
J(t, x, ν) = EP
ν
[ ∫ T
t
e−θ(r−t)f˜(r,X, νr)dr + e−θ(T−t)ξ˜(X·∧T )
]
.
Notice that∫ τ
t
(
∂sξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
r
∂sfu(r,X, ν
⋆
u)du
)
dr =
(
e−θ(T−τ) − eθ(T−t)
)
ξ˜(X·∧T ) +
∫ τ
t
(
1− e−θ(r−t)
)
f˜(r,X, ν⋆r )dr
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+
∫ T
τ
(
e−θ(r−τ) − e−θ(r−t)
)
f˜(r,X, ν⋆r )dr.
Now, replacing on the right side of (3.4) and cancelling terms we obtain that for P(x) − q.e.x ∈ X
v(σ, x) = sup
ν∈A(σ,x)
EP
ν
[∫ τ
t
e−θ(r−σ)f˜(r,X, νr)dr + v(τ,X·∧T )
]
.
which is the classic dynamic programming principle, see [27, Theorem 3.5].
Finally, we mention that representations in the spirit of (3.4) have been previously obtained, see [25, Proposition
3.2]. Nevertheless, this is an a posteriori result from a verification type of result and follows from a direct application
of Feynman–Kac’s formula.
7 Analysis of the BSDE system
We begin this section introducing the spaces necessary to carry out our analysis of (P).
7.1 Functional spaces and norms
Let (P(t, x))(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X be given family of sets of probability measures on (Ω,F) solutions to the corresponding
martingale problems with initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω. Fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X and let G be an arbitrary σ–
algebra on Ω, G := (Gr)s≤r≤T be an arbitrary filtration on Ω, X be an arbitrary G–adapted process, P an arbitrary
element in P(t, x). For any p > 1
• Lpt,x(G) (resp. L
p
t,x(G,P)) denotes the space of all G–measurable R–valued random variables ξ with
‖ξ‖p
L
p
t,x
:= sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP[|ξ|p] < +∞,
(
resp. ‖ξ‖p
L
p
t,x(P)
:= EP[|ξ|p] < +∞
)
.
• Spt,x(G) (resp. S
p
t,x(G,P)) denotes the space of Y ∈ Pprog(R,G), with P(t, x)– q.s. (resp. P– a.s.) càdlàg paths on
[t, T ], with
‖Y ‖p
S
p
t,x
:= sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
sup
r∈[t,T ]
|Yr|
p
]
< +∞,
(
resp. |Y |p
S
p
t,x(P)
:= EP
[
sup
r∈[t,T ]
|Yr|
p
]
< +∞
)
.
• Hpt,x(G) (resp. H
p
t,x(G,P)) denotes the space of Y ∈ Ppred(R,G) with
‖Y ‖p
H
p
t,x
:= sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[(
Tr[〈Y •W 〉T ]
) p
2
]
< +∞,
(
resp. ‖Y ‖p
H
p
t,x(P)
:= EP
[(
Tr[〈Y •W 〉T ]
) p
2
]
< +∞
)
.
• Hpt,x(G, X) (resp. H
p
t,x(G, X,P)) denotes the space of Z ∈ Ppred(R
d,G), which are defined σ̂2t dt– a.e., with
‖Z‖p
H
p
t,x(X)
:= sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[(
Tr[〈Z •X〉T ]
) p
2
]
< +∞,
(
resp. ‖Z‖p
H
p
t,x(X,P)
:= EP
[(
Tr[〈Z •X〉T ]
) p
2
]
< +∞
)
.
• Ipt,x(G,P) denotes the space of processes K ∈ Ppred(R,G), with P− a.s. càdlàg, non–decreasing paths with Kt = 0,
P–a.s., and such that
‖K‖p
I
p
t,x(P)
:= EP
[
|KT |
p
]
< +∞.
We will say a family (KP)P∈P(t,x) belongs to I
p
t,x((GP)P∈P(t,x)), if for any P ∈ P(t, x), K
P ∈ Ipt,x(GP,P), and
‖K‖Ipt,x := sup
P∈P(t,x)
‖K‖p
I
p
t,x(P)
< +∞.
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• Mpt,x(G,P) denotes the space of martingales M ∈ Popt(R,G) which are P–orthogonal to X (that is the product
XM is a (G,P)–martingale), with P–a.s. càdlàg paths, M0 = 0 and
‖M‖p
M
p
t,x(P)
:= EP
[
[M ]
p
2
T
]
< +∞.
Due to the time–inconsistent nature of the problem, for a metric space E we let P2meas(E,G) be the space of two
parameter processes (Uτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 : ([0, T ]2 × Ω,B([0, T ]2) ⊗ G) −→ (B(E), E) measurable. We also introduce the
following spaces.
• Lp,2t,x(G) (resp. L
p,2
t,x(G,P)) denotes the space of collections (ξ(s))s∈[0,T ] of G–measurable R–valued random variables
such that the mapping ([0, T ]×Ω,B([0, T ])⊗FXT ) −→ (L
p
t,x(G), ‖·‖Lpt,x) (resp. (L
p,2
t,x(G,P)), ‖·‖Lpt,x(P))) : s 7−→ ξ(s)
is continuous and
‖ξ‖p
L
p,2
t,x(P)
:= sup
s∈[0,T ]
EP[|ξ|p] < +∞
• Sp,2t,x(G) (resp. S
p,2
t,x(G,P)) denotes the space of processes (Uτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P
2
meas(R,GT ) such that the mapping
([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Spt,x(G), ‖ · ‖Spt,x) (resp. (S
p
t,x(G,P)), ‖ · ‖Spt,x(P))) : s 7−→ U
s is continuous and
‖U‖p
S
p,2
t,x
:= sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖Us‖Spt,x < +∞,
(
resp. ‖U‖p
S
p,2
t,x(P)
:= sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖Us‖Spt,x(P) < +∞
)
.
• Hp,1t,x(G) (resp. H
p,1
t,x(G,P)) denotes the space of processes (Uτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P
2
meas(R,GT ) such that the mapping
([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Hpt,x(G), ‖ · ‖Hpt,x) (resp. (H
p
t,x(G,P)), ‖ · ‖Hpt,x(P))) : s 7−→ U
s is continuous and
‖U‖p
H
p,1
t,x
:= sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖Us‖Hpt,x + sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[∫ T
0
‖U tt‖
pdt
]
< +∞,
(
resp. ‖U‖p
H
p,1
t,x(P)
:= sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖Us‖Hpt,x(P) + E
P
[ ∫ T
0
‖U tt‖
pdt
]
< +∞
)
.
• Hp,2t,x(G, X) (resp. H
p,2
t,x(G, X,P)) denotes the space of processes (Vτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P
2
meas(R
d,GT ) such that the mapping
([0, T ],B([0, T ]))→ (Hpt,x(G, X), ‖ · ‖Hpt,x(X)) (resp. (H
p
t,x(G,P)), ‖ · ‖Hpt,x(P))) : s 7−→ V
s is continuous and
‖V ‖p
H
p,2
t,x(X)
:= sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖V s‖Hpt,x(X) < +∞,
(
resp. ‖V ‖p
H
p,2
t,x(X,P )
:= sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖V s‖Hpt,x(X,P) < +∞
)
.
• Mp,2t,x(G,P) denotes the space of two parameter processes (Nτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P
2
meas(R,GT ) such that the mapping
([0, T ],B([0, T ]))→ (Mpt,x(G,P), ‖ · ‖Mpt,x(P)) : s 7−→ N
s is continuous and
‖N‖p
M
p,2
t,x(P)
:= sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖Ns‖Mpt,x(P) < +∞.
• Ip,2t,x(G,P) denotes the space of two parameter processes (Lτ)τ∈[0,T ]2 ∈ P
2
meas(R,GT ) such that the mapping
([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (Ipt,x(G,P), ‖ · ‖Ip,ot,x ) : s 7−→ L
s is continuous and
‖L‖p
I
p,2
t,x(P)
:= sup
s∈[0,T ]
‖Ns‖Ip(P) < +∞.
Remark 7.1. The spaces are H
p,1
t,x(G) and H
p,2
t,x(G, X) are Hilbert spaces. As for the space H
p,1
t,x(G) we highlight the
process U tt is well defined, since U
s
t (ω) is defined dt ⊗ P– a.e. on [0, T ]× Ω for all s ∈ [0, T ], and by continuity in s
we can define a B[0, T ]⊗F–measurable version. Finally we will suppress the dependence on (0,x) and write Sx(G)
for S0,x(G) and similarly for the other spaces.
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7.2 The BSDE system
We now begin our study of the system
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +K
P
T −K
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(x)– q.s.,
∂Y st (ω) := E
P
ν⋆
t,x
[
∂sξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂sfr(s,X,V
⋆(r,X,Zr))dr
]
, (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, ω ∈ Ω.
(H)
As a motivation of the notion solution to (H), let us note that the first equation is a 2BSDE under the set P(x), i.e.
the dynamics holds P(x)–q.s. A closer examination of Definition 2.6 reveals that, unlike in the classical stochastic
control scenario, one needs to be able to make sense of a solution under any P(s, x) for s ∈ [0, T ] and x outside a
P(x)–polar set. Fortunately, the results in Possamaï, Tan, and Zhou [69] allow us to verify that constructing the
initial solution suffices, see Lemma A.2.1.
Definition 7.2. Let (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , ∂Y rr be a given process and consider the equation
Y s,xt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Z
s,x
r , σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zs,xr · dXr +K
s,x,P
T −K
s,x,P
t , s ≤ t ≤ T. (7.1)
We say (Y s,x, Zs,x, (Ks,x,P)P∈P(s,x)) is a solution to 2BSDE (7.1) under P(s, x) if for some p > 1,
(i) Equation (7.1) holds P(s, x)–q.s.
(ii) (Y s,x, Zs,x, (Ks,x,P)P∈P(s,x)) ∈ Sps,x(F
X,P(s,x)
+ )×H
p
s,x(F
X,P(s,x)
+ )× (I
p
s,x(F
X,P
+ ,P))P∈P(s,x).
(iii) The family (Ks,x,P)P∈P(s,x) satisfies the minimality condition
0 = ess infP
P′∈Ps,x(t,P,FX+ )
EP
′[
Ks,x,P
′
T −K
s,x,P′
t
∣∣FX,P′t+ ], s ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s., ∀P ∈ P(s, x).
Consistent with Definition 3.5, we set (Y, Z, (KP)P∈P(x)) = (Y 0,x, Z0,x, (K0,x,P)P∈P(x)). We use the rest of this
section to prove Theorem 3.7, justifying that in the setting of this paper our approach encompasses that of [6].
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Let P ∈ P(x) and consider (Ω,FX,P(x)+ ,P). We first verify that (Y, Z,K) satisfies first equation
in System (H). A direct application of Ito¯’s formula to Yt = v(t,Xt) with X given by the SDE (2.7) yields that
P–a.s.
Yt = YT −
∫ T
t
(
∂tv(r,Xr) +
1
2
Tr[d〈X〉r∂xxv(r,Xr)]
)
dr −
∫ T
t
∂xv(r,Xr) · dXr
= YT +
∫ T
t
sup
Σ∈Σr(Xr)
{
Fr(Xr, Zr,Σ, ∂Yrr ) +
1
2
Tr[ΣΓr]
}
−
1
2
Tr
[
d〈X〉rΓr
]
dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr,
where we used (3.10) and the definition of H in terms of F as in (3.5). Next, by definition of σ̂2t and with Kt as in
the statement we obtain
Yt = YT +
∫ T
t
Fr(Xr, Zr, σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )−
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KT −Kt, P– a.s.
Next, we verify the integrability conditions in Definition 3.6. As σ is bounded, it follows that for any P ∈ P(x), Xt
has exponential moments of any order which are bounded on [0, T ], i.e. ∃C, supt E
P[exp(c|Xt|1)] ≤ C < ∞, ∀P ∈
P(x), ∀c > 0 ,where C depends on T and the bound on σ.
The exponential grown assumption on v and de la Vallée–Poussin’s theorem yield Y ∈ Spx(F
X,P(x)
+ ,P(x)) for p > 1.
Similarly, we obtain Z ∈ Hpx(F
X,P(x)
+ ,P(x), X) and ∂Y ∈ S
p,2
x (F
X,P(x)
+ ,P(x)). To derive the integrability of K, let
P ∈ P(x) and note that
EP[KpT ] ≤Cp
(
‖Y ‖p
S
p
x
+ sup
P∈P(x)
EP
[(∫ T
0
|Fr(Xr, Zr, σ̂2r , 0)|dr
)p]
+ ‖∂Y ‖p
S
p,2
x
+ ‖Z‖p
H
p
x
)
< +∞.
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where the inequality follows from the fact (t, x, z, a) 7−→ F (t, x, z, a, 0) is Lipschitz in z which follows from the
exponential growth assumption on f0 and the boundedness of the coefficients b and σ. The constant Cp depends
on the Lipschitz constant and the value of p as in Bouchard, Possamaï, Tan, and Zhou[10, Lemma 2.1.]. As the
term on the right does not depend on P, we conclude K ∈ Ipx((F
X,P
+ )P∈P(x)). Note that the previous estimate shows
as a by–product that the 2BSDE in (H) is well–posed, see [69, Theorem 4.2]. Therefore, provided K satisfies the
minimality condition by [69, Theorem 4.2.], we conclude 3.6.(i), i.e. (Y, Z,K) is the solution to the 2BSDE in (H).
We now argue that K satisfies (3.9). Following [73, Theorem 5.2], we can exploit the fact the σ is bounded and
the regularity in time of X , Z and Γ for fixed x ∈ X ,to show that for ε > 0, (t, ν) ∈ [0, T ] × A(x,P) and
τε,t := T ∧ inf{r > t : Kr ≥ Kt + ε}, there exists Pν
ε
∈ Px(t,P,FX+ ) such that kt ≤ ε, dt ⊗ dP
νε on [τε,t, T ]× Ω.
From this the minimality condition follows. Moreover, by assumption, we know there exists Pν
⋆
∈ P0(0,x, ν⋆) where
ν⋆ maximises the hamiltonian, i.e. σ̂2r = (σσ
⊤)t(Xt, ν⋆t ), dt ⊗ dP
⋆– a.e. on [0, T ]× Ω, and kt = 0, Pν
⋆
– a.s. for all t.
This implies the minimality condition is attained under P⋆ and 3.6.(iii) holds. Moreover, note that this implies
V
⋆
(t,Xt, Zt,Γt) = V⋆(t,Xt, Zt), Pν
⋆
– a.s. (7.2)
We are left to argue ∂Y satisfies the second equation in (H). Given the regularity of s 7−→ J(s, t, x), we can take
derivatives to the second equation in (3.10). Using this, for s ∈ [0, T ] fixed and ω = (x,w, q) ∈ Ω we can apply Ito¯’s
formula to ∂Y st = ∂sJ(s, t,Xt) under P
ν⋆
t,x. This yields,
∂Y st (ω) = E
P
ν⋆
t,x
[
∂sξ(s,XT ) +
∫ T
t
∂sfr(s,Xr,V
⋆(r,X,Zr))dr
]
,
where we cancel the stochastic integral term in light of the growth assumption on ∂xJ and we used (7.2).
7.3 Necessity of (H) for equilibria
We recall that throughout this section, we let the Assumptions A and B hold. To begin with, from the definition
of the set A(t, x), we can re–state the result of our dynamic programming principle Theorem 3.2, by decomposing a
control ν ∈ A(t, x) into a pair (P, ν) ∈ P(t, x) ×A(t, x,P), where P is the unique weak solution to (2.7) and ν. We
remark that for any given P ∈ P(t, x), there could be in general several admissible controls ν. With this we state
Theorem 3.2 as, for ν⋆ ∈ E(x), σ, τ ∈ Tt,T , σ ≤ τ and P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X
v(σ, x) = sup
P∈P(σ,x)
sup
ν∈A(σ,x,P)
EP
ν
[
v(τ,X) +
∫ τ
σ
fr(r,X, νr)− EP
⋆,ν⋆
r,·
[
∂sξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
r
∂sfu(r,X, ν⋆u)du
]
dr
]
. (7.3)
The goal of this section is to show that given ν⋆, P⋆, unique solution to the martingale problem asociated with ν⋆,
and v(t, x), one can construct a solution to (H). To do so, we recall that given a family of BSDEs (YP)P∈P(t,ω)
indexed by P(t, ω) ⊆ Prob(Ω) with (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω, a 2BSDE is the supremum over P(t, ω) of the P–expectation
of the afore mentioned family, see [73], [69]. This together with equation (7.3) reveals the road map we should take.
Let us begin by fixing an equilibrium ν⋆ ∈ E(x). For (s, t, ω,P) ∈ [0, T ] × [0, T ] × Ω × P(t, x) we consider the
FX–adapted processes
Y˜Pt (ω) := sup
ν∈A(t,x,P)
EP
ν
[
ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t
[
fr(r,X, νr)− ∂Y rr
]
dr
]
,
∂Y st (ω) := E
P
ν⋆
t,x
[
∂sξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂sfr(s,X, ν⋆r )dr
]
.
(7.4)
and on (Ω,FX,P+ ,P) the BSDE
YPt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,ZPr , σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
(∫ T
t
ZPr · dXr
)P
, 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T. (7.5)
Note we specify the stochastic integral w.r.t X is under the probability P. Our first step is to relate Y˜P with the
solution to the BSDE (7.5). Namely, Lemma 7.3 says that Y˜P corresponds to the first component of the solution to
(7.5).
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Lemma 7.3. Let Assumption B hold, (t, ω,P) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×P(t, x) and (YP,ZP) be the solution to the BSDE (7.5),
as in Papapantoleon, Possamaï, and Saplaouras [66, Definition 3.2], and ν˜⋆t := V
⋆(t,X,ZPt ). Then
Y˜Pt (ω) = E
Pν˜
⋆
[YPt ]. (7.6)
Proof. Let us consider on
(
Ω,FX,P+ ,P
)
, for t ≤ u ≤ T and ν ∈ A(t, x,P) the BSDE
YP,νu = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
u
(
hr(r,X,Z
P,ν
r , νr)− ∂Y
r
r
)
dr −
(∫ T
u
ZP,νr · dXr
)P
, P– a.s. (7.7)
Under Assumptions B.(ii) and B.(i), we know that z 7−→ ht(t, x, z, a) is Lipschitz–continuous, uniformly in (t, x, a),
that there exists p > 1 such that ([0, T ]×Ω,FX) ∋ (t, ω) 7−→ ht(t, x, 0, 0) ∈ Hp,2s,ω(R
m,FX,P+ ,P) is well defined, and that
∂Y ∈ Hps,x(R,F
X,P
+ ,P). Moreover, as for any ν, and ν˜ in A(s, x,P), (σσ
⊤)t(X, νt) = σ̂2t = (σσ
⊤)t(X, ν˜t), dt⊗dP–a.e.,
P is the unique solution to an uncontrolled martingale problem where (σσ⊤)t(X) := (σσ⊤)t(X, νt). Consequently, the
martingale representation property holds for any local martingale in (Ω,FP,P) relative to X , see Jacod and Shiryaev
[50, Theorem 4.29]. Therefore, conditions (H1)–(H6) in [66, Theorem 3.23] hold and the above BSDE is well defined.
Its solution consists of a tuple (YP,ν ,ZP,ν) ∈ Dps,x(F
X,P
+ ,P) × H
p
s,x(R
m,FX,P+ ,P, X) and for every ν ∈ A(t, x,P) and
P
ν
is as in Remark 2.4 we have
EP
ν
[YP,νt ] = E
P
ν
[
ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t
[
fr(r,X, νr)− ∂Y rr
]
dr
]
, t ∈ [0, T ].
In addition, Assumption B.(iii) guarantees that the solution (YP,ZP) ∈ Dps,ω(F
X,P
+ ,P)×H
p
s,ω(R
m,FX,P+ ,P) to BSDE
(7.5) is well defined. Furthermore, conditions (Comp1)–(Comp3) in [66, Theorem 3.25] are fulfilled, ensuring a com-
parison theorem holds. Indeed, asX is continuous (Comp1) is immediate, while (Comp2) and (Comp3) correspond in
our setting to B.(ii) and B.(i), respectively. By definition, ν˜⋆t satisfies (σσ
⊤)t(X, ν˜⋆t ) = σ̂
2
t , dt⊗dP–a.e. on [t, T ]×X ,
and so, ν˜⋆ ∈ A(t, x,P). By comparison, we obtain
Y˜Pt (x) = sup
ν∈A(t,xP)
EP
ν
[YP,νt ] ≤ E
P
ν˜⋆
[YPt ].
Remark 7.4. (i) In the literature on BSDEs one might find the additional term
∫ T
t dN
P
r in (7.5), where N
P is
a P–martingale P–orthogonal to X. Yet, as noticed in the proof once (σσ⊤)t(X) is fixed, uniqueness of the
associated martingale problem guarantees the representation property relative to X.
(ii) We remark that an alternative constructive approach to relate Y˜ to a BSDE is to consider for any ν ∈ A(s, x,P)
and t ≥ s the process
NP,νt := J(t, t,X, ν
⋆(P)) +
∫ t
0
(
fr(r,X, νr)− ∂Y rr
)
dr.
However, as the careful reader might have noticed, this requires that for a given P ∈ P(s, x) we introduce ν⋆(P)
the action process attaining the sup in (7.4). However, the existence of an action with such property is not
necessarily guaranteed for all P ∈ P(s, x), at least without further assumptions, which we do not want to impose
here.
Remark 7.5. At this point we are halfway from our goal in this section. For (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω, the previous lemma
defines a family (YP)P∈P(t,ω) of F
X,P
+ –adapted processes. Recalling our discussion at the beginning of this section, all
we are left to do is to take sup over (P(t, x))(t,x)∈[0,T ]×X . In other words, putting together (7.6) and (7.3), we now
know
v(t, x) = sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
ν˜⋆ [
YPt
]
. (7.8)
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In light of the previous remark and the characterisation in [69], we consider the following 2BSDE
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −K
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(x)– q.s. (7.9)
With this we are ready to prove the necessity of System (H).
Proof of Theorem 3.9. We begin by verifying the integrability of ∂Y , defined as in (7.4). From Assumption B.(ii)
we have that for any s ∈ [0, T ]
‖∂Y s‖Sp
x
≤ sup
P∈P(x)
EP
[∣∣∂sξ(s,X·∧T )∣∣p + ∫ T
0
∣∣∂sfr(s,X, ν⋆r )∣∣pdr
]
< +∞.
Therefore, as Assumption A.(i) guarantees the continuity of the map s 7−→ ‖∂Y s‖Sp0,x(FX ,P(x)) the result follows.
Let us construct such a solution from ν⋆ ∈ E(x). Under Assumption B.(ii), it follows from (7.8) and [69, Lemma
3.2.] that v is làdlàg outside a P(x)–polar set. Therefore the process v+ given by
v+t (x) := lim
r∈Q∩(t,T ],r↓t
v(t, x),
is well defined in the P(x)–q.s. sense. Clearly v+ is càdlàg, FX,P(x)+ –adapted, and in light of [69, Lemmata 2.2 and 3.6],
which hold under Assumption B, we have that for any P ∈ P(x), there exist (ZP,KP) ∈ Hp0,x(F
X,P
+ ,P)× I
p
0,x(F
X,P
+ ,P)
such that
v+t = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,ZPr , σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
(∫ T
t
ZPr · dXr
)P
+KPT −K
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s.
Moreover, the process Zt := (σ̂2t )
⊕ d[v
+,X]t
dt , where (σ̂
2
t )
⊕ denotes the Moore–Penrose pseudo–inverse of σ̂2t , aggregates
the family (ZP)P∈P(x). The proof that (KP)P∈P(x) satisfies the minimality condition (3.9) is argued as in [69, Section
4.4.].
Arguing as in [69, Lemma 3.5], we may obtain that for any P(x)− q.e.x ∈ X and P ∈ P(t, x)
v+t = ess sup
P
P˜∈P(t,P,FX+ )
Y P˜t
with Y P˜ as in (7.5). Consequently,
v(t, x) = sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP[v+t ].
Moreover, as for any t ∈ [0, T ] and P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X , P
ν⋆
t,x attains equality in (7.8), see Theorem 3.2, we deduce, in
light of (2.4), Pν
⋆
attains the minimality condition. This is, under Pν
⋆
, the process KP
ν⋆
equals 0. With this, we
obtain (v+, Z, (K)P
P∈P(x)) and ∂Y are a solution to (H). Moreover, Lemma 7.3 implies
ν⋆t ∈ argmax
a∈At(x,σˆ2t (x))
ht(t,X, Zt, a), dt⊗ dPν
⋆
–a.e., on [0, T ]× X .
7.4 Verification
This section is devoted to proof the verification Theorem 3.11. To do so we will need to obtain a rigorous statement
of how the processes defined by (H) relate. This is carried in a series of lemmata available in Appendix A.2.
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Proof of Theorem 3.11. We will first show that with ν⋆ as in the statement of the theorem Yt(x) = J(t, t, x, ν⋆) for
all t ∈ [0, T ] and P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X . To do so, let (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× X and note that Assumption C.(i) guarantees that
the corresponding 2BSDE under P(s, x) is well–posed. Indeed, it follows from Soner, Touzi, and Zhang [72, Lemma
6.2.] that for any p > p′ > κ > 1,
sup
P∈P(s,x)
EP
[
ess supP
s≤t≤T
(
ess supP
P ′∈Ps,x(t,P,F+)
EP
′
[
|ξ(T,X·∧T )|
κ +
∫ T
s
|Fr(X, 0, σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )|
κdr
∣∣∣∣F+t
]) p′
κ
]
< +∞.
The well–posedness follows by [69, Theorem 4.1.]. Now, in light of lemma A.2.1, for any s ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = Y
s,x
t , s ≤ t ≤ T, P(s, x)– q.s., for P(x)– q.e.x ∈ X ,
Zt = Z
s,x
t , σ̂
2
t dt⊗ dP(s, x)– q.e. on [s, T ]×X , for P(x)– q.e.x ∈ X ,
KPt = K
s,x,Ps,x
t , s ≤ t ≤ T, Ps,x − a.s., for P− a.e.x ∈ X , ∀P ∈ P(x).
(7.10)
We first claim that given a solution to (H) for any (s, x) ∈ (0, T ]× X , Pν
⋆
s,x attains the minimality condition for the
2BSDE under P(s, x), see Definition 7.2. Indeed, by Definition 3.6.(iii)
EP
ν⋆
0,x
[
K
Pν
⋆
0,x
T −K
Pν
⋆
0,x
t
]
= 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
As KP
ν⋆
0,x is an increasing process, this implies KP
ν⋆
0,x = 0 and therefore Pν
⋆
0,x attains the minimality condition for the
2BSDE in (H) under P(x). This implies, together with (7.10) and Blumenthal’s 0–1 law, that for P(x)– q.e.x ∈ X
and s ∈ [0, T ]
EP
ν⋆
s,x
[
EP
ν⋆
s,x
[
K
s,x,Pν
⋆
s,x
T −K
s,x,Pν
⋆
s,x
s
∣∣∣FXs+]] = EPν⋆s,x[Ks,x,Pν⋆s,xT −Ks,x,Pν⋆s,xs ] = 0, Pν⋆s,x–a.s.,
which proves the claim. Consequently, for P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X and s ∈ [0, T ]
Yt = Y
s,x
t = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zs,xr , σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zs,xr · dXr, s ≤ t ≤ T, P
ν⋆
s,x– a.s.
We note the equation on the right side prescribes a BSDE under Pν
⋆
s,x ∈ P(s, x). Moreover, given that for P(x)–
q.e.x ∈ X and s ∈ [0, T ], V⋆t (X,Z
s,x
t ) = V
⋆
t (X,Zt), dt⊗ dP
ν⋆
s,x– a.e. on [s, T ]×X , we obtain
Y s,xt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
(
hr(r,X,Zr, ν⋆r )− ∂Y
r
r
)
dr −
∫ T
t
Zs,xr · dXr, s ≤ t ≤ T, P
ν⋆
s,x– a.s.
In particular, at t = s we have that for P(x)–q.e. x ∈ X and t ∈ [0, T ]
EP
ν⋆
t,x
[
Y t,xt
]
= EP
ν⋆
t,x
[
ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
(
hr(r,X,Zr, ν
⋆
r )− ∂Y
r
r
)
dr
]
. (7.11)
Now, in light of Assumption D, there exists (∂Y, ∂Z) ∈ S2,2t,x(F
X,Pν
⋆
t,x
+ )×H
2,2
t,x(F
X,Pν
⋆
t,x
+ , X) such that for every s ∈ [0, T ]
∂Ysr = ∂sξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
r
∂hu(s,X, ∂Zsu, ν
⋆
u)du −
∫ T
r
∂Zsu · dXu, t ≤ s ≤ r ≤ T, P
ν⋆
t,x– a.s.
In addition, Lemma A.2.2 yields
EP
ν⋆
t,x
[∫ T
t
∂Y rr dr
]
= EP
ν⋆
t,x
[ ∫ T
t
EP
ν⋆
t,·
[
∂sξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
r
∂sfu(r,X, ν⋆u)du
]
dr
]
= EP
ν⋆
t,x
[ ∫ T
t
∂Yrrdr
]
.
Therefore, from Lemma A.2.3 and (7.11) we have that for P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X and t ∈ [0, T ]
EP
ν⋆
t,x
[
Y t,xt
]
= EP
ν⋆
t,x
[
ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
(
hr(r,X,Z
t,x
r , ν
⋆
r )− ∂Y
r
r
)
dr
]
= J(t, t, x, ν⋆). (7.12)
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Finally, arguing as in [16, Proposition 4.6], (7.12) yields that for P(x) − q.e.x ∈ X and t ∈ [0, T ]
v(t, x) = sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
Y t,xt
]
It remains to show ν⋆ ∈ E(x). Let (ε, ℓ, t, x, ν) ∈ R⋆+× (0, ℓε)× [0, T ]×Ω×A(t, x), ℓε to be chosen, and let ν⊗t+ℓ ν
⋆
be as in (2.12). Recall we established that for P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X , t ∈ [0, T ]
J(t, t, x, ν⋆) = ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Z
t,x
r , σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zt,xr · dXr +K
t,x,P
T −K
t,x,P
t , P(t, x)– q.s.
By computing the expectation of the stochastic integral under P
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆
we obtain
J(t, t, x, ν⋆)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+ℓ ν
⋆)
≥ EP
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆
[
ξ(T,X) +
∫ T
t
(
hr(r,X,Zt,xr , ν
⋆
r )− br(X, (ν ⊗t+ℓ ν
⋆)r) · σ̂⊤r Z
t,x
r
)
dr
− ξ(t,X)−
∫ T
t
(
fr(t,X, (ν ⊗t+ℓ ν⋆)r) + ∂Y rr
)
dr
]
= EP
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆
[
ξ(T,X)− ξ(t,X) +
∫ T
t
hr(r,X,Zt,xr , ν
⋆
r )− hr(t,X, Z
t,x
r , ν
⋆
r )− ∂Y
r
r dr
]
+
∫ t+ℓ
t
hr(r,X,Zt,xr , ν
⋆
r )− hr(t,X, Z
t,x
r , νr) + hr(t,X, Z
t,x
r , ν
⋆
r )− hr(r,X,Z
t,x
r , νr)dr
]
,
where the inequality follows from dropping theK term. Now, since for P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X , V⋆t (X,Z
s,x
t ) = V
⋆
t (X,Zt), dt⊗
dP– a.e. on [s, T ]×X for all P ∈ P(s, x), we have the previous expression is greater or equal than the sum of
I1 := EP
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆
[
ξ(T,X)− ξ(t+ ℓ,X) +
∫ T
t+ℓ
(
hr(r,X,Zt,xr , ν
⋆
r )− hr(t+ ℓ,X, Z
t,x
r , ν
⋆
r )− ∂Y
r
r
)
dr
]
,
I2 := E
P
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆
[
ξ(t+ ℓ,X)− ξ(t,X)−
∫ T
t
fr(t,X, ν
⋆
r )dr +
∫ T
t+ℓ
fr(t+ ℓ,X, ν
⋆
r )dr +
∫ t+ℓ
t
(
fr(r,X, ν
⋆
r )− ∂Y
r
r
)
dr
]
,
I3 := EP
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆
[ ∫ t+ℓ
t
(
fr(r,X, νr)− fr(t,X, νr) + fr(t,X, ν⋆r )− fr(r,X, ν
⋆
r )
)
dr
]
.
We now study each remaining terms separately. First, regarding I1, by conditioning we can see this term equals 0.
Indeed, this follows analogously to (7.11), by using the fact that
(
δω⊗t+ℓP
ν⋆,t+ℓ,x)
ω∈Ω
is an r.c.p.d. of P
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆
|FXt+ℓ,
see Lemma A.4.1, together with Lemma A.2.3.
We can next use Fubini’s theorem and Φ as in Assumption C to express the term I2 as
I2 = E
P
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆
[∫ t+ℓ
t
∂sξ(r,X)dr +
∫ T
t
∫ T
r
∂sfu(r,X, ν
⋆
u)dudr −
∫ T
t+ℓ
∫ T
r
∂sfu(r,X, ν
⋆
u)dudr −
∫ t+ℓ
t
∂Y rr dr
]
= EP
ν
[ ∫ t+ℓ
t
EP
ν⋆
t+ℓ,·
[
Φ(r,X)]− EP
ν⋆
r,·
[
Φ(r,X)
]
dr
]
,
where the second equality follows by conditioning, see Lemma A.4.1. Now, arguing as in the proof of [74, Corollary
6.3.3], under the weak uniqueness assumption for fixed actions ,Pν
⋆
tn,xn −→ P
ν⋆
t,x weakly, whenever (tn, xn) −→ (t, x).
By Assumption C.(iii), for every (r, t, x) ∈ [0, T ]2 × X , EP
ν⋆
t+ℓ,x
[
Φ(r,X)] −→ EP
ν⋆
t,x
[
Φ(r,X)], ℓ −→ 0. Moreover, as
t 7−→ Φ(t, x) is clearly continuous and (r, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, the previous convergence holds uniformly in (r, t). Together with
bounded convergence we obtain that for P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X and ν ∈ A(t, x), EP
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆ [
Φ(r,X)
]
−→ EP
ν⊗tν
⋆ [
Φ(r,X)
]
,
ℓ −→ 0, uniformly in (t, r).
We now argue that the above convergence holds uniformly in ν. Indeed, Assumption C.(i) guarantees that for
P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X the family Mxt+ℓ(x˜) := E
P
ν⋆
t+ℓ,x˜ [Φ(r,X)] − EP
ν⋆
t,x [Φ(r,X)], is P(t, x)–uniformly integrable. Thus,
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provided P(t, x) is weakly compact, an application of the non–dominated monotone convergence theorem, see
[21, Theorem 31.], yields the result. In order to bypass the compactness assumption on P(t, x), we consider the
compactWhy is that set compact? Need a reference set Arel(t, x) of solutions to the martingale problem for which
relaxed action processes are allowed, i.e. ignoring condition (iii) in the definition of P(t, x). By [27, Theorem 4.5.],
the supremum over the two families coincide. With this we can find ℓε such that for ℓ < ℓε∫ t+ℓ
t
sup
ν∈A(t,x)
∣∣∣EPν⊗t+ℓν⋆ [Φ(r,X)]− EPν⊗tν⋆ [Φ(r,X)]∣∣∣dr ≤ εℓ
Finally, to control I3, we see that Assumption C.(ii) guarantees there is ℓε such that for all (r, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]× X ×
A, |fr(s, x, a)− fr(t, x, a)| < ε/2 whenever |s− t| < ℓε, so that
EP
ν⊗t+ℓν
⋆
[ ∫ t+ℓ
t
|fr(r,X, νr)dr − fr(t,X, νr)|+ |fr(t,X, ν⋆r )− fr(r,X, ν
⋆
r )|dr
]
≤ εℓ.
Combining the previous arguments, we obtain that for 0 < ℓ < ℓε, P(x)–q.e.x ∈ X and (t, ν) ∈ [0, T ]×A(t, x)
J(t, t, x, ν⋆)− J(t, t, x, ν ⊗t+ℓ ν⋆) ≥ −εℓ.
7.5 Well–posedness: the uncontrolled volatility case
We start this section studying how System (H) reduces when no control on the volatility is allowed. Intuitively
speaking the first equation should reduce to a standard BSDE and under our assumption of weak uniqueness for
(2.7) we end up with only one probability measure which allows a probabilistic representation of the second element
in the system. We first study the reduction in the next proposition.
Proposition 7.6. Suppose σt(x, a) = σt(x, a˜) =: σt(x) for all a ∈ A, i.e. the volatility is not controlled, then System
(H) reduces to
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Hor (X,Zr, ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s.,
∂Y st = ∂sξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂hor(s,X, ∂Z
s
r ,V
⋆(r,X,Zr))dr −
∫ T
t
∂Zsr · dXr, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s., 0 ≤ s ≤ T.
(Ho)
Proof. As the volatility is not controlled there is a unique solution to the martingale problem (2.6), i.e. P(x) = {P}.
In addition, since (σσ⊤)t(x, a) = (σσ⊤)t(x) for all t ∈ [0, T ], then
Σt(x) = {(σσ⊤)t(x)} ∈ S+n (R), At(x, σt(x)) = A.
Let (Y, Z,K) be a solution to the 2BSDE in (H). As P(x) = {P}, the minimality condition implies that the process
KP vanishes in the dynamics, thus (Y, Z) is a solution to the first BSDE in (Ho). Now as the family ∂Y is defined
P–a.s., Y is well–defined in the P–a.s. sense too. Finally, P(x) = {P} guarantees that the predictable martingale
representation holds for (FX,P+ ,P)–martingales. With this, it follows that for s ∈ [0, T ], ∂Y
s in (H) admits the
representation in (Ho), which holds up to a P–null set.
Remark 7.7 (HJB system exponential case). As a sanity check at this point we can check what the above system
leads to in the case of exponential discounting in a non–Markovian framework. Defining f(s, t, x, a) and F (s, x) as
in Remark 6.5, note that
J(t, x, ν) = EP
ν
[∫ T
t
e−θ(r−t)f˜(r,X, νr)dr + e−θ(T−t)F˜ (X·∧T )
]
= Y tt .
Notice that
∂Y st = θe
−θ(T−s) +
∫ T
t
θe−θ(r−s)f˜(r,X, ν⋆r ) + b(r,X, ν
⋆
r ) · σ(r,X)
⊤Zsrdr −
∫ T
t
∂Zsr · dXr,
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and as it does turn out that Zrr = Zr, see Lemma A.2.2 and Theorem 3.11, we get
∂Y tt = θe
−θ(T−t) +
∫ T
t
θe−θ(r−t)f˜(r,X, ν⋆r ) + b(r,X, ν
⋆
r ) · σ(r,X)
⊤Ztrdr −
∫ T
t
∂Ztr · dXr
= θEP
ν⋆
[ ∫ T
t
e−θ(r−t)f˜(r,X, ν⋆r )dr + e
−θ(T−t)F˜ (X·∧T )
∣∣∣FX,Pt+
]
= θY tt .
Thus
Yt = ξ(T ) +
∫ T
t
Hor (Xr, Z
ν⋆
r , θYr)dr −
∫ T
t
Zν
⋆
r · dXr, ν
⋆
t (x, z, u) := argmax
a∈A
{
hot (t, x, z, a)
}
.
In the classic Brownian filtration set up, e.g. assuming σ is non–degenerate and n = d, the above BSDE corresponds
to the well known solution to an optimal stochastic control problem with exponential discounting, see [85].
We would like to stress the fact that the existence of a solution to System (Ho) is in general not guaranteed. Indeed,
for a fixed ν one could try to find the family of BSDEs (∂Y s)s, determined by the second equation and use this
solution to obtain Y . Nevertheless, this approach becomes nonviable as a result of the coupling arising from the
choice of ν in the first equation and its appearance in the second one. The general treatment of systems as (Ho) is
carried out in the Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 3.14. The result is immediate from Theorem A.3.1, see Appendix.
Remark 7.8. The general well–posedness result, i.e. in which both the drift and the volatility are controlled remains
open. In fact, as this requires to be able to guarantee the existence of a probability measure P⋆ under which the
minimality condition (3.9) is attained, we believe a feasible direction to attain this result is to go one level beyond
the weak formulation, and consider and work in a relaxed framework, see for example [27] for a precise formulation
of control problems in relaxed form.
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A Apendix
A.1 Optimal investment and consumption for log utility
We provide the necessary results for Section 5.1. We start with expressions to determine the functions a(·) and b(·).
We introduce the quantities
p :=
1
η
, q := 1−
1
η
, α1(t) := r +
1
2
β2p+ a(t)−p, t ∈ [0, T ], α2(t) := (1 − η)(α1(t) +
β2
2η2
(1 + η)), t ∈ [0, T ].
Under the optimal policy (c⋆, γ⋆) we have that Pν
⋆
–a.s.
dXt = Xt(r + β2η−1 + a(r)
− 1
η )dt+ βη−1XtdWt,
dXt
1−η = (1− η)X1−ηt
[
α1(t)dt+ pβdWt
]
,
dU(c⋆(t,Xt)) = a(t)qX
1−η
t
((
α1(t)− pa′(t)a(t)−1
)
dt+ pβdWt
)
,
which we can use to obtain that for P ∈ P(t, x)
EP[U(c⋆(r,Xr))] = U(c⋆(t, x)) + x1−η
∫ r
t
exp
(∫ u
t
α2(v)dv
)
a(u)q(α1(u)− pa′(u)a(u)−1)du,
EP[U(XT )] = U(x) exp
(∫ T
t
α2(u)du
)
.
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By direct computation in (A.5) one finds that in general a must satisfy
a′(t) + (1− η)a(t)α1(t) + a(t)qϕ(T − t) + ϕ′(T − t) exp
(∫ T
t
α2(u)du
)
+
∫ T
t
ϕ′(r − t)
∫ r
t
exp
(∫ r
t
α2(v)dv
)
a(u)q
(
α1(t)− pa
′(u)a(u)−1
)
dudr = 0, t ∈ [0, T ), a(T ) = 1,
(A.1)
where we recall α1 and α2 are actually functions of a. The boundary condition follows as YT (x) = U(x) for all x ∈ X .
The previous equation is, of course, an implicit formula that reflects the non–linearities inherent to the general case.
A general expression for b can be written down too. We have refrained to do so here.
Nevertheless, in the particular case η = 1, which corresponds to the log utility scenario, the expressiona involved
simplify considerably, which reflects the fact that all non–linearities vanish. Indeed, in this case p = 1, q = 0,
α1 = r + β/2− a−1, α2 = 0 and one obtains
b′(t) + a(t)α1(t)− log a(t)−
∫ T
t
ϕ′(s− t)
(
A(s)−A(t)− log[a(s)]
)
ds+ ϕ′(T − t)(A(T )−A(t))
+ log(x)[a′(t) + ϕ(T − t) + ϕ′(T − t)] = 0.
where A(t) denotes the antiderivative of α1. To find a we set
a′(t) + ϕ(T − t) + ϕ′(T − t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ), a(T ) = 1
This determines both α and A. b is then given by setting the first line in the above expression equal to zero together
with the boundary condition b(T ) = 0.
A.2 Verification theorem
Throughout this section we assume Assumption C. We present next a series of lemmata which shed light on the
properties satisfied by the 2BSDE in (H).
Lemma A.2.1. For (x, x, s) ∈ X × X × (0, T ] consider the 2BSDEs
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zr, σ̂2r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr +KPT −K
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T,P(x)– q.s.
Y s,xt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,Zs,xr , σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Zs,xr · dXr +K
s,x,Q
T −K
s,x,Q
t , s ≤ t ≤ T,P(s, x)– q.s.
(A.2)
Suppose both 2BSDEs are well–posed. Then, for any s ∈ (0, T ],
Yt = Y
s,x
t , s ≤ t ≤ T, P(s, x)– q.s., for P(x)– q.e.x ∈ X ,
Zt = Z
s,x
t , σ̂
2
t dt⊗ dP(s, x)– q.e. on [s, T ]×X , for P(x)– q.e.x ∈ X ,
KPt = K
s,x,Ps,x
t , s ≤ t ≤ T, Ps,x − a.s., for P− a.e.x ∈ X , ∀P ∈ P(x).
Proof. Following [69], we consider for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X
Ŷt(x) := sup
P∈P(t,x)
EP
[
YPt
]
,
where for an arbitrary P ∈ P(s, x), YP corresponds to the first coordinate of the solution to the BSDE
YPt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X,ZPr , σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
ZPr · dXr, s ≤ t ≤ T,P– a.s.
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It then follows by [69, Lemmata 3.2. and 3.6.] that Ŷ+, the right limit of Ŷ, is FX,P(x)+ –measurable, P(x)–q.s. càdlàg,
and for every P ∈ P(x), there is (ẐP, K̂P) ∈ Hpx(F
X,P
+ ,P)× I
p
x(F
X,P
+ ,P) such that for every P ∈ P(x)
Ŷ+t = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X, ẐPr , σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
ẐPr · dXr +
∫ T
t
dK̂Pr , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P– a.s.
By [51], there exists a universal process [Ŷ+, X ] which coincides with the quadratic co–variation of Ŷ+ and X under
each probability measure P ∈ P(x). Thus, one can define a universal FX,P(x)+ –predictable process Z by
Ẑt := (σ̂2t )
⊕ d[Ŷ
+, X ]t
dt
, (A.3)
and obtain,
Ŷ+t = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
Fr(X, Ẑr, σ̂
2
r , ∂Y
r
r )dr −
∫ T
t
Ẑr · dXr + K̂
P
T − K̂
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, P(x)– q.s.
By well–posedness, we have that
Ŷ+t = Yt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,P(x)− q.s.; Ẑt = Zt, σ̂
2dt⊗ dP(x) − q.e. on [0, T ]×X ;
K̂Pt = K
P
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T,P− a.s., ∀P ∈ P(x)
(A.4)
where the later denotes the solution to the first 2BSDE in (A.2). Thus, as Y+ is computed ω−by−ω, we can repeat
the previous argument on the time interval [s, T ] and Ωωs = {ω˜ ∈ Ω : x˜r = xr, 0 ≤ r ≤ s}, i.e. fixing an initial
trajectory. Reasoning as before, we then find that on Ωωs , Ŷ
+ is FP(s,x)+ –measurable and P(s, x)–q.s. càdlàg. By well–
posedness of the second 2BSDE in (A.2), this yields the analogous version of (A.4) between (Ŷ+, Ẑ, (K̂P)P∈P(s,x))
and (Y s,x, Zs,x, (Ks,x)P∈P(s,x)). It is then clear that
Yt = Y
s,x
t , s ≤ t ≤ T,P(s, x)– q.s., for P(x)– q.e. x ∈ X , s ∈ (0, T ].
The corresponding result for Z follows from (A.3). The relation for the family (KP)P∈P(x) holds P−by−P for every
P ∈ P(x) in light of the weak uniqueness assumption for the drift–less dynamics (2.7) and [15, Lemma 4.1], which
guarantees that for any P ∈ P(x) and P– a.e.x ∈ X(∫ T
t
Zr ·Xr
)P
=
(∫ T
t
Zr ·Xr
)Ps,x
, s ≤ t,Ps,x– a.s.
Lemma A.2.2. Let (Pν , ν) ∈M(x). For (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X consider the system, assumed to hold Pνs,x– a.s.
∂Yrt = ∂sξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂hu(r,X, ∂Zru, νu)du −
∫ T
t
∂Zru · dXu, s ≤ t ≤ T,
Yrt = ξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
hu(r,X,Zru, νu)du −
∫ T
t
Zru · dXu, s ≤ t ≤ T.
(D)
Let (∂Y, ∂Z) ∈ Sp,2s,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,P
ν
s,x)×H
p,2
s,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,P
ν
s,x, X) be the solution to the first BSDE in (D). Then, the mapping
[0, T ] ∋ s 7−→ (∂Ys, ∂Zs) ∈ Sps,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,P
ν
s,x) × H
p
s,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,P
ν
s,x, X) is Lebesgue–integrable with antiderivative
(Y,Z), that is to say (∫ T
s
∂Yrdr,
∫ T
s
∂Zrdr
)
= (YT − Ys,ZT −Zs), Pνs,x– a.s.
Furthermore, letting
∂Y rt (ω) := E
P
ν
t,x
[
∂sξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂sfu(r,X, νu)du
]
, (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]2, ω ∈ Ω,
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it holds that ∂Y ss = E
P
ν
s,x
[
∂Yss
]
and J(s, s, x, ν) = EP
ν
s,x
[
Yss
]
. If in addition ∂Y ∈ Sp,2x (F
X,Pνs,x
+ ), for any t ∈ [s, T ]
EP
ν
s,x
[∫ T
t
∂Y rr dr
]
= EP
ν
s,x
[ ∫ T
t
∂Yrrdr
]
.
Proof. We first prove the second part of the statement. Note that
Yst = ξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
(
fr(s,X, νr) + br(X, νr) · σ̂⊤r Z
s
r
)
dr −
∫ T
t
Zsr · dXr, P
ν
s,x– a.s.,
= ξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
fr(s,X, νr)dr −
∫ T
t
Zsr · dXr, P
ν
s,x– a.s.
This implies
Yrt (x) = E
P
ν
s,x
[
ξ(r,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
fu(r,X, νu)du
∣∣∣∣FX,Pνs,xt+
]
.
Therefore, by taking expectation
EP
ν
s,x
[
Yss (ω)
]
= EP
ν
s,x
[
ξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
s
fr(s,X, νr)dr
]
= J(s, s, x, ν).
The equality ∂Y ss = ∂Y
s
s , is argued identically. Now, to obtain the last equality we use the fact that ∂Y ∈
Sp,2s,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,P
ν
s,x). Indeed, the continuity of the mapping s 7−→ (∂Y
s, ∂Zs) guarantees the integral is well–defined.
The equality follows from the tower property.
We now argue the first part of the statement. Again, we know the mapping [0, T ] ∋ s 7−→ (∂Ys, ∂Zs) is continuous,
in particular integrable. A formal integration with respect to s to the first equation in (D) leads to∫ T
s
∂Yst ds =
∫ T
s
∂sξ(s,X·∧T )ds+
∫ T
t
∫ T
s
∂fr
∂s
(s,X, νr)ds+ br(X, νr) · σ̂⊤r
∫ T
s
∂Zsrdsdr −
∫ T
t
∫ T
s
∂Zsrds · dXr.
Therefore, a natural candidate for solution to the second BSDE in (D) is (Ys,Zs,N s), solution of the BSDE
Yst = ξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
(
fr(s,X, νr) + br(X, νr) · σ̂
⊤
r Z
s
r
)
dr −
∫ T
t
Zsr · dXr.
Let (Πℓ)ℓ be a properly chosen sequence of partitions of [s, T ], as in [77, Theorem 1], Πℓ = (si)i=1,...,nℓ with ‖Π
ℓ‖ ≤ ℓ.
Recall ∆sℓi = s
ℓ
i − s
ℓ
i−1. For a generic family process X ∈ H
p,2
s,x(G), and mappings s 7−→ ∂sξ(s, x), s 7−→ ∂sf(s, x, a)
for (s, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]×X ×A we define
Iℓ(X) :=
nℓ∑
i=0
∆sℓiX
sℓi , δX := XT −Xs, Iℓ(∂sξ(·, x)) :=
n∑
i=0
∆sℓi∂sξ(s
ℓ
i , x), I
ℓ(∂sf)t(·, x, a) :=
nℓ∑
i=0
∆sℓi∂sft(s
ℓ
i , x, a),
and notice that for any t ∈ [0, T ]
Iℓ(∂Y )t − (δY )t = I
ℓ(∂sξ(·, X·∧T ))− (ξ(T,X·∧T )− ξ(s,X·∧T ))−
∫ T
t
(
Iℓ(∂Z)r − (δZ)r
)
· dXr∫ T
t
[
Iℓ(∂sf)r(·, X, νr))− (fr(T,X, νr)− fr(s,X, νr)] + σ̂rbr(X, ν)[Iℓ(∂Z)r − (δZ)r]dr.
Thanks to the integrability of (∂Y, ∂Z) and (Y, Z), it follows that Iℓ(∂Y )− (δY ) ∈ Hp,2s,x and similarly for ∂Z and Z.
Therefore, [10, Theorem 2.2] yields
‖Iℓ(∂Y )− (δY )‖p
H
p,2
s,x
+ ‖Iℓ(∂Z)− (δZ)‖p
H
p,2
s,x
≤ EP
ν
s,x
[∣∣∣Iℓ(∂sξ(·, X·∧T ))− (ξ(T,X·∧T )− ξ(s,X·∧T ))∣∣∣p
+
∫ T
t
∣∣∣Iℓ(∂sf)r(·, X, νr))− (fr(T,X, νr)− fr(s,X, νr))∣∣∣pdr
]
.
The uniform continuity of s 7−→ ∂sξ(s, x) and s 7−→ ∂sf(s, x, a), see Assumption C, justifies, via bounded convergence,
the convergence in Sps,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,P
ν
s,x) (resp H
p
s,x) of I
ℓ(∂Y s) to Y T − Y s (resp Iℓ(∂Zs) to ZT − Zs) as ℓ −→ 0.
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Lemma A.2.3. Let (Pν , ν) ∈M(x), (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X and (∂Y, ∂Z) and (Y,Z) as in (D). Then
Ytt = Y
T
T +
∫ T
t
hr(r,X,Z
r
r , νr)− ∂Y
t
tdr −
∫ T
t
Zrr · dXr, s˜ ≤ t ≤ T, Ps,x– a.s. (A.5)
Proof. By evaluating ∂Y at r = t in (D) we get
∂Ytt = ∂sξ(t,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂hr(t,X, ∂Z
t
r, νr)−
∫ T
t
∂Ztr · dXr, P
s
x– a.s.
We will show that for s ≤ t ≤ T , Ps,x − a.s.
ξ(T,X·∧T )− ξ(t,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
hr(r,X,Z
r
r , νr)dr −
∫ T
t
ZrrdXr =
∫ T
t
hr(t,X,Z
t
r, νr)dr −
∫ T
t
Ztr · dXr +
∫ T
t
∂Yrrdr
Indeed, ∫ T
t
∂Yrdr =
∫ T
t
∂sξ(r,X·∧T )dr +
∫ T
t
∫ T
r
∂hu(r,X, ∂Zru, νu)du dr −
∫ T
t
∫ T
r
∂Zru · dXu dr.
Now, Assumption C.(ii) and ∂Z ∈ Hp,2s,x(F
X,Pνs,x
+ ,P
ν
s,x, X) yield∫ T
t
∫ T
r
∂hu(r,X, ∂Zru, νu)du dr =
∫ T
t
∫ u
t
[
∂sfu(r,X, νu) + σ̂ubu(X, νu) · ∂Zru
]
dr du
=
∫ T
t
[
hu(u,X,Zuu , νu)− hu(t,X,Z
t
u, νu)
]
du
Moreover, ‖∂Z‖Hp,2
s˜,x
(X) < +∞ guarantees
∫ T
0 E
Pνs,x
[ ∫ T
0
∣∣σ̂tZrt ∣∣2dt] p2 dr < +∞ so a stochastic Fubini’s Theorem, see
Da Prato and Zabczyk [18, Section I.4.5], justifies∫ T
t
∫ T
r
∂Zsu · dXudr =
∫ T
t
[Zuu − Z
t
u] · dXu, P
ν
s,x − a.s.
A.3 Well–posedness
Throughout this section we work under the setting of Section 3.6 but with a slightly more general BSDE system.
More precisely we consider the following maps
gˆ :[0, T ]× [0, T ]×X × R× Rd × R −→ R, ∂g : [0, T ]× [0, T ]×X × R× Rd −→ R,
ξ :[0, T ]×X −→ R, ∂ξ : [0, T ]×X −→ R,
(A.6)
which are all assumed to be jointly Borel measurable. We also define for any t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ X , (y, z, u, v) ∈
R× Rd × R× Rd, g(t, x, y, z, u) := gˆt(t, x, y, z, u). We will work under the following assumptions.
Assumption G. (i) The map s 7−→ gˆt(s, x, y, z, u) (resp. s 7−→ ∂gt(s, x, u, v, y, a)) is continuous, uniformly in
(t, x, y, u) (resp. in (t, x, u, v, y, z));
(ii) the map (y, z, u) 7−→ gt(x, y, z, u) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, i.e. ∃Lg > 0, s.t. ∀(t, x, y, y′, z, z′, u, u′),
|gt(x, y, z, u)− gt(x, y′, z′, u′)| ≤ Ly
(
|y − y′|+ |σt(x)⊤(z − z′)|+ |u− u′|
)
;
(iii) the map (u, v, y, z) 7−→ ∂gt(s, x, u, v, y, z) is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, that is to say that there exists
L∂g > 0, s.t. ∀(s, t, x, u, u′, v, v′, y, y′, z, z′)
|∂gt(s, x, u, v, y, z)− ∂gt(s, x, u′, v′, y, z)| ≤ L∂g
(
|u− u′|+ |σt(x)⊤(v − v′)|+ |y − y′|+ |σt(x)⊤(z − z′)|
)
;
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(iv) (s, t, x, y, z, u) 7−→ g˜t := gt(x, 0, 0, 0) and (s, t, x) 7−→ ∂g˜st := ∂gt(s, x, 0, 0, 0, 0) are well defined processes in
H2
x
(FX ,P) and H2,2x (FX ,P), respectively.
For (ξ, ∂ξ) ∈ L2(FXT ,P)× L
2,2(FXT ,P) consider the system
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
gr(X,Yr,Zr,Urr )dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr −
∫ T
t
dNr, t ∈ [0, T ],
Ust = ∂ξ(s,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
∂gr(s,X,Usr ,V
s
r ,Yr,Zr)dr −
∫ T
t
Vsr · dXr −
∫ T
t
dMsr, (s, t) ∈ [0, T ]
2.
(S)
with (Y,Z,N ,U ,V ,M) ∈ H2
x
(FX,P+ ,P)×H
2
x
(FX,P+ , X,P)×M
2
x
(FX,P+ ,P)×H
2,1
x (F
X,P
+ ,P)×H
2,2
x (F
X,P
+ , X,P)×M
2,2
x (Rd,P).
A.3.1 A priori estimates and regularity properties
In order to alleviate notations, and as it is standard in the literature, we suppress the dependence on ω, i.e. on
X in the functions. In this section, we fix x ∈ X and an arbitrary probability measure P ∈ P(x). To ease the
notation we will write H2 for H2
x
(FX,P+ ,P) and similarly for the other spaces involved. We remove the dependence of
the expectation operator on the underlying measure, and write E instead of EP. Throughout this section, we define
H := H2 ×H2 ×M2 ×H2,1 ×H2,2 ×M2,2.
To obtain estimates between the the difference of solutions, it is more convenient to work with norms defined by
adding exponential weights. For instance, for any c ∈ R, we define the norm ‖ · ‖H2,c by
‖U‖2H2c = E
[ ∫ T
0
ect|σ⊤t U
s
t |
2dt
]
.
We recall such norms are equivalent for different values of c, since [0, T ] is compact. We also recall the inequality
( n∑
i=1
ai
)2
≤ n
n∑
i=1
a2i , (A.7)
valid for any positive integer n and any collection (ai)1≤i≤n of non–negative numbers.
Lemma A.3.1. Let (Y,Z,N ,U ,V ,M) ∈ H be a solution to (S). Then (Y,U) ∈ S2×S2,2. Furthermore there exists
a constant C > 0 depending only on the data of the problem such that if we define ‖(Y, Z,N,U , V,M)‖2 :=
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Yt|
2 +
∫ T
0
|σ⊤t Zt|
2dt+
∫ T
0
ecr−d[N ]r
]
+ sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Ust |
2 +
∫ T
0
|σ⊤t ∂Z
s
t |
2dt+
∫ T
0
ecr−d[Ms]r
]
,
then
‖(Y, Z,N,U , V,M)‖2 ≤ C E
[
|ξ(T )|2 +
∫ T
0
|g˜t|
2dt
]
+ sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[
|∂ξ(s)|2 +
∫ T
0
|∂g˜t(s)|2dt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I20
<∞.
Proof. We proceed in several steps.
Step 1: Let s ∈ [0, T ], we first show that (Y,U) ∈ S2 × S2,2. Indeed note that under the Lipschitz condition
|∂gr(s,Usr , σ
⊤
r V
s
r ,Yr,Zr))| ≤ |∂g˜(s)|+ L∂g
(
|Usr |+ |σ
⊤
r V
s
r |+ |Yr|+ |σ
⊤
r Zr|
)
,
and together with (A.7) we obtain that there exists C > 0, which may change value from line to line, such that
|Ust |
2 ≤ C
(
∂ξ2(s) +
∫ T
0
(
|∂g˜r(s)|2 + |Usr |
2 + |σ⊤r V
s
r |
2 + |Yr|2 + |σ⊤r Zr|
2
)
dr +
(∫ T
t
Vsr · dXr
)2
+
(∫ T
t
dMsr
)2)
.
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We note that by Doob’s inequality
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
(∫ t
0
Vsr · dXr
)2 ]
≤ 4‖Vs‖2H2
x
, (A.8)
so it is a uniformly integrable martingale. Taking supremum over t and expectation we obtain
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Ust |
2
]
≤ C
(
‖∂ξ(s)‖2L2 + ‖∂g˜(s)‖
2
H2 + ‖U
s‖2H2 + ‖V‖
2
H2 + ‖Y‖
2
H2 + ‖Z‖
2
H2 + ‖M
s‖2M2
)
<∞. (A.9)
Given (∂ξ, ∂g˜) ∈ L2,2×H2,2 and (U ,V ,M) ∈ H2,1×H2,2×M2,2, the map ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (S2, ‖ ·‖S2) : s 7−→ Us
in continuous. As s ∈ [0, T ], ‖U‖S2,2 < +∞ and consequently U ∈ S2,2. Similarly, we obtain
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Yt|
2
]
≤ C
(
‖ξ(T )‖2L2 + ‖g˜‖
2
H2 + ‖Y‖
2
H2 + ‖Z‖
2
H2 + ‖U‖
2
H21
+ ‖N‖2M2
)
<∞. (A.10)
Step 2: To obtain the estimate of the norm note that by applying Ito¯’s formula to ect
(
|Yt|2 + |Ust |
2
)
we obtain,
P–a.s.
ect|Yt|2 + ect|Ust |
2 +
∫ T
t
ecr|σ⊤r Zr|
2dr +
∫ T
t
ecr|σ⊤r V
s
r |
2dr +
∫ T
t
ecr−d[N ]r +
∫ T
t
ecr−d[Ms]r
= ecT (|ξ(T )|2 + |∂ξ(s)|2) + 2
∫ T
t
ecr(Yrgr(s,Yr,Zr,Urr )− c|Yr|
2 + Usr∂gr(s,U
s
r ,V
s
r ,Yr,Zr)− c|U
s
r |
2)dr +MT −Mt,
where we use the orthogonality of X and both Ms and N , and introduced the notation
Mt := 2
∫ t
0
ecrYrZr · dXr + 2
∫ t
0
ecr−Yr− · dNr + 2
∫ t
0
ecrUsrVr · dXr + 2
∫ t
0
ecr−Usr− · dM
s
r.
We insist on the fact that the integrals with respect to both N and Ms account for possible jumps, see [50, Lemma
4.24]. Moreover, the Lipschitz assumption together with the inequality 2ab ≤ εa2 + ε−1b2 for ε > 0 yield that the
left–hand side above is smaller than
≤ ecT |ξ(T )|2 + ecT |∂ξ(s)|2 +
∫ T
0
ecr
(
C1|Yr |
2 + C2|Usr |
2 + |g˜r|2 + |∂g˜r(s)|2 +
1
2
|σ⊤r Zr|
2 +
1
2
|σ⊤r V
s
r |
2
+
1
2
|Urr |
2 − c|Yr|
2 − c|Usr |
2
)
dr +MT −Mt,
where the constants C1 and C2 changed appropriately. As in (A.8), the Burkholder–Davis–Gundy inequality in
combination with the fact that both Y and Us are in S2 shows that M is a true martingale. Therefore, letting
c ≥ max{C1, C2}, the monotonicity of the integral yields
E
[
ect|Yt|
2 + ect|Ust |
2 +
1
2
∫ T
0
(
|Urr |
2 + |σ⊤r Zr|
2 + |σ⊤r V
s
r |
2
)
dr +
∫ T
t
ecr−
(
d[N ]r + d[M
s]r
)]
≤ E
[
ecT |ξ(T )|2 + ecT |∂ξ(s)|2 +
∫ T
0
ecr
(
|g˜r|
2 + |∂g˜r(s)|2
)
dr
]
.
(A.11)
Therefore, taking sup over s in (A.11) in combination with (A.9) and (A.10) we obtain the result.
Lemma A.3.2. Let (ξi, ∂ξi) ∈ L2×L2,2 and (gi, ∂gi) for i ∈ {1, 2} satisfy Assumption G and suppose in addition that
(Yi,Zi,N i,U i,V i,Mi) ∈ H are solutions to the system (S) with coefficients (ξi, gi, ∂ξi, ∂gi), i ∈ {1, 2} respectively.
Then
‖(δY, δZ, δN , δU , δV , δM)‖2 ≤ C
(
E
[∣∣δξ∣∣2 + ∫ T
0
∣∣δgt(Y1r , Z1t , U1tt )∣∣2dt
]
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+ sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[∣∣δ∂ξ(s)∣∣2 + ∫ T
0
∣∣δ∂gt(s,U1st ,V1st ,Y1t ,Z1t ))∣∣2dt
])
where for ϕ ∈ {Y,Z,N ,U ,V ,M, ξ}
δϕ1 := ϕ1 − ϕ2, and δgt(Y1r , Z
1
t , U
1t
t ) := g
1
t (Y
1
r , Z
1
t , U
1t
t )− g
2
t (Y
1
r , Z
1
t , U
1t
t ), t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Note that by the Lipschitz assumption on g and ∂g together with the boundedness of b we know there exists
bounded processes (αi, βi, γi), i ∈ {1, 2} and ε2 such that
δYt = δξ(T ) +
∫ T
t
(
δgr(Y1r ,Z
1
r ,U
1r
r ) + γ
1
t δYr + α
1
t · σ
⊤
t δZt + β
1
t δU
t
t
)
dr −
∫ T
t
δZr · dXr −
∫ T
t
δdNr,
δUst = δ∂ξ(s) +
∫ T
t
(
δ∂gr(s,U1sr ,V
1s
r ,Y
1
r ,Z
1
r ) + β
2
t δU
s
r + ε
2
t · σ
⊤
t δV
s
t + γ
2
t δYr + α
2
t · σ
⊤
t δZr
)
dr
−
∫ T
t
δ∂Zsr · dXr −
∫ T
t
δdMsr.
We can therefore apply Lemma A.3.1 and the result follows.
A.3.2 General well–posedness
Theorem A.3.1. Let Assumption (G) hold. Then (S) admits a unique solution in H .
Before we present the proof we recall that in light of Lemma A.3.1 and Lemma A.3.2 once Theorem A.3.1 is proved
the existence of a unique solution in S2 ×H2 ×M2 × S2,2 ×H2,2 ×M2,2 follows immediately.
Proof. We first note that uniqueness follows from Lemma A.3.2. To show existence, let us define the map
T : H −→ H
(y, z, n, u, v,m) 7−→ (Y,Z,N ,U ,V ,M),
with (Y,Z,N ,U ,V ,M) given by
Yt = ξ(T,X·∧T ) +
∫ T
t
gr(X, yr, zr, urr)dr −
∫ T
t
Zr · dXr −
∫ T
t
dNr,
Ust = ∂ξ(s,X·∧,T ) +
∫ T
t
∂gr(s,X, usr, v
s
r , yr, zr)dr −
∫ T
t
Vsr · dXr −
∫ T
t
dMsr.
Step 1: We first show T is well defined. Let (y, z, n, u, v,m) ∈ H .
(i) For the tuple (Y,Z,N ), notice that
Y˜t := E
[
ξ(T ) +
∫ T
0
gr(yr, zr, u
r
r)dr
∣∣∣FX,Pt+
]
, is a square integrable F–martingale.
Indeed, under Assumption G, g is uniformly Lipschitz in z so we obtain
E
[
|Y˜t|
2
]
≤ 2
(
‖ξ(T )‖2L2 + C
(
1 + ‖y‖2H2 + ‖z‖
2
H2 + ‖u‖
2
H2,1
))
<∞, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
Integrating the above expression, Fubini’s theorem implies that Y˜ ∈ H2, thus the martingale representation
property, see [50, Theorem 4.29], guarantees the existence of a unique F–predictable process Z ∈ H2 and an
orthogonal martingale N ∈ M2 such that (Y,Z,N ) satisfies the correct dynamics, where
Y := Y˜ − E
[ ∫ t
0
gr(yr, zr, u
r
r)dr
]
,
Furthermore, Doob’s inequality implies Y ∈ S2.
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(ii) Similarly, for the pair (U ,V ,M) we first recall that for all s
Ust = E
[
∂ξ(s) +
∫ T
t
∂gr(s, usr, v
s
r , yr, zr)dr
∣∣∣FX,Pt+
]
.
Let us argue the continuity of ([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (H2, ‖ · ‖H2) : s 7−→ Us. Let (sn)n ⊆ [0, T ], sn −→
n→∞
s0 ∈ [0, T ]
and define for ϕ ∈ {U ,V , u, v, ∂ξ}, ∆ϕn := ϕsn − ϕs0 . From the previous observation we have that
|∆Unt |
2 ≤ 2E
[
|∆∂ξn|2 +
∫ T
0
∣∣∂gr(sn, usnr , vsnr , yr, zr)− ∂gr(s0, us0r , vs0r , yr, zr)∣∣2dr∣∣∣FX,Pt+
]
.
Therefore, the result follows from
E
[ ∫ T
0
|∆Unt |
2dr
]
≤ 2T
(
‖∆∂ξn‖2L2 + C
(
ρ2∂g(|sn − s0|) + ‖∆u
n‖2H2 + ‖∆v
n‖2H2
))
.
Now we show ‖U‖H2,1 <∞. Recall by definition the H2,1 norm has two terms. To control first one, note that for
s ∈ [0, T ]
U˜st := E
[
∂ξ(s) +
∫ T
0
∂gr(s, usr, v
s
r , yr, zr)dr
∣∣∣FX,Pt+
]
, is a square integrable F–martingale.
since
E
[
|U˜st |
2
]
≤ 2
(
‖∂ξ(s)‖2L2 + C
(
1 + ‖u‖2H2,1 + ‖v‖
2
H2,2 + ‖y‖
2
H2 + ‖z‖
2
H2
))
<∞, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Now as Ust = U˜
s
t − E
[ ∫ t
0 gˆr(s, v
s
r , νr(zr))dr
]
, we get the estimate
sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[ ∫ T
0
|Ust |
2dt
]
≤ 2T
(
‖∂ξ‖2L2,2 + C
(
1 + ‖u‖2H2,1 + ‖v‖
2
H2,2 + ‖y‖
2
H2 + ‖z‖
2
H2
))
<∞.
To control the second term in the H2,1 norm note that
E
[ ∫ T
0
|U tt |
2dt
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
0
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Ust |
2ds
]
,
therefore, the continuity of s 7−→ E[supt∈[0,T ] |U
s
t |
2
]
would yield the result. Let (sn)n ⊆ [0, T ], sn −→
n→∞
s0 ∈ [0, T ]
and use Doob’s inequality on U to obtain
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Unt |
2
]
≤ C
(
‖∆∂ξn‖2L2 + ρ
2
∂g(|sn − s0|) + ‖∆u
n‖2H2 + ‖∆v
n‖2H2
)
, (A.12)
which implies the continuity of s 7−→ E[supt∈[0,T ] |U
s
t |
2
]
and, as a byproduct, that Us ∈ S2 for all s. We conclude
‖U‖H2,1 < +∞ and U ∈ H2,1. Consequently, the martingale representation property guarantees the existence for
any s ∈ [0, T ] of F–predictable processes (Vs,Ms) ∈ H2 ×M2 with the desired dynamics.
We now show that (V ,M) ∈ H2,2 ×M2,2. Applying Ito¯’s formula to |Usr |
2 we obtain
|Ust |
2 +
∫ T
t
|σ⊤r V
s
r |
2dr +
∫ T
t
d[Ms]r = |∂ξ(s)|2 + 2
∫ T
t
Usr∂gr(s, u
s
r, v
s
r , yr, zr)dr − 2
∫ T
t
UsrV
s
r · dXr
− 2
∫ T
t
Usr− · dM
s
r.
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First note Us ∈ S2,2 guarantees that the last two terms are true martingale for any s ∈ [0, T ]. To show
([0, T ],B([0, T ])) −→ (H2, ‖ · ‖H2) : s 7−→ Vs is continuous, let (sn)n ⊆ [0, T ], sn −→
n→∞
s0 ∈ [0, T ]. With (A.12), we
obtain
E
[ ∫ T
0
|σ⊤r ∆V
n
r |
2dr + [∆Ms]T
]
≤ C
(
‖∆∂ξ‖2L2 + ρ
2
∂g(|sn − s0|) + ‖∆u
n‖2H2 + ‖∆v
n‖2H2
)
.
Likewise, we also obtain
sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[ ∫ T
0
|σ⊤r V
s
r |
2dr + [Ms]T
]
≤ C
(
‖∂ξ‖2L2,2 + ‖∂g˜‖
2
H2,2 + ‖v‖
2
H2,2 + ‖U‖
2
H2,1
)
<∞.
Since the first term on the right–hand side is finite from Assumption G, we obtain ‖V‖H2,2 + ‖M‖M2,2 < ∞. All
together, we have shown that φ(y, z, n, u, v,m) ∈ H .
Step 2: We now show that T is a contraction under the equivalent norms ‖·‖H2,c· . Let (y
i, zi, ni, ui, vi,mi)i=1,2 ∈ H .
(i) Applying Ito¯’s formula to ecr|δYr|2, noting that δYT = 0 and we obtain
ect|δYt|2 +
∫ T
t
ecr|σ⊤r δZr|
2dr +
∫ T
t
ecr−d[δN ]r =
∫ T
t
ecr
(
2δYr
(
gr(y1r , z
1
r , u
1r
r )− gr(y
2
r , z
2
r , u
2r
r )
)
− c|δYr|
2
)
dr
− 2
∫ T
t
ecrδYrδZr · dXr − 2
∫ T
t
ecr−δYr−dδNr,
and we note that Yi ∈ S2,2 guarantees the last two terms are true martingales. Additionally the uniform Lipschitz
continuity of g in (y, z, u) guarantees
|gr(y1r , z
1
r , u
1r
r )− gr(y
2
r , z
2
r , u
2r
r )|
2 ≤ C(|∆yr |2 + |σ⊤t ∆zr|
2 + |∆urr|
2).
Taking expectation, these two observations yield that for any ε > 0
E
[
ect|δYt|2 +
∫ T
0
ecr|σ⊤r δZr|
2dr +
∫ T
t
ecr−d[δN ]r
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
0
ecr
(
2Cε−1|δYr|2 − c|δYr|2 + ε(|δyr|2 + |σ⊤r δzr|
2 + |∆urr|)
)
dr
]
Choosing ε = 2Cc−1 we get
E
[ ∫ T
0
ecr|σ⊤r δZr|
2dr +
∫ T
t
ecr−d[δN ]r
]
≤
2C
c
(
‖δy‖H2 + ‖δz‖H2 + ‖δu‖H2,1
)
E
[ ∫ T
0
ect|δYt|2dr
]
≤
2CT
c
(
‖δy‖H2 + ‖δz‖H2 + ‖δu‖H2,1
)
.
(ii) Similarly, applying Ito¯ ’s formula to ecr|δUsr |
2, we obtain
ect|δUsr |
2 +
∫ T
t
ecr|σ⊤r δV
s
r |
2dr +
∫ T
t
ecr−d[δMs]r = −2
∫ T
t
ecrδUsr δV
s
r · dXr − 2
∫ T
t
ecr−δYr−dδMsr,
+
∫ T
t
ecr
(
2δUsr
(
∂gr(s, usr
1, vsr
1, ysr
1, z1r )− ∂gr(s, u
s
r
2, vsr
2, ysr
2, z2r )
)
− c|δUsr |
2
)
dr.
Again, the fact that ∆Us ∈ S2,2 guarantees that the last two terms are true martingale for all s. Additionally, the
Lipschitz continuity of ∂g in (u, v, y, z) implies
|∂gr(s, usr
1, vsr
1, ysr
1, z1r )− ∂gr(s, u
s
r
2, vsr
2, ysr
2, z2r)|
2 ≤ C
(
|δusr|
2 + |σ⊤r δv
s
r |
2 + |δyr|2 + |σ⊤r δzr|
2
)
,
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yielding in turn for any ε > 0
E
[
ect|δUsr |
2 +
∫ T
t
ecr|σ⊤r δV
s
r |
2dr +
∫ T
t
ecr−d[δMs]r
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
0
ecr
(
2Cε−1|∆Usr |
2 − c|∆Usr |
2 + ε
(
|∆usr|
2 + |σ⊤r ∆v
s
r |
2 + |∆yr|2 + |σ⊤r ∆zr|
2
))
dr.
Choosing ε = 2Cc−1 we get
sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[ ∫ T
0
ecr|σ⊤r δV
s
r |
2dr +
∫ T
t
ecr−d[δMs]r
]
≤
2C
c
(
‖δu‖H2,1 + ‖δv‖H2,2 + ‖δy‖H2 + ‖δz‖H2
)
,
sup
s∈[0,T ]
E
[ ∫ T
0
ect|δUsr |
2dr
]
≤
2CT
c
(
‖δu‖H2,1 + ‖δv‖H2,2 + ‖δy‖H2 + ‖δz‖H2
)
.
We conclude T has a fixed point as it is a contraction for c large enough.
A.4 Auxiliary lemmata
To being with we present a result that justifies our choice of the class A(t, x) in our definition of equilibrium.
Lemma A.4.1. Let τ ∈ Tt,T , ν ∈ A(x) and ν˜ ∈ A(t, x). Then, Pν⊗τ ν˜ = Pν ⊗τ Pν˜τ,·, ν ⊗τ ν˜ ∈ A(t, x), A(t, x, τ) =
A(t, x).
Proof. The later two results follows from the first. Let ν˜ ∈ A(t, x), we claim that Pν ⊗τ Pν˜τ,X is well defined
and solves the martingale problem associated with ν ⊗τ ν⋆. Indeed, by [74, Exercise 6.7.4, Theorem 6.2.2] we
have that ω 7−→ Pν
⋆
τ(ω),X(τ(ω),ω)[A] is Fτ−measurable for any A ∈ F , and P
ν⋆
τ(ω),X(τ(ω),ω)[Ω
ω
τ ] = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Therefore, Theorem 2.1 guarantees Pν ⊗τ(·) Pν˜τ(·),X(·) is well defined and P
ν ⊗τ(·) P
ν
τ(·),X(·) equals P
ν on Fτ and
(δω⊗τ(ω) Pν
⋆
τ(ω),x)ω∈Ω is an r.c.p.d. of P
ν ⊗τ Pντ,X given Fτ . In combination with [74, Theorem 1.2.10] this yields M
ϕ
is a (F,Pν ⊗τ Pν,τ,X)−local martingale on [t, T ] with control ν ⊗τ ν⋆.
Lemma A.4.2. Given (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , τ ∈ Tt,T , (M, M˜) ∈M(t, x)×M(t, x) such that ν ⊗τ ν˜ ∈ A(t, x,P). Then
P
ν
⊗τ P
ν˜
τ,· = P
ν⊗τ ν˜
Proof. This follows from Lemma A.4.1 and the fact we can commute changes of measure and concatenation.
Lemma A.4.3. For ℓ > 0 let (γℓi )i∈[nℓ] be sample points as in Theorem 3.2. (γˆ
ℓ
i )i∈[nℓ] are stopping times.
Proof. We study (γˆℓi )i∈[nℓ] as the argument for the other sequences in the proof is similar. The result follows from
a direct application of Galmarino’s Theorem, see [19, C. iv. 99-101], we recall it next for completeness: Let ̺ be
FT –measurable function with values in [0, T ]. ̺ is a stopping time if and only if for every t ∈ [0, T ] we have that
̺(ω) ≤ t, (Xr,Wr,∆r[ϕ])(ω) = (Xr,Wr,∆r[ϕ])(ω˜) for all (r, ϕ) ∈ [0, t]× Cb([0, T ]×A) implies ̺(ω) = ̺(ω˜).
Now, in the context of Theorem 3.2 we are given Πℓ = (τ ℓi )i∈[nℓ] a collection of stopping times that partitions the
interval [σ, τ ] ⊆ [0, T ]. As ℓ > 0 is fixed we drop the dependence of the partition on ℓ and write Π = (τi)i∈[n].
Without lost of generality we consider the case of a partition of [0, T ]. For ω ∈ Ω we can use [77, Theorem 1] to
obtain a sequence of sample points (̺i(ω))i∈[n] of the intervals prescribed by Π, i.e. ̺i(ω) ∈ [τi−1(ω), τi(ω)] for all i.
We want to show ̺i ∈ T0,T for all i.
A close inspection to the proof of [78, Theorem 1] allows us to see that for fixed ω ∈ Ω the choice of ̺i(ω) depends
solely on [τi−1(ω), τi(ω)] and the application t 7−→ ft(t, x, a) for (t, x, a) ∈ [0, T ] × X × A. We recall that as the
supremum is taken over Apw(t, x) the action process is a fix value a ∈ A over the interval [τi−1, τi]. We first note
that for ω˜ ∈ Ω as above the fact that Π ⊂ T0,T , i.e. {τi ≤ t} ∈ Ft, implies Π(ω˜) = Π(ω). Next, we observe that
ft(t,X, νi)(ω) = ft(t, x·∧t, a) = ft(t,X, νi)(ω˜) as is ft(s, x, a) is optional for every (s, a) ∈ [0, T ]×A. These two facts
imply ̺i(ω) = ̺i(ω˜) and the result follows.
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